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Constitutional Rhetoric: The Genre Performance of the Written Constitution in 
Transnational, Transcultural Contexts        
     Bhushan Aryal 
A new kind of project within the broad field of writing studies, this dissertation studies 
the written constitution as a genre from the lens of rhetorical genre studies, for which it uses the 
constitutions of the United States, Cherokee Nation, and Nepal as sample cases because of their 
historical and cultural differences. Analyzing why and how the genre originated in the United 
States in the eighteenth-century, and how it was used in the two other contexts subsequently, the 
study demonstrates the double dynamics in the use of the genre: while the genre modifies genre-
receiving contexts by its ideological/functional structures, the adopters also appropriate it to 
achieve their needs. That the degree—not the kind—of that double dynamics differs from one 
rhetorical context to another, and that knowing that degree of a particular genre use requires a 
careful observation of the associated players, historical context, and texts is the central 
demonstration of this dissertation. For instance, the Cherokee Nation in 1827 adopted the U.S.-
modelled constitution to resist their removal, but, in the process, they redefined the tribe’s nature 
of government and sovereignty. In the context of the United States in 1780s, the genre served as 
the defining conduit for the republicanism’s transition from I call “subjective republicanism” to a 
pragmatic form of governance. The analysis of the actors’ motivations involved in the seven 
constitutions of Nepal demonstrates that the hegemonic global ascendency of the written 
constitution in the twentieth-century required even traditional rulers to adopt the genre so that 
they can legitimize their rule within the country and receive recognition from international 
community, although they did not have the interest to observe the idealistic view of 
constitutionalism embedded in the genre’s ‘original’ disposition. Nepal’s constitutional history 
also suggests that the question of what counts as the legitimate author of a constitution could be a 
conflicting factor between the forces of tradition and modernity in a culture with a different form 
of legitimization for its legal codes. Cumulatively, this comparative study of the transnational, 
transcultural, and tranlingual application of the written constitution in a broad historical context 
spanning two centuries shows two major tendencies: One the one hand, the genre mobilizes an 
idealistic democratic aspiration for the rule of law designed by collective human sovereignty. On 
the other hand, the genre gets utilized for arbitrary rules because of its power of legitimization. 
But the genre falls under higher strain when the deeper contention arises because the idealistic 
applications themselves cannot decide on the definitions of the master tropes of modernity such 
as equity, democracy, and constitutional authorship.       
 This study’s significance lies at two levels. First, while scholars, including rhetoric and 
composition specialists, have researched and commented on the U.S. Constitution and other 
constitutions, this dissertation is the first substantial study of the written constitution from 
rhetorical genre perspective. Thus, the project offers rhetoric and writing scholars with the new 
cases not only demonstrating the power of genre studies to define larger national narratives, but 
also illustrating complexities of high-stake, large-scale, public collaborative writing projects. At 
the second level, the project also is in dialogue with the existing scholarship in the contexts of 
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Constitutional Rhetoric: The Genre Performances of the Written Constitution in 
Transnational, Transnational Contexts (The Cases of the United States, Cherokee Nation, 
and Nepal) 
Chapter 1: The Rhetoric of the Written Constitution: Genre, Authorship and Sovereignty 
 The written constitution is perhaps the most powerful genre in the modern, secular world. 
It rests at the zenith of many globally hegemonic concepts such as nation-state, democracy, and 
sovereignty. While secular and rational in its aspiration, the written constitution is comparable to 
religious texts such as the Bible in its formidable community-constituting and faith-generating 
capacity.1 Borrowing the word “miracle” from Catherine Drinker Bowen that she uses to 
characterize the 1787 Philadelphia Constitutional Convention and its subsequent formative 
impact in the United States and the rest of the world, the constitution as a genre has miraculous 
transformative power.2 Empires certainly existed in the past, and rulers issued laws, but the kind 
of participatory large-scale nation-states dominating the contemporary world  would not have 
materialized without the written constitution—a genre claiming to be the law of laws.  
 One important aspect of studying the constitution as a genre is to treat it as a species, 
something that Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg and James Melton do in their project reported in 
the book The Endurance of National Constitutions. They gather 935 national constitutions 
written between 1787 and 2005 in their archive, note the operational life of each constitution, 
and analyze the constitutions to identify the design factors contributing to the longevity/mortality 
of the documents. Given the short life span of most constitutions (19 years on average, as they 
                                                          
1 See constitutional scholar President Barack Obama’s farewell speech delivered on January 10, 
2017 for the connection. The speech demonstrates the similarity in priestly sermons and 
ceremonial presidential addresses not only in terms of the style of delivery but also in terms of 
the moral imperative of following the original creeds (Christian in sermons; liberty, self-
governance, and national solidarity in presidential speeches) involved in them.  
2 Bowen uses the word “miracle” to describe the 1787 Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia. 
Certainly, she does not use the word to expound the power of the genre that the convention and 
ratification process experimented for the first time at national level. “Miracle” for Bowen rested 





report), and the recent phenomenon of many countries writing new constitutions, they want to 
discover the underlying pattern of long-serving constitutions so that the discovered deep 
grammar can be transplanted in the unstable places of the world.3 While they do not deny the 
role of environmental factors, they claim that “design factors” such as “constitutional flexibility, 
the inclusiveness of the constitution, and the level of detail and scope of coverage in the 
constitutions” significantly determine the life span of a constitution (2, 8). Undoubtedly, their 
project is valuable for any comparative study of constitutions, but their focus on finding textual 
pattern has undermined the role of context; the written constitution emerges as a species, but 
their decontextualized approach has stripped the constitutions of their rhetorical dimension. 
Instead of studying specific performances of a constitution in a rhetorically active context, their 
effort concentrates on finding the essence of the so-called best constitutional texts. They 
approach their study as structuralists rather than as rhetorical genre analysts.     
 Certainly, Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton have not claimed to be genre theorists. 
Nevertheless, even the most dominant genre approach to the constitution has been to characterize 
a constitutional text in relation to literary genres as if only literary forms have the distinction and 
prestige of being genres. For instance, Ulrich Schmid finds four different Russian constitutions 
reflective of “drama, fairy tale, gospel, [and] performance” in their forms (“Constitution and 
Narrative” 431). In another study, he presents the 1814 Norwegian Constitution as poetry (“The 
Norwegian” 78-79). An exception in this regard is Karen Gammelgaard’s book chapter: While 
she still focuses on textual features of four nineteenth-century European constitutions 
substantially, she borrows from the genre theorist Carolyn Miller in her attempts to find the 
                                                          
3 The Longevity of national constitution is mostly a desired attribute, although Thomas Jefferson 
at one point in 1789 thought that each generation should write its own constitution in every 19 





functions of the constitution as a genre. Based on those textual characteristics and the political 
implications of those textual features, Gammelgaard discovers recurring recognizable “discursive 
patterns” in the constitutions, presenting it as evidence of the constitution as a “transnational 
genre” (106).            
 In this scholarly context, where the written constitution has not been studied substantially 
from rhetorical genre perspective, I ask the following questions: why and how did the written 
constitution emerge in the United States in the eighteenth-century? What functions did it perform 
for the founding generation? Does the foregrounding of the Constitution as a genre enlighten us 
with new insight about the role of the word in the foundation of the United States? How has the 
genre performed in non-western contexts with the written constitution’s hegemonic global 
ascendency in the subsequent centuries? What can the writing teachers understand about the 
dynamics of large, public collaborative writing projects from the constitution writing processes 
of some of the countries analyzed in this dissertation?       
 What I am trying to do in this dissertation is to study the written constitution as a species, 
but not as a decontextualized, rhetoric-free essentialized form; as a genre performing particular 
functions, but not exactly as the manifestations of grand motives represented by literary forms; 
as a pliable text type embodying certain ideological imprints, yet not as the fixed ideology 
restricting its uptakers to employ it for their own purposes; and, as something brought into being 
by historical forces, but also as something guiding the course of history. I’m using the noun 
‘uptakers’ above as the agents of doing “uptake” in the sense Ann Fredman has theorized. As 
Anis Bawarshi comments on Fredman’s idea, uptake of a genre is about “selecting a set of 
possibilities and not others” (“Beyond” 246). This approach is akin to what Bawarshi calls 





sentence and an utterance, where “while sentences are defined grammatically, utterances are 
defined performatively,” Bawarshi theorizes genre performances as the actual iteration of a genre 
in real time and situation (“Beyond” 244). This approach lends me an opportunity to think about 
the written constitution as a transnational genre with certain genre parameters yet with the 
variation in its uptake across time and place. Indeed, the analysis of the genre performances of 
the written constitution becomes incomplete without referring to the American experimentation 
in the late eighteenth-century because it functions as the first major yardstick in the application—
if not the origin—of the constitution as a genre.       
 Indeed, a long textual and generic history such as legal contracts, government ordinances, 
and treaties among nations propelled the birth of the written constitution. In themselves the ideas 
that that a piece of written text can be binding of human conduct and that violation of the oath in 
the text/contract is punishable are revolutionary cultural feats in human history. The ideas 
suggested that a written document can be instrumental in forging collective human subjectivity 
and in realizing large-scale communities such as the nation-state. The ideas catapulted a written 
text to the center of persuasive collaborative activities because it would function as the anchor, 
proof, and discipliner of those activities. This collective ability—or, perhaps, human fallibility to 
misrecognition and false identification with symbols as Jacques Lacan has theorized—to hold 
faith on a written text lies at the core of how the constitution and related genres function 
pragmatically.                  
  However, while it may have taken thousands of years for achieving the evolutionary 
collective human faith on the written text, the period between 1776 and 1787—as Robert 
Ferguson notes— served as a great experimentation of the written constitution across various 





to the science of written constitution, a form that would subsequently dominate the globe (137).  
Americans had certain national philosophical aspirations and historical anxieties during the 
period. For instance, they feared that their hard-fought and newfound liberty could be shallowed 
by the corrupting influence of power. As Gordon Wood has analyzed, American revolutionaries 
borrowed the classical model of virtue, which led them to think of “a republic of equal, active 
and independent citizens [where]…the loss of independence and virtue was corruption” (104). 
The written constitution for them thus was a tool to restrict the power with a set of laws so that 
the virtue in the leaders could remain intact safeguarding the liberty of the people. This vision 
necessitated the clear codification, definition, and division of power—and perpetual check-and-
balances—among the organs of the government. The practice of introducing the constitution 
would be gradually the norm in the world in the subsequent period.    
 As we can expect because of its centrality in the modern nation-states, the written 
constitution has been one of the most commented scholarly subjects, generating a plethora of 
books, articles, and conferences. However, within rhetoric and composition scholarship, the 
constitution as a genre has not attracted much attention. Among the limited studies, perhaps the 
most extended commentary comes from Kenneth Burke. He, in the last chapter of A Grammar of 
Motives, characterizes the Constitution of the United States of America as “a set of [idealistic] 
wishes more or less at odds with one another” (375). Given the impossibility of creating 
unanimous consensus, a constitution is bound to embody a variety of—and often contradictory—
wishes of its constituents for it to be an acceptable, governing document.  Burke thus calls the 
Constitution “a calculus of motives” or an “anecdote summational in character…wherein human 
relations grandly converge” (Grammar 325, 324).  He points out the unavoidability of 





public right and private duties: “A public right, for instance, ‘necessarily implies’ a private 
obligation or a private jeopardy; a private right ‘inevitably’ implies a public obligation or a 
public jeopardy” (Burke, Grammar 375). With this theorization, Burke emphasizes “the fiction 
of positive law,” an assumption that the Constitution is a coherent body of laws written in stone 
(Grammar 363). Then, for him, the question becomes, if it is a bundle of contradictory wishes, 
how does the Constitution function? Since the Constitutional text becomes prominent mostly in 
the contexts of court litigations where both litigants in question seek evidences from the text to 
justify their position (otherwise there would be no case or argument at all), what wish gets to be 
rewarded depends on the “Constitution-behind-the-Constitution”—the body of precedents and 
prevailing dominant values (Burke, Grammar 362). The Constitution for Burke thus is a living 
document—open to new constructions, and continuously rewritten by judicial interpretations. 
Expanding on Burke’s argument, Virginia Anderson reads the Constitution as a postmodern text, 
“a metonymic constellation of contingent possibilities relying on contextual interpretation for 
implementation and realization” (276). She further writes, “the Constitution is a bundle of 
incipient antitheses waiting to be highlighted rhetorically in litigation, then reconstructed 
rhetorically through paratactic reassociations (Anderson 276). While Burke and Anderson 
provide us with a rich rhetorical angle and many of their ideas are transferable to the analysis of 
other constitutions, their work primarily is on the U.S. Constitution, not on the constitution as a 
genre.              
 Conducted at a crucial historical moment when the conception of sovereignty was 
shifting from monarchy to people, the American experimentation with the written constitution 
established the idea that politics can be a game among sovereign citizens with their self-authored 





consequential performance. For instance, the written constitution may bring a country into being. 
As William Warmer and his cowriters proclaim, the constitution is “the thing that invented 
Norway” (21). If it does not reach to that extreme always, the written constitution as a 
performative genre at least reconstitutes the government and power relationship in a country.4 
 While the genre still imposes some of its ideological and procedural features from its 
earlier enunciations, with its global adoption and adaptation, the written constitution has 
performed many context-specific functions. John Swales observes, “When these [genre] 
performances proliferate, genres tend to drift through time and geographical space, partly 
inherently and partly as a result of intertextual acceptance and rejections” (14). Certainly, it is 
virtually impossible to analyze—let alone identify—all the functions performed by the 
constitutional genre.           
 In the rest of this dissertation, I read the constitutions of the United States, the Cherokee 
Nation and Nepal by placing them in their specific historical contexts with the view of what 
functions the genre performed, what purposes it served, and how the uptakers used it. My 
approach is symptomatic rather than exhaustive: instead of reading all articles in the selected 
constitutions, I highlight a few dominant functions and motivations, accentuating major 
tendencies rather than generating a definitive total narrative on the topic. About genre analysts, 
Swales writes, “The work of genre analysts is to track these textual regularities and irregularities 
and explain them in terms of relevant and pertinent social circumstances and the rhetorical 
demands they engender” (14). While I am conscious of the pitfalls of forcing texts and contexts 
                                                          
4 See Akhil Amar’s long commentary on the preamble of the U.S. Constitution (5-53). He 
emphasizes the performative function of the constitution by highlighting the democratic 
ratification process and the words in the preamble such as “do ordain and establish this 
Constitution.” The constitution for him is akin to vows, such as ‘I do’ in weddings. Also, see J.L. 
Austin’s interdisciplinarily influential, groundbreaking theorization, particularly the first chapter 





within the existing theoretical models, my approach in this dissertation certainly is that of a genre 
analyst—not least because the quest of the genre performances, as Bawarshi defines, relieves the 
analysist from any theory confirmation practices. 
1.1 Rhetorical Genres, Symbolic World, and Social Performances       
Before delving directly into the genre of the constitution, a brief compendium of 
Rhetorical Genre Studies (RGS)—the major theoretical tool of my study—is in order. While 
scholars have studied genre for centuries in a variety of contexts, Rhetorical Genre Studies 
developed in North America in the late twentieth-and early-twenty-first centuries—particularly 
in the works of K.K. Campbell, K.H. Jamieson, Carolyn Miller, Charles Bazerman, Amy Devitt, 
David Russell, and Anis Bawarshi—has transformed the idea of genre “from a descriptive to an 
explanatory activity, one that investigates not only text-types and classification systems, but also 
the linguistic, sociological, and psychological assumptions underlying and shaping these text-
types" (Bawarshi, Genre17).  The most influential shift appeared when Carolyn Miller defined 
genre as “typified rhetorical actions based in recurrent situations" (159) in her seminal 1984 
essay. By defining genres as “typified rhetorical actions,” Miller geared the genre theory from its 
traditional formal orientation to rhetorical functions, from the quest of identifying salient features 
of a genre form to the performative functions of a genre.       
 Following Miller, rhetoric and composition scholars started rethinking and redefining 
genre. One comprehensive and powerful articulation of the definition of genre comes from 
Charles Bazerman in his “The Life of Genre, the Life in the Classroom." He writes,  
Genre are not just forms. Genres are forms of life, ways of being. They are frames 
for social action. They are environments for learning. They are locations within 





communications by which we interact. Genres are the familiar places we go to 
create intelligible communicative action with each other and the guideposts we 
use to explore unfamiliar. (19)  
Certainly, genres for Bazerman are “social actions,” but they go beyond just being the moment-
based rhetorical actions. Human beings— as “symbol-using” and symbol-living animals—dwell 
in the world of meanings constructed by symbols such as language and cultural codes (Burke, 
Language 3).5 Such a state of existence requires us to understand, define, and act on social 
expectations because the symbolically constructed world is a structure made up of shared 
meanings and forms. From an individual perspective, individual actors may have an opportunity 
to modify the structure through their actions, but the symbolic world precedes the person in 
existence. Participating in that world entails learning and performing genres. Thus, as Bazerman 
defines, genres are “forms of life, ways of being”, “frames for social actions”, “environments of 
learning”, “locations within which meaning is constructed”, or the “shapes” of thoughts and 
communication.  For an individual, acting in the symbolic world—knowing what to do, where to 
do it, whether to do it, how to do it, or even why to do it—rests on his or her acculturation with 
the genres that constitute the world.  Even the sense of historical exigency emanates from the 
existence and understanding of a genre that allows the participants to think of something as an 
exigency. Bawarshi writes, "As cultural artifacts, they [genres] embody exigencies, and in using 
                                                          
5 This idea is as old as it is new. Aristotle meant it when he defined men as social animals. 
Structuralism and poststructuralism as developed in the works of Ferdinand De Saussure and 
Jacques Derrida may have differences about the nature—particularly the degree of coherence—
of symbolic system, the primacy of symbolic structure in the human world is their essence. 
When Judith Butler defined gender and sex as social performances as historically evolved and 
individually performed symbolic actions, she was deepening the prominence of symbolic 
function in human life, highlighting how even biological factors are coopted by symbolic needs 





genres, we enact and reinforce these exigencies as recognizable, meaningful, consequential 
actions" (Genre 41). Genres are not only tools of social actions; they are also equally 
determining of the need of the performance of those actions.     
 To emphasize the same point further, genres bring the things into being. For instance, the 
idea of sovereignty might have gone through certain modification in centuries as it travelled 
through various contexts and genre conventions, but it could be a conceptual being because of 
certain genres articulating it. In the modern time, it is through the written constitution and other 
related legal genres, sovereignty became a tangible workable concept regulating people’s lives 
and governments’ behavior. Genre thus is "constitutive rather than merely regulatory" (Bawarshi, 
Genre 24). Bawarshi further writes, "genre does not simply regulate a pre-existing social 
activity; instead, it constitutes the activity by making it possible by way of its ideological and 
discursive functions" (italic original, Genre 24). Genre, from this perspective, is not just a tool of 
social actions, but constitutive of actions themselves.     
 Theorizing this way, as the structure shaping human actions, genre may sound like a 
completely deterministic force, stifling the users’ creative possibilities. But, as Paul Prior writes, 
“genres should be understood not as templates but always partly prefabricated, partly improvised 
or repurposed” (17). Undoubtedly, genre—as “typified rhetorical actions based on recurrent 
situations”—embodies ideological imprints; being based on convention, instant recognition, and 
a sense of continuance characterize a genre.  However, as Prior suggests, when the same genre is 
taken up in another rhetorical situation, the new setting adds on its own peculiarities, giving 
genre improvisational quality. While the fundamental purpose of using the genre in a new 
situation may be similar to the one from its use in earlier situation, that it has to perform context 





of genre is comparable to the DNA in a biological organism: DNA is something fundamental to 
an organism, defining its characteristics, but evolutionary mechanism transforms DNA as well 
because of the organism’s adaptive process in the environment. Deepening the metaphor further, 
while a constitution shares the genotype of the genre, it also manifests itself in the form of a 
phenotype, the form influenced by the environment. Thus, genre certainly carries on its pre-
deterministic quality, but it is equally open to modification in order to be contextually relevant in 
different situations.           
 The transformation possibilities in a genre spring from various sources. First, as 
Bazerman has written, a genre does not work in isolation: genres function within “genre 
systems” of “interrelated genres that interact with each other in specific settings” (Bazerman, 
“Genre Systems” 97, 99). The genres participating in a genre system form various kinds and 
degrees of combination and permutation depending on the dynamics of the setting. The setting—
as a thick context—is composed of many factors from long-term historical and cultural aspects to 
momentary power relationship among actors, determining how the participating genres interact 
among each other within the evolving genre system.6  While the genre exerts its influence from 
the past in the new setting, the new setting also modifies the genre, appropriating it for that 
setting. Bazerman writes, “It [genre performance] embodies the full history of speech as 
intertextual occurrences but attending to the way that all the intertext is instantiated in generic 
form establishing the current act in relation to prior acts” (“Systems” 99). Genres are tools 
“within which communicants instantiate and reproduce situated desires, practices, relations, and 
subjectivities” (Bawarshi, Genre 115). Second, but not entirely different from the first point, the 
                                                          
6 See Geertz, particularly the first chapter (3-30), for the importance of “thick description” to 
appreciate the complex totality of a culture. Setting certainly is more than a culture because a 





modification also comes from genre’s place in what David Russell calls an “activity system,” 
which he defines as “any ongoing, object-directed, historically conditioned, dialectically 
structured, tool-mediated human interaction” (510). In his intricately rich definition that borrows 
from Russian structuralism and Bakhtin’s dialogism, Russell emphasizes on the 
contextualization of genre.  Genres are part of human activity in the world: as conceptual and 
functional tools, they retain their past characteristics while undergoing change through their 
participation in an activity. As a part of a dynamic activity system, genres allow the system to 
work on them, but simultaneously, they contribute to the particular instantiation of the activity 
system as well. Synthesizing them together, Bazerman’s “genre systems” theory and Russell’s 
“activity system” establish genre as a context-driven dynamic functional tool that works in a 
system of complex combination and permutation with other genres.      
1.2 Constitutional Genre, Authorship and Sovereignty  
Exemplified first by the ratification process of the American Constitution in the late 
1780s and the ideological underpinning such as popular sovereignty invested in the process, 
authorship has come to be a core aspect of the constitutional genre. As the main law of the land, 
a national constitution holds the power to de/legitimize people’s actions, but the greatest test of a 
constitutional text rests on its ability to gain self-legitimization. Since no text is providentially 
sanctioned to be the ultimate law, a constitution depends on the elements of its own genre 
convention for its transformation from a type of a text to the legitimate authority with power to 
dictate the ways of the people and institutions. It is primarily through constitutional authorship—
itself a constructed phenomenon within the genre convention—through which a constitutional 
text establishes it governing mandate. In this regard, the constitution as a genre is comparable to 





proper signature and seal for their authentication. Indeed, whether the text passes the test of 
being an appropriate governing document depends on whether it is proposed, drafted and ratified 
by the body of people considered to be a legitimate authority for the task. Proper authorship is 
thus the mechanism for transforming a set of words into the hallowed document functioning as 
the main law of the land.  However, despite this centrality, the constitutional authorship is a 
complex historical production that does not serve uniformly across history and locations.   
 The observations and claims made in the previous paragraph generate important 
questions: How did the idea of constitutional authorship originate? How did it become possible 
to think of a nation having a selfhood and authorship with the ability to write its own laws, 
particularly in the post-monarchial era? In what follows, I argue that the emergence of 
constitutional authorship should be tied with the historical transformation in the practices and 
conceptions of sovereignty, especially during the Enlightenment. In the process, I will also 
demonstrate how the analysis of the genre-function of the written constitution facilitates the 
understanding of such historical transformation.     
 Previously, in the pre-Enlightenment period, while the exact terms of practices differed 
from one location to the other and from one period to another within the same location, the 
predominant political mode accorded sovereignty to the monarch.7 Not only did the king possess 
sovereign immunity but also issued laws because of his divine power, an ideological disposition 
that made the king more a medium—an “agency” rather  than an “agent,” using the terms from 
                                                          
7 Louis XIV’s famous statement “The State? I am the State?” represents an interesting moment 
in Thomas Carlyle’s history of the French Revolution (8). While the king still claims his divine 
authority with the statement, the world around him has moved ahead. Thus, instead of an 
affirmative cheering from his courtiers, the statement is “replied with silences and abashed 
looks” (Carlyle 8). In this historical narrative, Carlyle captures the transformative moment in the 
practices of sovereignty in the French court as represented both by the muted nonverbal cues and 





Burke’s pentad—rather than the author of purported universal (because they were interpreted as 
coming directly from the god) political and social laws.8 In this ideological imagination, the 
king's sovereignty emanated directly from the upper sovereignty—the ultimate source—placing 
the king at the pinnacle of the stratified feudal hierarchical order while making everybody else 
his subjects. In the extreme form of this practice, the monarch concentrated power without 
having to divide, categorize, and define it into various modern familiar terms such as legislative, 
judiciary or executive. Certainly, his (sometimes, her) majesty’s contemporary critics and 
commentators remarked whether a particular monarch was an ideal one,9 and, certainly, in 
reality, the king delegated his power to clever courtiers, who exercised the king’s power more 
than the monarch themselves. Nevertheless, since the kingdom was conceived to be an extension 
of the king’s body, thus locating sovereignty in the single authority of the monarch, the dominant 
contemporary conception of sovereignty accorded theoretical and political unity to pre-modern 
nations.             
 The forces that led to the Enlightenment challenged this conception of sovereignty—
dissociating it from the king, and thus preparing for a different kind of political arrangement.10 
                                                          
8 See Burke’s Grammar for his theorization of pentad.  
9 The king was thought to be an executor of universal justice.   
10 Here is what we should not forget when we think about sovereignty. First, the predominant 
mode of sovereignty that we think about, theorize, and practice today in academic, legal and 
political settings comes not entirely, but dominantly from European tradition of kings, 
republicanism, and the Enlightenment. As practiced within this tradition, the current dominant 
practice of sovereignty, which is not fully coherent in its motives and composition, embodies 
contradictory impulses—one coming from the king’s desire to be the imperial master with total 
hold upon as many people and resources as his power could amass, and the other one coming 
from the individual’s natural rights and justice tradition that was developed to confront the king’s 
power within national setting. In a post-monarchial phase, the state tries to assume the 
premodern king’s sovereign power but assuring that the state’s sovereignty is for securing the 
individual citizen’s sovereignty. This version of sovereignty—rooted mostly in legal, procedural 
discursive and institutional framework—dominates the political imagination today because of the 





Now modern nation-states made up of print culture and written constitutions, as Benedict 
Anderson has argued, replaced the kingdom, making citizens' nationalist consciousness rather 
than their association with the king as the connecting fabric of the new disposition. In the 
modern nation-states, citizens—not the king—became the major actors. As Richard A. Ryerson 
has argued, the notion of modern republic with sovereignty in people itself was an embryonic 
idea during the Enlightenment period (qut. in Arnold 131). Thinking from the perspective of 
sovereignty, this new cultural imagination lost the unity of sovereignty possessed by the pre-
modern king-centered nations. Now both the state and the citizens were conceived to be 
sovereign entities: the state would enjoy the power of sovereign immunity that the king 
previously possessed, while individual citizens also would have sovereignty with their 
fundamental natural rights guaranteed by the written constitution and bill of rights This 
discussion demonstrates that an analysis of the genre-function of the constitution help us see the 
connection in the construction of and relationship among citizenship, sovereignty and authorship. 
 For illustration, the Declaration of Independence and Abraham Lincoln’s Gettysburg 
Address represent two unique moments capturing this transformation and the tension between 
the two forms of sovereignty. The Declaration proclaims the sovereignty of individuals as 
inherent fundamental rights endowed by the creator, as “self-evident" truths, not requiring any 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
The juggernaut of this mode is so powerful that it has become almost impossible to think of other 
forms of sovereignty without referencing it effectively. Certainly, postcolonial and indigenous 
intellectual projects have tried to find, articulate and forward alternative forms of sovereignty. 
But, “Once absorbed into the ‘chronopolitics’ of the secular West, colonized space cannot 
reclaim autonomy and seclusion; once dragged out of their precolonial state, the indigenes of 
peripheries have to deal with the knowledge of the outside world, irrespective of their own 
wishes and inclinations” (Miyoshi 730). Alternative vision of sovereignty and political 
organization demands what Dipesh Chakrabarty calls, “provincializing Europe,” meaning putting 
the dominant western thought into its own place for imagining different forms of political 





external justification.11 Since the Declaration's immediate purpose was more the colonies' 
independence from the British Empire rather than the formation of a new state (the United 
States), the document does not grant much power to the state structure. The Declaration 
proclaims, " to secure these rights [the unalienable rights of individuals], governments are 
instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed; that 
whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people 
to alter or to abolish it." In this vision, the state’s sovereignty remains subservient to the citizens’ 
sovereignty. But the Declaration's vision of the supremacy of the citizens' sovereignty —also 
reflected in the 1781 Articles of Confederation—over that of the state proved to be a too 
idealistic proposition, a shortcoming that the 1787 Constitution proposed to overcome with the 
provision of an effective and strong federal government. The events between the dates of the 
Declaration and the Constitution’s enforcement demonstrated that the viability of citizens' 
unalienable rights rested on the state’s ability to secure them. This realization made the Founding 
fathers conceive the state (national government) as a sovereign body—an entity larger than the 
sum of its individual citizens. Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address—delivered almost eight decades 
after the Declaration to commemorate the sacrifice of the dead soldiers in the Civil War— in a 
sense represents the pivotal moment when state sovereignty holds the primacy.   
 While Lincoln reiterates the Declaration’s idealistic vision stating that the American 
government was "of the people, by the people, and for the people," for him the major question of 
the Civil War was about "whether that nation or any nation so conceived, and so dedicated, can 
long endure." The point is this: the state (conceived in a certain way, of course) itself was 
                                                          
11 While the repeated political, legal and cultural assertions of this statement might have made 
this conception a (positively) hegemonic influence almost to the point that we may feel as if 
individual rights were inherent natural rights not requiring any justification, a momentary critical 





sovereign; individual sacrifice was worth preserving the state so that it could safeguard the 
citizens’ sovereignty. Therefore, in this formulation, the sovereignty of the state neither is the 
composite of its citizens' sovereignty, nor is it always defined only in relationship to its 
opposition to the sovereignty of other nations. In an ideal setting, in the way the Declaration 
wishes, the state tries to bear no sovereignty at all as if its only function were to preserve the 
sovereignty of its citizens. However, in practice, as the instance of the Civil War suggested, the 
state starts assuming full sovereignty, asking for the sacrifice of its citizens for its maintenance.  
From this logic, the state sovereignty serves as a structural necessity to guarantee citizen's 
sovereign rights. Because of such necessity, citizens’ highest duty becomes their willingness to 
terminate their life for the sake of national sovereignty.     
 Giorgio Agamben in his books has influentially theorized this conundrum—the unstable 
relationship between the state and citizens in the practices of sovereignty. Agamben 
demonstrates a pattern in the responses of western liberal states when they confront political 
crises, particularly those that challenge their ability to maintain law and order. During the crises, 
the governments suspend regular laws, declaring the state of exception. Executed by using the 
force of the law to suspend certain other parts of the law (mostly, the fundamental rights of the 
citizens guaranteed in constitutions) itself, this ability of the sovereign—the state now, replacing 
the king in pre-modern time—represents the supremacy of the state's sovereignty over the 
citizens' sovereignty. The suspension turns certain people into what Agamben calls "bare life" or 
"life in general" or "pure being" without any legal protection (Home 66, 66, 182).  The bare life 
is the Homo Sacer, the accursed one that the state or anybody can kill without any punishment. 
Deprived of any human epistemic, political, and cultural attributes, the bare life becomes an 





sovereignty" (Homo 67). During the state of exception—which occurs regularly contrary to what 
the name suggests—democracies convert themselves not into obvious "dictatorship but a space 
devoid of law, a zone of anomie in which all legal determinations are deactivated" (Exception 
50). Cumulatively, Agamben exhibits how the state's propensity to suspend the protective regular 
laws—of those that convert bare human lives into sovereign citizens with political rights—
inversely manifests the idealistic vision of sovereignty represented in the texts such as the 
Declaration.            
 This struggle expressed in the tension between the wishes of the Declaration and the 
spirit of the Gettysburg Address captures the ambiguity in the modern conception of 
sovereignty—a conception that presents individual sovereignty as intrinsically innate yet 
incapable of self-sustaining, thus requiring the protection of an external sovereign power.12  
Emanated from the bifurcated location of the modern sovereignty, this ambiguity poses a unique 
challenge of connecting two forms of sovereignty into one workable system, into one agency, 
one will for it to be functional. I argue that one major political technology for addressing this 
challenge has been the constitutional authorship. In constitutional authorship—and the national 
governing mandates created through periodic elections—not only citizens practice their 
sovereign rights by participating in the creation of the laws that govern them, but also create a 
collective will for the nation.          
 Before elaborating how constitutional authorship tries to unite both forms of sovereignty 
into single workable mechanism, an explanation of the historical coevolution of authorship, 
individuation and popular sovereignty is in order.  As Roland Barthes has argued, "The author is 
a modern figure, produced no doubt by our society insofar as, at the end of the middle ages, with 
                                                          
12 Irony lied in the Civil War’s connection with slavery; saving the Union also meant abolishing 





English empiricism, French rationalism and personal faith of the Reformation, it discovered the 
prestige of the Individual, or, to put it more nobly, of the 'human person'" (142-143). Although 
Michel Foucault does not concede to Barthes’ death of the author thesis, he concurs with the 
basic proposition that authorship is a modern historical construct with some functions (1628-36). 
Thinking from the perspective of constitutional genre and transformation of sovereignty that the 
emergence of the genre accompanied, I am suggesting that authorship and citizenship manifested 
two different facets of the same emerging sovereign individual. Being an author and a citizen 
assumes the inherent sovereignty of the individual assigned with the privileges of exercising and 
expressing one’s uninfluenced core values. The two concepts evolved together: as the historical 
process of transferring sovereignty from the king to the citizen was undergoing, political 
philosophers were refining the idea of the individual's inalienable natural rights, while authorship 
was also seeing its formation and ascendency simultaneously.13 The same cultural forces that 
created the idea of a citizen endowed with sovereign free will necessitated the idea of authorship. 
Increasingly, the individualizing process—creating the concept of a person as an individual 
endowed with independent cognitive, emotional and intuitive power free from the rest of 
environment—revived the classical republicanism depositing sovereignty on individuals—
ushering in the need of new kind of politics and culture.14 To further emphasize the point, 
striping sovereignty of an individual removes her citizenship as well as the possibility of having 
an authorship. A bare body without fundamental rights is neither a rightful witness in a court of 
law nor capable of accessing her rational self for authorial expression.  Sovereignty therefore 
underpins both citizenship and authorship.       
                                                          
13 Think of John Locke’s political treatises, for instance.  
14 Chapter one will demonstrate this connection extensively, especially in connection with the 






 However, as theorized above, the historical development in the conception of sovereignty 
during the Enlightenment did not transfer the earlier sovereignty of the king to the citizen alone. 
The state also emerged as a sovereign entity that needed the process of national individuation. In 
the past, the king could exercise the sovereignty of the state. Now, that means, the nation had to 
have a body and selfhood with the ability to make decision, with a single will. Using Cartesian 
paradigm, the nation needed a rational, thinking agency with the power of self-determination to 
be a sovereign self. Converting a nation— as massive as the United States in the Eighteenth-
century— into single-bodied thinking mechanism with the ability to make pointed decisions and 
deliberations needed some craft, a procedure. Constitutional authorship—and the mandate 
created through periodic elections for instituting governments after the enactment of the 
Constitution—became the mechanism of such individuation. To meet this expectation, cultural 
imagination would increasingly cast nation into the image of human body.15 Now, this 
conception—the idea of constitutional authorship and the governing mandate—could constitute 
oneness out of the chaotic mass of divergent people with a variety of interests, relationships, and 
power. For instance, the first unofficial moto of the United States “E pluribus unum” (one out of 
many), in a sense, succinctly captured the spirit of this transformation in 1782. Now with this 
political craft, a sovereign nation could decide on thorny issues with the precision of even a 
                                                          
15 Medical rhetoric is particularly illustrative of the metaphor of nation-state as a body. In one 
manifestation, medical discourse treats, "the body as nation state at war over its external borders, 
containing internal surveillance system to monitor foreign intruders" (Martin 410). In this 
imagination, human body and national body share similar kind of vulnerability: external agents 
can infiltrate them, jeopardizing their health and sovereignty. However, the definition of disease 
and externality do not always have same markers. Demagogues and fascist purists often utilize 
the same body-nation metaphorical vision to malign and exterminate vulnerable groups of people 
within the boundaries of the nation, characterizing them as diseases eating the national purity and 
selfhood. For instance, Andreas Musolff has demonstrated how "Nazis used [the imagery of the 
body-politic) to legitimize their genocidal policies [by treating a group of people] … as a 





single digit— mathematically by counting the votes cast by sovereign individuals. Constitutional 
authorship as a political technology thus becomes functionally meaningful in its capacity to bring 
both forms of sovereignty together for political action: It allows sovereign citizens to exercise 
their power in the formulation of the national law; simultaneously in the process, it also creates a 
national selfhood, a prerequisite for a sovereign body in the world governed by Cartesian cultural 
imagination.          
 Undoubtedly, this is not the only way through which constitutions are enacted in the 
modern world.16 But this view of constitutional authorship that combines the visions of popular 
sovereignty, democracy, and citizens’ self-rule serves as the dominant ideology for modern 
politics.  For instance, the same ideology of constitutional authorship governed Nepali 
revolutionaries’ mindset hegemonically when they demanded for the people-written constitution 
as they mounted many political movements and revolutions for seven decades in the second half 
of the twentieth-and early-twenty-first centuries. Same ideology of constitutional authorship is 
evoked when Japanese conservatives characterize the 1947 Japanese Constitution “as a foreign 
imposition” because it works as “a strategy for depriving the document of legitimacy and 
undermining popular support for the provisions that formally limit country’s military 
capabilities” (Law 240). The idea of popular collective authorship is thus a strong legitimizing 
force in the genre of the written constitution.       
 But what is important to note is that the constitutional authorship itself is the product of 
what Bawarshi calls “genre function” (Genre 19-23). As Bawarshi defines, the concept of genre 
function avoids the limitations inherent in “author function,” which Foucault theorized not as an 
expression of an individual’s interiority, but as a function, particularly of classification of 
                                                          
16 See the chapter three in this dissertation for three kinds of constitutional authorship practiced 





discourses and texts, and of rewarding and punishing of individuals for their expression. 
Bawarshi argues, since all texts, such as users’ manuals, do not have authors but still exist in the 
world performing functions, the best way to understand the place and functions of the texts is in 
terms of genres rather than that of authorship (Genre 19-23). Building on and expanding the 
same concept, I argue that constitutional authorship itself is the function of constitutional genre 
because it is crafted, defined, and produced by the genre convention. Constitutional authorship is 
not a self-evident natural phenomenon; the written constitution procedurally produces the 
constitutional authorship. While the procedure tries to strike a balance for respecting both the 
individual sovereignty and the need of creating national legitimate selfhood, a particular 
actualization of the authorship differs from one context to the next because of the genre 
modification caused by kairotic and contextual factors in its particular instantiation. 
 This theorization leads constitutional scholarship to new directions at least in two ways. 
First, it changes the nature of debate on constitutional authorship within legal studies. Primarily, 
two views of constitutional authorship exist in legal studies of the U.S. Constitution. The 
originalist school attributes the authorship to the drafters of the text, emphasizing judicial 
interpretation should consult the relevant contemporary texts such as the Federalist Papers to 
decipher the original intention of the Constitution. This school contents that judges can maintain 
the sanctity and uniform interpretation of the Constitution only by associating the text with the 
original authorial intention. Doing anything else is to jeopardize the spirit of the Constitution. 
Libertarian legal scholar Randy E. Barnett, for instance, argues that the tradition of judicial 
interpretation has killed the Constitution as intended by the Founders. He stresses that the 
Constitution has been replaced by the “judges’ constitution” (5). Stating “we the people” as 





consent of the governed’—is wrong because it is a standard that no constitution can meet” (13, 
3). He further argues that, “holding the Constitution to this untenable ideal both undermines its 
legitimacy and allows others to substitute their own meaning for that of the text” (3). On the 
other hand, the proponents of the idea of living constitution maintain that political and cultural 
positions of the time determine the meaning of the Constitution. Highlighting actual practices in 
court proceedings and interpretations, legal scholar David A. Struss, for instance, points how the 
actual text of the Constitution is rarely consulted, how the focus remains on collective body of 
precedents and tradition for making a decision, and how judges decide considering ‘what is fair’ 
and ‘what works’ rather than consulting the Constitution in the absence of a clear precedent. 
 As the legal and literary scholar Stanley Fish would maintain, it is the interpretative 
community—instead of dead founders—that determines the meaning of the Constitution. From 
the vantage point of the notion of the living constitution, the original authorship of the 
Constitutional text might have shaped the superstructure of the state such as the formation of 
governmental branches, citizens' basic rights, and government responsibilities. But so far as most 
of the time-pressing cases are concerned, it is the common law or the constitution with the 'c' (the 
collective body of precedents) that guides everyday court decisions. The originalist school thus 
assigns a definite group of people—such as those involved in the drafting, ratifying and 
amending—the attribute of constitutional authorship. However, from the perspective of living 
constitution, while individuals play roles, a set of documents and prevailing socio-political moors 
exerts the force in the construction of the constitutional meaning.      
 When constitutional authorship is interpreted as the genre function or product of the 
genre, the question should be more about how the constitutional authorship is procedurally 





understood this way, this perspective, as theorized above, suggests that constitutional authorship 
is a historically constructed category that the historical forces—including human actors—
brought into being to respond to the rhetorical exigency of the moment when one conception of 
sovereignty was giving way to new form of sovereignty, shifting the vision of kingdom into the 
popular nation-state. As it stands now, the dominant form of constitutional authorship evolved 
first in the United States and was later globalized hegemonically. In this form, nor the ideas such 
as ‘the consent of the governed’ or ‘judiciary interpretation’ or ‘the original text authored by the 
Founders’ function with absolute force, nor they can be relegated into non-significance.  Arguing 
for one at the cost of the other is either to commit intentional or affective fallacy or to neglect the 
role of founding intentions or affected interpretations. The constitutional authorship thus should 
be sought and interpreted as defined, developed and realized within the genre tradition. And, 
when authorship is conceived as the function of the genre, and when a genre is understood as 
composed of dynamic structures, we open the possibilities of the realization of various forms of 
constitutional authorship in the spectrum from the authorship constituted through an inclusive 
electoral procedure at the one end to the authorship dictatorially imposed by a military 
strongman at the other end.          
 Besides this opening, the shift of focus from author-function to genre-function also 
provides us with another insight about the unattainability of radical democratic wishes 
sufficiently through constitutional authorship. In fact, Thomas Jefferson, long ago at the time 
when constitutional genre convention was on the process of inception, observed the difficulty of 
translating the political idealism of popular sovereignty in practice. In his correspondence from 
France with James Madison in 1789, Jefferson, the composer of the lofty aspiration of 





form of government were so perfectly contrived, that the will of the majority could always be 
obtained, fairly and without impediment. But this is true of no form. The people cannot assemble 
themselves; their representation is unequal and vicious” (634-35). As Jefferson states, let alone 
radical democratic will, often engineering a national governing mandate is just a forceful ritual 
instead of an organically originated condition. As Akhil Amar notes, the electoral system 
adopted by the U.S. Constitution in 1789 was as much inspired by the sublime political ideal 
such as the separation of power as was influenced by the fact of slavery. 17 The democratic 
promise of the national authorship (as expressed in constitutional authorship or periodically 
established governing mandate), even the ratification of the U.S. Constitution was “heresthetic” 
in nature (Riker 9). As William Riker argues, drafters set up a situation “composing the 
alternatives among which political actors must choose” one of the alternatives because of the 
“structure of the situation to support the herestheticians’ purpose” even when they were not 
happy with their choice (9). Simply put, the drafters gave a false either-or choice on the motion 
instead of allowing the citizens to modify the provisions within the document. As Robert 
Ferguson observes, the American Constitution could be ratified not only because of its 
“inevitable repository of epistemological ambiguities” and “philosophical uncertainties” but also 
because of the strategies of “careful circumvention of controversial words like ‘national,’ 
‘republic,’ and ‘federal’” (130, 137). This kind of postmodernist-deconstructionist critique hits 
directly at the heart of the promise of modernity, of which constitutional authorship is a major 
political technology. The numbers function crucially in establishing the idea of a legitimate 
constitutional authorship and governing mandate; and, they are also supposed to be objective and 
impartial staircases leading human societies to the lofty political ideals such as democracy, self-
                                                          





rule, and liberty. But often electoral systems and the numbers themselves are less than perfect 
tools of translating ideals into practice. As a result, sometimes, the numbers and electoral 
procedures may function as the ideological façades buttressing the flimsy unattainable dreams. 
As Jefferson lamented, actualizing idealism in its absolute form is a hard proposition. 
Undoubtedly, constitutional authorship has been a formidable democratic feat from historical 
perspective. However, having to have an electoral procedure for constituting national authorship 
and the compromise of the two forms of sovereignty built in its structure always haunt the 
promise enshrined in the genre. After all, as Burke states, the Constitution is mostly “a calculous 
of [many] motives” or wishes rather than a representation of all wishes.    
 Until this point, the whole theorization has been on how constitutional authorship is 
crafted procedurally within a country for the legitimization of the document. But, the use of the 
written constitution as a genre also presents another interesting dimension, something not 
imagined to be within the boundaries of the genre of a national constitution.  
 Constitutional authorship is also used to claim national sovereignty. When the Cherokee 
Nation adopted the written constitution in 1827, certainly the constitution, as expected, brought a 
new form of government. However, since the prime motivation for the adoption of the genre then 
was to resist the impending removal, the Cherokees found in the genre—particularly their ability 
to author their constitution—a site of articulating, defining and demonstrating national 
sovereignty. The constitution for them was a tool of expressing national sovereignty, a defiant 
posture of having an impregnable independence posed to the external world.  By including a 
statement on territorial boundaries of the nation and the sources of those boundaries as 
determined by the nation’s treaties with the United States in its first article, the 1827 Cherokee 





boundaries. The approach activated both the power of the constitutional genre that the Cherokees 
were instantiating and the exact statement in the U.S. Constitution regarding the sacred 
obligation of the federal government to honor the treaties. This activation not only reconstituted 
(because the adoption of Euromerican genre convention refashioned the nature of the Cherokee 
national sovereignty) but tried to defend Cherokee national sovereignty. While the circumstances 
were different, the 1962 Constitution of Nepal was partly internationalist in its perspective as 
well because its author, king Mahendra, used the genre to assert his—and thus the nation’s 
power— to write any kind of constitution without external pressure. Not so enthusiastic to 
provide sovereignty to the citizens as the 1962 Constitution vested sovereignty in the king 
literally, this application of the genre constituted and claimed the sovereignty of the nation, 
defined largely in terms of the country’s capacity to author its own constitution. These examples 
illustrate that constitutional authorship has practically become the site of articulating national 
sovereignty for the countries facing external pressure against their self-determination.    
 Being based on these theoretical positions, this dissertation examines the constitutions of 
the United States, Cherokee Nation and Nepal. Chapter one concentrates on the U.S. 
Constitution, particularly arguing that the genre of the written constitution provided the United 
States an opportunity to externalize the norms of republicanism, articulating them not only as the 
personal matter of subjective deliberation but also as objectively measurable conducts open to 
observation, analysis, and judgement by an external authority. Based on the idea of individual 
virtue, classical republicanism predominantly had a subjective spiritual dimension. As embodied 
in the image of Roman political leader Cato, whom George Washington admired, classical 
republicanism emphasized qualities such as austerity, service, and sacrifice, the qualities that 





venerated the republican qualities, they knew that the history was not kind to republics. Power 
corrupted the virtue, catapulting the republics into ruin. Thus, they could not constitute a strong 
national government after the Independence in 1776 because the concentrated power far from 
their locality posed an imminent threat to their liberty. They instead stuck with the 1781 Articles 
of Confederation that bestowed sovereignty in the local and state governments. However, the 
historical exigency demanded a strong national government to protect the newfound liberty 
itself. The compromise was the 1787 Constitution: they could have a national government but 
limited by the power described in the words of the document. Now, not only the people holding 
public offices had to be elected periodically so that the constituents could examine whether the 
power had corrupted their virtue, checks-and-balances among the independent organs of the 
government became the norm of the new disposition. Influenced by scientific descriptivism of 
the Enlightenment, the constitution-based politics made public conducts objectively examinable 
attributes. Instead of having to contemplate internally, one could now check the words of the 
Constitution to determine whether they have observed the high ethos of republican virtue.  
 The second chapter focuses on the 1827 Cherokee Constitution. Borrowing from and 
expanding on Kenneth Burke’s theory of identification, I argue that the Cherokee adoption of the 
genre of written constitution in early nineteenth-century to constitute their nation— and their use 
of the Constitution to claim their progress according to the spirit of the U.S. policy of Indian 
Civilization—was a part of the Cherokee politics of identification. By adopting the written 
constitution and western institutional paraphernalia, the Cherokee Nation claimed its relation of 
identification with the United States. The nation claimed it had progressed enough, with the logic 
that its resemblance with the United States required the United States to recognize the Cherokee 





increasingly influential ideology of hierarchy of civilizations that placed Native Americans at a 
lower rank often portraying them as incapable of rational deliberation, the Cherokees found in 
the written constitution a space of articulation for their national sovereignty in the terms that 
United States could recognize. Since the motive of the adoption of the Cherokee Constitution can 
be revealed only by placing it in the context, I read primary texts such as letters, newspaper 
articles, and public appeals. While the last part of the chapter briefly contemplates on the 1999 
Cherokee Constitution, particularly to demonstrate how the written constitution allows a space 
for the reconfiguration of sovereignty, the chapter’s main thrust lies in exploring the nineteenth 
century context.            
The third chapter concentrates on Nepal’s seven-decade experimentation with the written 
constitution. While the chapter discusses a range of metaconstitutional interests and effects such 
as how the genre was originally introduced by a threatened autocratic family regime to legitimize 
itself against the popular uprising in 1948, and also how the genre was also viewed as a claim of 
national sovereignty in the chaotic South Asian context of the 1950s and 60s, the major argument 
rests on the question of constitutional authorship. I argue that constitutional authorship—the 
question of who gets to write the national constitution legitimately—was the defining factor of 
political disruptions in Nepal from 1948 to 2015. Revolutionaries—a common denominator for a 
range of political parties and actors in a long history—from as early as 1948 internalized the idea 
from the international genre convention that a national constitution should be written by a 
popularly elected constituent assembly. While for a brief period in 1951 the king also seemed to 
agree with the revolutionaries, he took the constitutional authorship as his traditional 
prerogative—a symbolic exercise of his sovereign power, not open for compromise. The clash of 





philosophies suggested by these visions guided the seven constitutions written between 1948 and 
2015. The chapter ends with a not-so-celebratory note: While the Constituent Assembly declared 
the new Constitution in 2015 ending the clash and abolishing the monarchy, the procedural 
nature of constitutional authorship with its roots in modernity could not fully satisfy the 
postmodernist interests of many Nepali constituents. Nepal experimented with a widely inclusive 
form of representation for the Constituent Assembly, but the strong opposition to the newly 
promulgated (and passed by an overwhelming majority of the Constituent Assembly) 
Constitution suggests that the respect for the constitutional authorship of popular majority itself 
is a matter of what Bawarshi calls “genre function.” Given Nepal’s constant introduction of new 
constitutions, the culture of organizing mass protests to demand political changes, and 
postmodernist identity politics together created a context that undermined the ethos of the 
constitutional authorship of popular majority. The debates on how the new Constitution could 
not respect the wishes of many communities demonstrated how the idea of national popular 
constitutional authorship was what Edmund Morgan has theorized a matter of “inventing 
people”—something discursively effected rather than a natural phenomenon unconditionally 
acceptable to all (13-14). However, since no equal functionally effective alternative genre exists 
to replace the constitution, it would be interesting to observe how the newly redefined 
sovereignty and national authorship would fare in the old country with the new Constitution. The 
fourth chapter brings the discussion of earlier chapters together and makes conclusions about the 
state of the written constitution as a genre in the early twenty-first century.   
 In the epilogue, “What does the Written Constitution as a Genre Teach Us about the 
Teaching of Writing?” I meditate on the pedagogical implication of this study. Genre theorists 





and rhetoric (Bawarshi, Miller, Bazerman, Swale, Devitt). Genres constitute the teaching of 
writing, and any sustained discussion of a genre offers insights into at least the need of having to 
be aware of the structure, ideology and purpose of a genre. For the purpose of delimitation and 
precision in this section, I use the idea of threshold concept, pondering what the process of the 
writing of the constitution can reveal us about the nature of collaborative writing that we can use 
in the teaching of writing. Rhetoric and composition scholar Kathleen Blake Yancey argues that 
the threshold concepts of composition studies serve as the “articulation of shared beliefs 
providing multiple ways of helping us name what we know and how we can use what we know 
in the service of writing” (xix). As Yancey and the contributors in Linda Adler-Kassner and 
Elizabeth Wardle’s edited collection, Naming What We Know: Threshold Concepts of Writing 
Studies, state threshold concepts are more about the articulations of ideas that we already know 
than about proposing anything completely new. Following their lead, I add a new threshold 
concept of writing as manifested by the transnational, transcultural contexts of constitution 
writing: a high-stake collaborative writing is complex and contested in nature—not always a 
friendly and smooth process as the adjective “collaborative” in the expression may connote. By 
“high stake collaborative writing,” I am suggesting those public, professional and personal kinds 
of writing that would transform the lives of people writing the document. While constitutions, 
laws, and policy papers are some of the examples of high stake writing, many other academic 
and professional documents may also have high stake for collaborating writers. In a high-stake 
writing, collaborators bring in conflicting ideologies, identities and interests in the writing 
process, and they also perceive that the outcome of the writing project would significantly 
impact them, forcing them to maneuver the writing toward their interest and ideology, a 





pre-writing agreement regarding how they would follow the process for the project’s completion. 
In the transcultural, transnational and historically different contexts of constitution writing that I 
examined in this dissertation, conflict surrounded the writing process. For instance, in the United 
States in the 1780s, it was hard enough for the participants of the Philadelphia Constitutional 
Convention to come up with an agreed upon document, and the ratification process that followed 
the drafting of the Constitution was not less contentious. While the general Enlightenment 
philosophical platform provided the participants a system for exchanging ideas meaningfully in 
the convention, both the ideological and pragmatic differences among them made the 
Constitution writing process a heated business in the summer of 1787.    
 This threshold concept that collaborative writing is a complex and contested process 
requiring pre-writing agreement for the effective execution of a project builds on some of the 
other threshold concepts of writing studies. Victor Villanueva writes, “writing provides a 
representation of ideologies and identities” (57).  Articulating another threshold concept of 
composition studies, Andrea A. Lunsford writes, “writing is informed by prior experiences” (54).  
Heidi Estrem states, “disciplinary and professional identities are constructed through writing” 
(55). Charles Bazerman and Howard Tinberg go even further and argue that, “writing is an 
expression of embodied cognition” (74). Placing these concepts together in the context of 
collaborative writing, it can be said that writers bring in different embodied cognitions, 
ideologies and identities. While the need of coexistence may have forced them to collaborate, 
often the collaboration of people with different interests and ideologies is charged with conflict. 
Such collaboration demands us to critically examine how the process of collaboration goes, who 
get to assert their agency in the process, how they negotiate what they are going to write, and 





capacity to transform the way we approach collaborative writing. In course of developing this 
concept, I also suggest how writing teachers can facilitate their students better by distinguishing 
labor-intensive and ideological collaborations. While the two categories are not completely 
separable in practice, having the categories and knowing differences between them positions 
teachers to approach collaboration with clarity and purpose, suggesting them to take appropriate 


















Chapter 2: The Genre functions of the Written Constitution, Republicanism, and the 
Formation of the United States of America  
2.1 Introduction           
 As the introductory chapter established, the written constitution was a unique American 
invention that subsequently become a global genre ushering in a long era of nation-states built on 
the power of the written word. This power however was not a completely new idea for the 
delegates gathered in the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention in 1787: they had brought with 
them a dense history of experimentation with the form and procedures of drafting and adopting 
written constitutions. Before the promulgation of the 1789 Constitution, American states had 
written and rewritten constitutions, and in the process had established a political imagination that 
required a written constitution at the helm of a nation-state—not a hegemonic trait of the time. 
So, after the failure of the 1781 Articles of Confederations, the question was not about whether 
the United States needed a constitution, but about its fundamental nature—a thorny question that 
fired the debates and discussion to various directions during the framing and ratification of the 
Constitution. The debate highlighted that the genre had had its strong genesis and powerful 
currency within the political culture of the new republic, but it needed to address a host of 
complex and often contradictory pragmatic and philosophical demands of the new nation if the 
Constitution were to be the supreme law of the land—a high aspiration for the new genre that 
would both supplant the British tradition of unwritten constitution and place all other laws—
including the state constitutions—within its jurisdiction.       
 Undoubtedly, writing about the U.S. constitution with a fresh perspective is a 
monumental task. Because of its centrality in American life, scholars from a variety of 





word in the Constitution and the motivations and histories behind the word are researched, 
debated and discussed to fulfil multitude of aims from finding a historical fact to forwarding an 
interest.18 Scholars also have studied the sources of thought for the Constitution and the very 
ideas of constitutionalism as it pertained to the framers. What has not been much discussed is 
how the constitution as a genre functioned in the context of late eighteenth-century America.  
This chapter is an attempt to answer that question.      
 In this chapter, I approach the Constitution from rhetorical genre perspective and ask 
what functions the written constitution performed for the framers. Indeed, as it does not need 
much argumentation now, the Constitution—as any constitution is expected to do so by now—
established the framework of governance for the new nation. But that function alone, which 
appears to be a normal phenomenon for a twenty-first century reader steeped in the world of 
nation-states with written constitutions, represented an epochal achievement at the point when 
the genesis of the genre was gaining ground. What this chapter argues is that the Constitution 
helped the founding generation to contextualize republicanism to the United States by affording 
them a method to articulate a new governing system. The framers devised a government in such 
a way that constitutionalism would be the unalterable feature, forcing every generation of 
Americans either to be governed by the existing constitutional text or to amend it as per their 
aspirations. This promise came with the stipulation that the future generation would not be able 
to replace the Constitution itself. This focus on the codification of governing principles in the 
written form transformed the nature of politics. Now with the written constitution as the required 
governing code at the zenith of a nation-states, citizens could tally their civic behaviors with the 
externalized codes written in the Constitution. With this experimentation, republicanism entered 
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into a new phase of history: during the Revolutionary War, classical republicanism was primarily 
a subjective phenomenon; the followers of republicanism during that phase introspected within 
to judge their behavior whether they had observed the virtuous conduct of republicanism as 
found in the character such as Cato. But with the written constitution as the definer of American 
republicanism, the followers of this lofty historical quest could see outside and evaluate whether 
they were conducting themselves with virtuously. To recapitulate the same point, I argue that the 
main genre function of the written constitution for the United States in 1780s was to formulate, 
contextualize, and externalize the idea of republicanism. The written externalized the idea of 
republicanism but without restricting the possibility of its redefinition. The Constitution would 
remain immortal freeing the people from the possibility of any whimsical human rule, but the 
people themselves would have the power to amend. This idea—the immortality of 
constitutionalism but the possibility of endless rethinking the best from of governance—in the 
Constitution opened a space for public rhetoric: the citizen would be exchanging persuasive 
ideas to change the Constitution so that they could have a “more perfect Union.”    
 To make this argument, I refer to interdisciplinary scholarship from history to literature to 
legal studies. Approaching this way, my objective is not to create a thorough narrative of the 
entire process of the transformation of republicanism as manifested in more than one dozen 
constitutions drafted between the dates of the Independence and the inauguration of George 
Washington as the first president. What I’m doing is a symptomatic reading of the texts and 
context to suggest how the written constitution was the major player of the transformation of 
republicanism and the formation of the United States. With this argument, as it would be 
manifest in the later part of the chapter, I invite early American scholarship of that period to shift 





words in the inception of the United States.          
 In what follows, the chapter has four sections. The first section recounts the place of 
republicanism in early American scholarship, how republicanism’ hermeneutical plasticity made 
it a formidable force in the Revolutionary War, and how the same interpretive elasticity opened it 
to be used in justifying many interests creating discordances in the newly independent nation. In 
this section, I propose, define and plain the notion of subjective republicanism to argue that the 
written constitution helped to transform the republican elasticity into a more definite governing 
structure. The next section highlights the debt of classical republicanism to the written 
constitution: not only the written constitution helped the United States to contextualize 
republicanism for it, classical republicanism’s advocacy against a person’s arbitrary rule 
provided the written constitution its main ideology—constitutionalism. The last section discusses 
the significance of this argument for early American scholarship particularly by highlighting how 
genre—not the word—should be the focus of scholarship that aims at excavating the formative 
influences of signs and symbols for the inception of the United States.  Arguing that public 
sphere, written and spoken words, and eloquence were more the part of the activity system of the 
genre of written constitution than the definite shapers of the new governing system, the section 
insists on the need to foreground the role of the written constitution as a genre—not merely as a 
bundle of a printed words—in the formation of the United States.    
2.2 Subjective Republicanism, the Written Constitution, and the Externalization of Virtue
 Scholars have established that republicanism was the dominant political philosophy that 





States.19 Based on his archival research, primarily the personal letters exchanged among 
colonists during the mid-eighteenth-century, historian Bernard Bailyn has found the anti-
authoritarian strand embedded in British Whig philosophy had prompted the colonists to 
interpret the British presence in America as an assault on their liberty(22-54). Gordon Wood 
thinks that the American revolutionaries borrowed the classical model of virtue, which led them 
to think of “a republic of equal, active independent citizens [where] . . . the loss of independence 
and virtue was corruption” (104). J.G. A. Pocock thinks of the Revolution as a reenactment of a 
Machiavellian moment whose intellectual roots can be traced to Florentine Renaissance culture, 
where people realized that they can build the ultimate temporal society based on universal, 
republican values (-506-10). Robert E. Shalhope has termed the understanding formed around 
these historians as “a Republican Synthesis” pronouncing it as the formative intellectual and 
cultural force of the Revolutionary and early national period (49). In this synthesis, 
republicanism—with its roots in classical Roman tradition—entered the American colonies 
primarily through Scottish Enlightenment tradition and dominated the contemporary American 
imagination with a few key words such as liberty, virtue, and corruption.     
 It is also firmly established that Americans did not just adopt republicanism from 
European traditions but mostly adapted it to make it contextually relevant to the new nation. 
Constitutional scholar Dan T. Coenen argues that Hamilton and Madison “stamped the notion of 
republicanism with a distinctively American meaning” (93). He highlights three distinctions of 
the American contextualization of republicanism: “(1) the ultimate sovereignty of people, (2) the 
republican nature of all branches of government, and (3) the idea of distancing operations of their 
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government from future control of the Constitution itself” (93). M.N. S. Sellers—with the 
advantage of his studies in classics, history, and legal studies—argues, “Americans used their 
European predecessors selectively to advance a different, less democratic and distinctly 
American ideology” (xi). James Madison’s notes from the Constitutional Convention, private 
letters among founding fathers, and the texts of debates surrounding the states and federal 
constitution in the 1780s represent the fact that the adaption was a deeply deliberate and arduous 
process. The sheer number of words exchanged during the process represent an enterprising 
American mind intent on solving a problem, particularly not repeating the mistakes of Roman 
and English republican experimentation. As the events in the first decade following the 
Independence—particularly the failure of the Articles of Confederation—suggested, the adaption 
was challenging and difficult; it involved complex processes and structures to create a collective 
view on governance.            
 I’m arguing that the most innovative and consequential of this process was the invention 
of the written constitution. The process involved all those experimentations with the genre 
carried out at state and federal levels, including the first major amendments of the Constitution 
codified as the Bill of Rights. The experimentations with the form provided Americans a conduit 
to think about a government plan that could uphold the basic attitude and motivation associated 
to republicanism. This process that culminated in the drafting of the Constitution defined 
republicanism for the United States. Willi Paul Adam has studied the history of the state 
constitutions drafted between the Declaration of Independence and prior to 1787.20 His study 
suggests that the states practiced diverse ways of drafting and promulgating constitutions. For 
them, no single form of republican constitution-making procedure existed as a reference. Some 
                                                          





of the drafters could discuss classical practices, but they were more abstract conjectures than the 
guiding principles of a genre convention. In most states, existing provincial congresses drafted 
new constitutions without recognizing the distinction between their traditional legislating 
functions and the new work of drafting and approving a constitution. The states of Connecticut 
and Rhode Island continued their colonial charters with a slight modification to note the 
Independence. Massachusetts’ 1779 experiment primarily installed the ideas of constitutional 
convention and ratification. In the state’s second attempt to write the constitution after the 
independence, Massachusetts organized the constitutional convention solely for the purpose of 
drafting its constitution, and the convention later presented the newly drafted constitution to the 
people for ratification—the procedure that served as a model for the Union. This history suggests 
that while republicanism was a widely respected and internalized political ideology of the time, it 
was through experimentations with constitutions at state and federal levels that an agreeable 
republican form of governance could be articulated. The written constitution as a genre thus 
provided a forum or a platform or a way to systematize the idea of republicanism in the way it 
could meet the expectation of the majority of the people in the United States at that time.   
 Explaining this thesis demands a theorization of subjective republicanism. By attributing 
the adjective “subjective,” I’m trying to highlight two principal traits of republicanism in the way 
it was understood and practiced during the Revolutionary and pre-Constitutional phase of the 
new republic. First, it focused heavily on a person’s virtue, placing the whole burden and 
responsibility of preserving oneself from the corrupting influence of power on the individual. 
From this perspective, republicanism was the political morality that individuals were free to 
exercise and would be honored for doing it in the best way possible for them. It became an 





but this political/social morality did not have any external authority to impose the republican 
virtue onto the individual. Indeed, in this vein of thinking, the external supervision of someone’s 
conduct for assessing the republican conduct stood against the very core of the republicanism. 
From this perspective, republicanism remained a quasi-spiritual political philosophy that 
individuals could use to preserve their liberty and to serve their life for the betterment of 
humanity. Central to this tenet is the idea of sovereignty.21 Subjective republicanism emphasized 
the idea that an individual is naturally sovereign to exercise his or her innate liberty. Thus, the 
subjective version of republicanism also placed significance on the individual’s personal 
responsibility and virtue to safeguard one’s sovereignty.  In a sense, republicanism in this version 
was a religion without any punishing god overseeing a believer’s conduct. Sovereign within, a 
propertied and self-sufficient human being would make the best call and judgment for herself.   
Stating another way, this version places the whole burden or responsibility of upholding one’s 
virtue—whatever way it is defined—on the subject herself. Introspection, austerity, and sacrifice 
define republicanism in this version.         
 So, instead of looking for any legal systems outside, the followers of the subjective 
republicanism received inspiration from historical or legendary figures idolized for their 
republican virtue. Roman Republican figures such as Cato and Cincinnatus flared American 
imagination. Joseph Addison’s 1713 tragedy Cato, for instance, was one of the most staged 
dramas in America in the second half of the eighteenth-century—a fact that demonstrates how 
predominant the republican legendary idols were during that time. That the play was so popular 
also suggests that subjective republicanism was not merely a philosophy of handful of elites; it 
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formed a strong presence in the popular culture.22 Even in May 1778, General George 
Washington authorized to stage the play in his military camp in Valley Forge, Pennsylvania. The 
staging neglected the Congressional ban on such kind of theatrical production. Historican 
Bernard Bailyn notes the popularity and impact of Cato the character this way: “So popular and 
influential had Cato’s Letters become in the colonies…, it gave rise to what might be called a 
“Catonic” image, central to the political theory of the time, in which the career of the half-
mythological Roman and the words of the two London journalists merged indistinguishably” 
(44).23  It is well-documented that figures such as Benjamin Franklin, John Adams, and Patrick 
Henry adored the figure of Cato as the role model for stoic personal sacrifice, honorable public 
life and an example of republican virtue. Washington’s letters were peppered with the quotes 
from the play. Within his lifetime, Washington was often compared to Cincinnatus.24  
 With the desire to have a clarity of thought, some scholars have tried to define the 
republicanism as practiced during the Revolutionary and early national period as something 
definite, something that would undercut my understanding of subjective republicanism.  For 
instance, Sellers emphasizes how Americans “differed less about the nature of republicanism 
than the means of preserving it” (6). Sating that American republicanism was influenced from 
the Roman tradition and that the founding generation was well-versed in Roman political 
philosophy and history, Sellers identifies the following eight characteristics of republicanism 
practiced during the time: “(1) pursuit of justice and the common good, through (2) the rule of 
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23 The two journalists were John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon who wrote the letters under the 
pseudonym of Cato. So, besides the play, magazines and newspapers circulated the image of 
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law, under (3) a mixed and balanced government, comprising (4) a sovereign people, (5) a 
deliberative senate and (6) an elected magistracy” (6). The other aspects included “the patrician 
vision of (7) orderly liberty and (8) public virtue it sought to preserve” (Sellers 6). Undoubted, 
the existence of these features of republicanism at that time cannot be denied.          
 In forwarding the notion of subjective republicanism, I’m not arguing that these 
characteristics of republicanism did not prevail. Indeed, the framers of the Constitution and 
public of the time could identify and associate the characteristics enumerated above as 
republican traits. Mostly, these republican characteristics represented an attitude and ideal about 
what kind of political society Americans during the founding period wanted to have. What I’m 
arguing is that the republican attitude and ideal formed by these characteristics did not easily 
translate to a government plan that could address the challenges facing the United States.  To 
assume that the commonly-held republicanism had the capacity to automatically translate to a 
governing form in that period has some implications: First, when we agree that the republicanism 
was the dominant thought of the Revolution,  it should also be agreed that the Article of 
Confederation, which was the first constitution drafted immediately after the Revolution, must be 
said to hold the republican thought in its full intensity. This assertion can be made not because 
two temporary adjacent events always involve a cause-and-effect relationship, but because the 
Articles was thought to be the best expression of local sovereignty and individual liberty. If we 
agree with the proposition that the Article embodied the best form of republicanism because it 
embodied the Revolutionary spirit, the understanding implies that republicanism could not 
address the contemporary American need—particularly in the context of the failure of the 
Articles. Republicanism was just a quasi-spiritual political flare that could ignite the fire for the 





nation-building. Thinking that way also implies that the 1789 Constitution is somewhat 
diminished in its observation of republicanism because of its difference from the Articles. Thus, 
instead of agreeing with any these important propositions and their implications, the more 
accurate way of understanding early national American republicanism would be to see it as a 
major but a flexible and quasi-spiritual political motif open to multiple interpretations.  
 With this line of reasoning, I’m not trying to argue that the Constitution does not bear the 
mark of republicanism. Nor I’m suggesting that republicanism was any less a powerful 
influencing thought. As Sellers argues, certainly, the influential figures of the founding 
generation had studied Roman history and the political thought associated with it in their school 
and college curricula, and the republicanism—along with other influences and historical, 
religious and personal inflections—served as the dominant ideology. The people immersed in 
this ideology could identify something that was against the basic tenets of this attitude and ideal. 
But republicanism—no matter how powerful it was—in itself did not have a ready-made 
governing program that could be installed in the new republic. Had it that kind of definite form, 
Americans did not need the complex transition of more than a decade before the ratification of 
the Constitution.          
 Indeed, this motivational aspect of subjective republicanism proved to be the most 
powerful potent force during the Revolution. The possibility of the plasticity of interpretation 
embedded within subjective republicanism could speak to a host of interests and aspirations, 
triggering a wide participation of colonists in the Revolutionary war. Mark Garrett Longaker has 
identified three versions of republicanism—millennial, manufacturing, and agrarian—prevalent  
in late eighteenth-century America: Rooted in puritan values that “advocate[d] community over 





theology” in the sense that the new nation would analogically serve as “a covenant between God 
and the American republic” (25). Alexander Hamilton’s “manufacturing republicanism” 
advocated for strong federal government for safeguarding the Americans’ liberty and 
sovereignty. Thomas Jefferson’s “commercial agrarian republicanism” insisted on the 
independence of small state holders from the encroachment of a big federal government 
(Longaker 28-32). Longaker argues that the value of republicanism primarily rested in providing 
the founding generation a common set of vocabulary to articulate and exchange various positions 
in a language that they could share.  But if somebody really tried to pin-point to a single, 
universally defined republicanism, none existed. As historical Mercy Otis Warren noted in her 
1805 book, the way “interested and ambitious men [used], …republicanism was an indefinite 
term. …This was indeed, more the language of art than principle” (quoted in Sellers 3). Given 
republicanism’s cultural capital, the people from different walks of life could use republicanism 
for their purpose in a positive way.        
 While the republicanism’s plasticity helped mobilize large sections of Americans to 
participate in the Revolutionary War, the Cato-inspired subjective nature of liberty could not 
convert into a government structure needed for independent colonies. After the Independence, 
Americans did not agree easily on the kind of new government.  Heated discussions and 
discordances prevailed. Ultimately, the republican antipathy towards a far-flung centralized 
government forced them to be settled with the 1781 Articles of Confederation that assigned 
practical power to the states, without positing any meaningful authority on the federal 
government. As it was revealed within a few years, the arrangement made in the Articles could 
not address the issues of national security and federal debt payment incurred during the 





Declaration and the Constitution if it had worked—had failed.  The failure made the founding 
figures realize that they needed to write a new constitution that could uphold the spirit of the 
Revolution as well as address the pragmatic concern of the new nation. The realization lead to 
the framing of the Constitution in 1787. But the rancorous debate on the Constitution during the 
ratification process fought in the public sphere often using the pseudonyms also suggested that 
republicanism could be brought to forward arguments in both sides of the proposed Constitution. 
  James Madison made a passionate remark regarding the limitations of subjective 
republicanism for the new republic at the Constitutional Convention on June 6th, 1787:  
In all cases where a majority are united by a common interest or passion, the 
rights of the minority are in danger. What motives are to restrain them? A prudent 
regard to the maxim that honesty is the best policy is found by experience to be as 
little regarded by bodies of men as by individuals. Respect for character is always 
diminished in proportion to the number among whom the blame or praise is to be 
divided. Conscience, the only remaining tie, is known to be inadequate in 
individuals: In large numbers little is to be expected from it. Besides, Religion 
itself may become a motive to persecution & oppression. These observations are 
verified by the Histories of every Country antient & modern.25    
At the surface, this remark may sound only as a comment on the form of a government. But 
when examined closely, especially by thinking about the early American context suffused with 
the language of subjective republicanism, the statement implies how the new republic could not 
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be formed solely based on the assurance that the common people would act virtuously. Madison 
thinks that while a few giants like George Washington could embody the Cato-like character in 
ethically challenging situations, it would not be practical to ask most of the people the same 
virtuous behavior without any external system of accountability. Thus, building a new republic 
on the assumption that people will behave honorably by themselves would be a pragmatically-
compromising idealistic proposition.        
 In the remark, he also highlights that it is not just a few people, but an elected majority 
could lose the “character.” Influenced by an interest instead of the character, a majoritarian 
mobocracy—manufactured by a democratic electoral process—could jeopardize the rights of an 
individual. For Madison’s audience at the convention, the claim did not need any example. The 
very need of the new Constitution arose from the fact that the states had failed to honor their 
pledge voluntarily. According to the Articles of Confederation, the Congress did not have the 
power to levy taxes on the people; the states that generated revenue through taxation did not 
contribute to the federal government to pay for the credits incurred during the Revolutionary 
War. Madison’s audience had known this fact and had carefully studied many historical 
examples of how virtuous individuals had become victims of powerful majority. Thus, the 
genteel founding republican heroes gathered in Philadelphia for drafting the Constitution were 
not fans of democracy—especially in the way they understood the term. A thoughtful sovereign 
individual like Cato mattered significantly for them and saving the possibility of the existence of 
such individual with full integrity in the new Constitution remained their high priority for the 
health of the new republic. A majoritarian government and dependence on the people’s virtue 
alone would not ensure such protection.       





1787 Philadelphia. That the voluntary virtuous behavior—the cornerstone of the classical 
republicanism—could not serve the new nation was a widely shared view. Reporting the results 
of the Convention to Thomas Jefferson, who as the U.S. minister for France was taking his 
residence in Paris, James Madison notes,    
A voluntary observance of the federal law by all members [states], could never be 
hoped for. A compulsive one could never be reduced to practice…. Hence was 
embraced the alternative of a Government which instead of operating on the 
States, should operate without their intervention on the individuals composing 
them; and hence the change in the principle and proportion of representation.26 
By the time of the Convention, the delegates had understood that the virtue-based subjective 
republicanism could not pragmatically deliver to the people a political environment to exercise 
their liberty freely. For the framers of the Constitution, restraining the power of the majority and 
respecting the individual liberty become  fundamental objectives in “the new plan of 
government.”27 The new Constitution thus needed a system of check-and-balances where the 
party or the person in power would not be able to violate the individual rights.28 For that purpose, 
the delegates envisioned an independent and stable judiciary with the power to interpret the 
                                                          
26 The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution Digital Edition, ed. John P. 
Kaminski, Gaspare J. Saladino, Richard Leffler, Charles H. Schoenleber and Margaret A. Hogan. 
Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2009. Original source: Commentaries on the 
Constitution, Volume XIII: Commentaries on the Constitution, No. 1) 
27 The framers were thinking more about the new plan of government rather than the genre of the 
written constitution. In the contemporary writings, the two expressions are almost 
interchangeable, but “the new plan” is used more extensively.  
28 Certainly, the notion of individual did not include many human beings residing in the United 
States at that time. Enslaved persons were treated as property of proper individuals. Although 
many people found it abominable, the idea of an individuals’ property rights sanctioned slavery. 
That only propertied white man could exercise his sovereignty without self-interest a powerful 





Constitution. This same interest led to voluntary term limits for the Supreme Court Justices so 
that they could function without the any apprehension of firing from the elected governmental 
authorities. The point is this: while virtue-based and liberty-granting aspiration embedded in 
subjective republicanism could rally wide participation during the Revolutionary War, it was 
insufficient to offer an effective governmental framework in the post-Independence America. 
Only systematically delineated government plan could save the country and help the republic to 
sustain its republican aspiration. The written constitution become the tool to achieve that goal.  
  The written constitution however did not just translate classical republicanism into 
American context. The weight of the pragmatics was so heavy that the genre had to reconfigure 
republicanism in the image that would fulfill multiple interests in the prevailing context. With 
the progression of the 1780s, the founders had started to feel that the Article had failed to address 
the need of the new nation. The 1781 Articles represented the republican spirt as it emphasized 
the sovereignty of states. As scholars have widely written, direct participatory local systems were 
the best forms of republic in the classical republican system; although the states were not as 
small as the classical republicanism suggested, their relatively smaller size in comparison to the 
Union made sense. But, as the events after the promulgation of the 1781 Articles suggested, the 
arrangement did not work. Now, the Congress needed to come up with an alternative plan if the 
United States were to remain viable. One challenge on the way remained re-contextualizing 
republicanism to meet the challenges facing the new republic. If the new nation were to sustain, 
republicanism—in whatever way it was understood—had to be adjusted with the pragmatics of 
the context. The new government plan had to preserve the motives and aspirations of 
republicanism that had inspired the Revolution. This was partly also because there was no other 





adjusting the pragmatic concerns of the new republic and spirit of subjective republicanism was 
the prime objective of the new Constitution. To understand how different the discourse of 
republicanism had become and how far the pragmatics had taken lead during the drafting and 
ratification, we have to turn to Hamilton. In the article “Conjectures About the New 
Constitution,” published sometimes between September 17-30, 1787, he writes: 
The new constitution has in favor of its success these circumstances—a very great 
weight of influence of the persons who framed it, particularly in the universal 
popularity of General Washington—the good will of the commercial interest  
throughout the states which will give all its efforts to the establishment of a 
government capable of regulating, protecting and extending the commerce of the 
Union—the good will of the most men of property in the several states who wish  
a government of the union able to protect them against domestic violence and the 
depredations which the democratic spirit is apt to make on property; and who 
besides anxious for the respectability of the nation—the hopes of the Creditors of 
the United States that the general government possessing the means of doing it 
will pay the debt of the Union—a strong belief in the people of the insufficiency 
of the present confederation to preserve the Union and of the necessity of the 
Union to their safety and prosperity. (9) 
While he justifies how the proposed Constitution would function in the best of the republican 
spirit in some of his federalist papers, this almost private conjecture demonstrates that the fate of 
the constitution rested on its ability to fulfil the commercial and military interest of the powerful 
elites. Undoubtedly, the Constitution gained favorable weight from the ethos of Washington and 





But, as Hamilton conjectures, the republicanism of the new Constitution had a chance of 
ratification only if it could fulfill other, not-so-republican interest themselves. In other words, the 
spiritual virtue-based purity embedded in subjective republicanism was undergoing 
transformation through the Constitution. And, it had to go through that process if republicanism 
were to serve the new nation meaningfully. Thus, the written constitution transformed 
republicanism for Americans so that the political view could meet the interests of the time.   
2.3 Republicanism, Constitutionalism, and the Written Constitution    
 While legal traditions had existed for thousands of years in many civilizations and 
certainly the United States was looking back to a long western tradition dating back to Greco-
Roman time, the absence of written constitutions in the past raises the question: how did the U.S. 
Constitution or the state constitutions written during that period gain the kind of functional 
currency at a time when the genre convention was not developed enough to warrant such power? 
I argue that while the Constitution helped define republicanism for the United States, prevailing 
republicanism—no matter how subjective it was—also provided the context for the emergence of 
the genre. As Arthur E. Sutherland documents a long European history from the “Great Charter 
of 1215” to many English experiments with Cromwellian Revolution and the 1688 Glorious 
Revolution prepared for the conceptual dawn of constitutionalism.29 Undeniably, these 
precedents of contracts and laws showed way to constitution. Maybe republicanism of some sort 
must have had some role in the case of those precedents for those charters, laws and contracts to 
be operational. But in the case of the United States in the eighteenth-century, republicanism 
played significant role in the advent of constitutionalism. Republican opposition to a person’s 
arbitrary regime required a nation an objective set of rules for its functioning. If Americans did 
                                                          





not want a new British-modelled king, they needed a powerful governing tool with an ability to 
run the state, operate politics, and legitimize and delegitimize political activities. The written 
constitution answered that need. If no single person or divine authority were to be trusted with 
the ultimate power, a procedurally framed and ratified hallowed text could be agreed as the 
anchoring legitimizing force. Thus, it is this eighteenth-century American republican intellectual 
and cultural atmosphere that offered the written constitution the kind of genre power that it 
enjoys now. So, to recapitulate the argument, while Americans had a subjective and thus a 
multifaceted understanding of republicanism that hindered an easy and automatic emergence of a 
national government, the fact that republicanism was widely shared and valued provided an 
intellectual and ideological fertile ground for the genesis of the written constitution as a genre. 
 This point is important to accentuate because the analysis of the function of a genre needs 
an understanding of its ideology. As Amy Dewitt has argued, a genre embodies an ideological 
disposition. In the absence of an ideological or functional core, a genre becomes unrecognizable 
or stops performing in the way its convention dictates it to function. While exact functions of a 
genre can be different in various contexts, the genre imposes its ideology to a degree in all 
contexts and knowing the ideology can help a genre analyst to understand how a genre imposed 
its governing ideological disposition differently in different contexts.    
 The ideology of the written constitution is constitutionalism, the idea that written 
constitution holds the supreme position in a nation-state, that all political decision—including the 
amendments of the Constitution—should be made in reference to this text. The written 
constitution has been used for a variety of purposes for the last two centuries, and by now the 
genre has become so fundamental to the institution of the nation-state that even dictators deploy 





constitutionalism to its core. This attraction to the written constitution comes from the genre’s 
power of legitimization. But the question comes, since the legitimizing power of the written 
constitution does not emanate from constitutional texts themselves, what is the source? Certainly, 
for now, after more than two hundred years’ history, the international genre convention that 
originated with the American experimentation accords the new constitutions their authority to 
legitimize and delegitimize activities within its jurisdiction. But in the eighteenth-century when 
such convention did not exist, republicanism provided the written constitution the functional 
power that other non-constitutional text cannot claim.      
 As Timothy Sweet has noted in his comments on the previous draft of this chapter, one 
fundamental characteristic marked the difference between Cato, the Roman republican legend 
discussed earlier, and the founding American generation. Cato chose suicide to uphold his 
republican virtue; for him, dying a worthy death triumphed over living a philosophically 
compromised life. While republicanism was still subjective in character, the republicanism that 
Cato crafted for him was a definite honorable code of conduct without much leeway for different 
courses of action: If one could not live virtuously, suicide remained one of the best alternatives. 
An honorable death sanctified a gloriously lived life. Indeed, dying untainted—that is, remaining 
uncorrupted until the end of one’s life—held the most prized yardstick of traditional 
republicanism; remaining untainted needed the most challenging task—remaining sovereign over 
one’s own disciplines. This yardstick tested one’s ability to will the virtuous course of life, and to 
discipline oneself for remaining true to the will. So, while this kind of austere self-disciplinary 
republican mechanism provided some determined persons a spiritually guided secular course of 
life, republics failed constantly because republicanism rested mostly on personal ability to 





secondary to living a virtuous life or dying a horrible death for this political imagination.   
 But American founding generation wanted a system of republican governance geared 
towards longevity rather than suicide.30 The generation constantly thought about the failure of 
the past republican experiments, taking the historical burden to themselves to correct the 
trajectories of republics.31 If they were to respond to this historical burden effectively, the 
founding generation had to be creative, going beyond merely adopting the Cato-styled republican 
belief. They had to devise a way to create a sustainable republic that would live long and 
pragmatically align the republican virtue with a multitude of multigenerational interests and 
fundamental human tendencies.         
 They responded to this historical burden by formulating the collective national selfhood 
through the written constitution. They created “we the people”: Now, certainly it mattered that 
individual citizens conduct themselves in a virtuous manner, but even more important for the 
new republic became the preservation of the national selfhood by following constitutional 
procedure.  What is interesting is that this national selfhood was more than the sum of the 
people; it was a constitutionally produced abstract idea that needed to be saved for the 
functioning and longevity of the republic. An individual citizen was theoretically a part of this 
                                                          
30 Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address is particularly remarkable in this connection. In the address, he 
highlights how the outcome of the Civil War was directly relevant to the historical burden 
expressed by the founding generation. Saving the Union for Lincoln was about whether the 
republican experiment could remain viable on the face of the planet. As Lincoln presents, the 
outcome of the Civil War would suggest whether the United States was a historically different 
kind of republic—one destined to last longer than to have vanished with the caprices of some 
players. 
31 That the new republic might not last longer was a constant theme during the formative phase 
of the United States. In the absence of an anchoring institution such as monarchy, the United 
States seemed an idealistic proposition liable to corruption. The continental size of the nation 
added further enigma. Given the fact that no public document like the Constitution in the way we 
understand it today existed prior to the American experimentation did not foreground the written 
constitution as the kind of anchoring institution in the way it emerged to be. It was a unique idea 





collective selfhood, could contribute to the construction of this selfhood by participating in the 
elections and other national ceremonies and events, and would automatically remain under the 
jurisdiction of this abstraction. But this collective national selfhood itself, however, was 
impersonal in nature. No single individual could assume or replace it. As explained in the 
introductory chapter, this collective national selfhood replaced the tradition monarch.    
 The construction of collective national selfhood—a concept that Lincoln was trying to 
preserve in the Civil War—was of paramount significance for the transformation of 
republicanism in the United States. Now, the people could be governed from outside, but the 
governing agency would not be the human arbitrary rule—like the one Americans experienced 
prior to the Revolutionary War. They would be governed by collective sovereign national being 
secularly crafted through their own participation. They could assume that this collective selfhood 
could be judicious, virtuous and republican in nature because they would themselves participate 
in its formulation. This formulation automatically incorporated the concept of the consent of the 
governed. While the agency was externalized in the Constitution with all the procedures and 
system of power delegation system codified by it, the people technically were governing 
themselves. The spirit remained truly republicanism.           
 Thus, while the written constitution helped the United States to contextualize 
republicanism, republicanism provided the written constitution the power to be the supreme 
governing agency of the land.  
2.4 The Constitution and Unresolved Ambiguities       
 The claim that the Constitution defined republicanism for the United States does not 
mean that the document resolved all ambiguities and differences within republicanism. The text 





sovereignties of the federal government and states could be settled for the time, and the division 
of power among the branches of the government could be determined. The Constitution also 
included specific provisions such as the term of office for the president, the number of members 
in the congress, and the process of constitutional amendment. But the power of the text 
originated from its flexibility of interpretation: The people ratified it because the document could 
bring–if not all—at least the differences between Hamilton and Madison together prompting 
them to advocate for its ratification. Not only the text included the provision of its amendment, 
the Constitution opened the door for judicial interpretation. It claimed its immortality and 
irreplaceability to the point that all future sovereignties and amendments would be dictated by 
the Constitution.32 But the promise of its immortality rests on the idea of an unending possibility 
of amendments. Indeed, the words in the preamble, “We The People of the United States, in 
Order to form a more perfect Union,” which must have had a different meaning for the framers, 
captures the spirit of flexibility of the text. 33       
 Indeed, the ratification could be materialized because the document could speak to the 
interests of the majority of the people. To garner that support, not only the framers inserted the 
unanimity of voice among them, but also carefully selected the words to avoid ideologically 
contentious dictions. Some ambiguity in the Constitution was part of the strategy. Literary 
scholar Richard Ferguson comments, “the unanimity injected into the language of the 
constitution. . .. enforce[d] [internal] allegiance” and posed the unity to external powers (134). 
Only by the “epistemological ambiguities” and “philosophical uncertainties,” and by the “careful 
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Amendments function as additions on the existing texts. Even after the certain provisions are 
amended, the provisions continue to exist in the Constitution, although they stop functioning.    
33 The expression stood for the failure of the Articles of Confederation and hoped for the 





circumvention of controversial words like ‘national,’ ‘republic, and ‘federal,” the drafters 
managed to pass the Constitution (Ferguson 130-137).  Rhetorician Kenneth Burke in his A 
Grammar of Motives characterizes the Constitution as “a set of [idealistic] wishes more or less at 
odds with one another” (375). Burke thus calls the Constitution “a calculus of motives” or an 
“anecdote summational in character…wherein human relations grandly converge” (Grammar 
325, 324). Repeating some of the ideas from the introductory chapter, Burke highlights the 
unavoidability of contradictory impulses in the Constitution for it to be acceptable for a large 
mass of people. To illustrate his point about the contradiction within the Constitution, he writes: 
“A public right, for instance, ‘necessarily implies’ a private obligation or a private jeopardy; a 
private right ‘inevitably’ implies a public obligation or a public jeopardy” (Burke, Grammar 
375). Virginia Anderson characterizes the Constitution as a postmodern text, “a metonymic 
constellation of contingent possibilities relying on contextual interpretation for implementation 
and realization” (276). She further writes, “the Constitution is a bundle of incipient antitheses 
waiting to be highlighted rhetorically in litigation, then reconstructed rhetorically through 
paratactic reassociations (Anderson 276).        
 While these rhetoricians and postmodernists might see the contradictions in the 
Constitution as structures needed to craft a governing mandate and may attach a particular court 
verdict to a certain side of contradictions within the Constitution, the proponents of the idea of a 
living constitution find the document not performing that role. As the proponents of the idea of 
living constitution have argued, the functionality of the Constitution remains in its capacity to 
accommodate the changing historical perspectives. As they describe, the Constitution does not 
even have to be amended for such accommodation. David A. Strauss, a powerful voice for the 





for judicial interpretation (111). It does not mean that the Constitution does not have 
specificities. But on the contentious philosophical issues, the Constitution has an abundant 
“generality” that offers the possibility of attaching court decisions to the Constitution. He writes, 
“the genius of the U.S. Constitution is precisely that it is specific where specificity is valuable 
and general where generality is valuable” (112). Certainly, originalists reject this proposition and 
argue that the words of the Constitution as written during the Philadelphia Convention holds the 
capacity to direct judicial interpretation. They maintain that judges must refer to the intension of 
the framers of the Constitution and the amendments to make their decisions; doing otherwise 
would transform the judges into unelected legislators. While the originalists have a point and that 
the Constitution continues to shape American political and social life far deeper ways than many 
living constitutionalists may agree to, the fact that the nuances in the meaning of words change 
from one historical context to another suggests that clinging with the originalist interpretation 
may be a pragmatically unattainable hermeneutic wish.           
 So, all this discussion boils down to the following conclusion: While the written 
constitution helped the United States to define the terms of republicanism, it did not completely 
fix and settle the definition for always. The framers offered the frames of governance, for which 
details could be supplied later according to the spirit of the succeeding time. The Constitution 
provided a general framework on which every generation would have the opportunity to insert its 
idea of republicanism or an acceptable principle of governance by legislation, judicial 
interpretation, and constitutional amendments by following the procedures in the Constitution. 
This flexibility not only helped for the ratification, but also structured the possibility of the 
Constitution’s growth—ensuring the longevity of the Constitution and the country in the process. 





became the core of the state that not only provided the United State a stable reference point but 
also the promise of growth.  
2.5 A Move from Written/Spoken Word to Genre       
 Then the question becomes this: what is there to be gained by foregrounding the role of 
the written constitution as a genre in the externalization of republicanism and the formation of 
the United States? The role of the word in the formation of the Revolutionary culture and the 
republic is well-documented. Michael Warner’s sophisticated book, for instance, has placed the 
written word at the foundation of the United States. Borrowing from Jürgen Habermas, Warner 
argues that print culture in mid-eighteenth-century United States created a public sphere that 
could comment on both the domestic and governmental spheres with an independence never seen 
so dominantly in the history before. All those intense deliberations during the ratification of the 
Constitution would not have materialized in the absence of the public sphere. He argues that the 
modern conception of citizenship that emerged during that period relied on the silent 
consumption of printed material, a process in which the reader could imagine as a member of 
what Benedict Anderson terms an “imagined community” built on the strength of print 
technology and the political and ideological apparatus that accompanied it. On the other hand, 
Sandra Gustafson and Christopher Looby in their separate works have highlighted the 
significance of the spoken word and eloquence for the large scale democratic participation of the 
time.34 Madison’s documentation of the speeches delivered during the Constitutional Convention 
justifies Gustafson’s argument that the direct oral exchanges of ideas was key to the negotiating 
process through which the framers could agree on a draft of the document to be sent for the 
ratification. While these scholars may disagree on the degree of significance in the mode of 
                                                          





delivery, they have collectedly established the primacy of the word in the creation of the United 
States. Indeed, this assertion cannot be denied; the United States is the republic built with the 
words.            
 But what I’m arguing is this: the words could be formative to the way the history of the 
United States unfurled subsequently because of the genre of the written constitution. Merely 
establishing the significance of the word or its deep and wide-ranging use does not explain how 
they formed the United States. In many ways these conditions prevailed in other European 
locations contemporaneously, a prevalence that did not automatically lead to the constructions of 
the nation-states. Indeed, the print culture brought about deep transformation in the political 
subjectivity of the people and the idea of modern citizenship became conceivable on this 
platform. But these factors, such as the existence of public sphere, the technological and 
economic infrastructure for the dissemination the printed word, and eloquence themselves served 
more as parts of what genre theorists David Russell terms as “activity system” for the written 
constitution.35 Russel argues that genres do not function independently; they need an entire 
system of activities for them to be functional. Unquestionably, these factors—print culture, 
public sphere, and eloquence—were not only parts of the activity system of the written 
constitution; they had their own impacts and must have been parts of other genre systems as 
well. And, indisputably, the written constitution as it developed in the United States could not be 
conceived without these factors. The written constitution could not have originated or got 
experimented or become functional in the absence of these factors such as the newspapers for 
printing federalist and anti-federalist polemics, coffeehouses for deliberating the consequences of 
proposed constitutions, and public addresses generating response from the common citizens. 
                                                          





These variables provided an indispensable supportive role for the wide-ranging experimentation 
of the written constitution at the state and federal levels. But their formative impact on the 
United States as a nation-state can only be explained by relating them with the genre of the 
written constitution. The nation could be conceived in a deliberate fashion because the genre 
provided a mechanism for such enterprise.        
 Thinking from the vantage point of Lincoln’s Gettysburg address can clarify this point. 
The whole point of the Civil War as stated in the address was whether “a new nation, conceived 
in liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal…shall not perish from 
the earth.” In the address, he uses the 1776 Declaration as the point of the new nation’s origin. 
The United States might have gained independence and emerged as a new nation in 1776 and its 
Revolutionary ideals might have directed its future course, but the United States that he was 
trying save came from the Constitution. All conditions including the words, public sphere, and 
other documents such as the Declaration of Independence established the condition, but it was 
the written constitution that gave the government.       
 To state the same idea differently, the written constitution shaped the governing structure 
of the United States giving a concrete operational form to republicanism. Although the United 
States was conceived in the 1776 with republicanism serving as its governing ideology, both 
concepts remained oppositional semiabstract phenomena that could be highly effective in 
combating the British empire but proved short in details and functionality when having to 
address the governing needs after the Independence. Indeed, the Revolutionary ideals and 
republicanism offered the ideological foundation for the experimentation with the written 
constitution. But what is equally significant is that in the absence of this genre, some form of 





the fate of the United States. The experiment that Lincoln was trying preserve originated from 
the written constitution.            
 To accentuate this point, we need some discussion of genre—particularly how genres 
create an environment for the possibility of an action. As rhetorical genre theorists have 
established, institutions, thoughts and social actions do not originate by themselves.36 While 
genres are not completely deterministic because the user uptakes of a genre can vary from one 
situation to another producing situation-specific result, how we act in certain situations are 
mostly shaped and made thinkable by the existence of a range of genres in our disposal. As Anis 
Bawarshi argues the availability of genre for a social action makes its existence possible; a 
typical recurring social action anticipates the existence of a corresponding genre. This idea 
implies that any theorization of the formation of the United States entails the recognition of the 
roles of genres. Words themselves do not make institutions; they need to be structured in genres 
for creating recognizable, recurring situations. Undoubtedly, the United States in eighteenth-
century did not ready-made genre convention except some motifs offered by classical republican 
references. The whole experimentation with the written constitution in the two decades following 
the Independence not only gave the world the genre in which a secular, republican nation-state 
could be imagined, but also served as the formative genre for the United States.    
 To highlight the genre-function of the written constitution, it would be important to 
discuss how the written constitution was different from the genres associated with it in the past.37 
The Constitution embodied a remarkable departure mainly in two regards—its immortality and 
the ability for amendment. The Constitution played with an interesting structural puzzle: almost 
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37 I’m grateful to Dr. Timothy Sweet for pointing me to this direction, particularly asking me to 






everything written in it can be changed, but the Constitution itself could not be replaced.38 The 
spirit of the time could modify the text but the constitution itself could not be discarded. This 
condition equips the constitution with a unique genre power; it places the idea of 
constitutionalism at the center of the new republics’ policy. Now, the people—common citizens 
and people holding the public offices—were accountable to the Constitution. The allegiance to 
the Constitution—not the king—thus become the central tenet of this new political 
imagination.39  Indeed, the genres performing some functions of the written constitutions existed 
throughout human history. The functioning of an organized community needed governing laws; 
even despotic rulers who loved to present themselves as the rule required to issue decrees for 
governance. No matter how severe, brute power alone never organized human society. Often, 
such power was used to enforce the law people did not find conscionable. Within the European 
tradition, non-autocratic laws existed; the whole history of republicanism in a sense was about 
the practice and quest for such kind of law. For instance, the 1688 Glorious Revolution of Britain 
constitutionalized monarchy and established the supremacy of parliament. New laws were passed 
                                                          
38 The functional efficiency of this conundrum could be understood with the example of the 1990 
Nepali Constitution.  Widely touted within Nepal and aboard, this constitution was a 
compromised document that ensured constitutional monarchy and parliamentary democracy. In 
one unique way, the constitution differed from the American Constitution. It not only claimed its 
immortality but also presented certain features of the constitution as inalterable. That provision 
of inalterability—while it worked perfectly within the power dynamics of time when the 
Constitution was framed—created resistance against it. Given the idea of certain things’ 
inalterability, even the proponents of the constitution could not speak in the document’s favor, 
requiring the country to write a new constitution. The longevity/immortality of a constitution 
requires a limitless transformability.  It is in this structural conundrum rests the genius of the 
American Constitution. 
39 For a twenty-first century American, who grew up reciting “the Pledge of Allegiance” in her 
school, this notion may appear to be a simple, everyday phenomenon. But it is in this capacity to 
be so common and applicable in everyday life lied the unique historical innovation involved in 
the emergence and function of the written constitution. Previously, allegiances used to be either 
to the god, a king, or to organizations—not to a text. The puritan foregrounding of the Bible as 
the text must have had its influence in this development, but again such sources should not 





for that effect. But what is unique with the American Constitution was the idea of amendment. 
The Constitution did not have to die for the new ideas to be incorporated: This promise of 
constitutional immortality and ever-lasting growth established the idea that a country could be 
anchored around the text while the text itself could go through modification.  
2.6 Conclusion           
 Thus, the written constitution externalized subjective republicanism in such a way that 
republicanism could be continuously redefined through constitutional amendment. The 
Constitution promised the people the inalterability of constitutionalism that there would be no 
human dictator lording over them. The genre also promised that the people could forge their 
rules collectively by codifying them in the Constitution. The written constitution thus served as 
the major tool for the United States to transform the subjective form of republicanism into a 
governing political structure, a structure that provides a solid anchoring framework for the 
governmental operation but also is flexible enough to incorporate changing historical 
perspectives. The printed words, public sphere and eloquence were necessary conditions for the 
emergence of the genre of the written constitution; they therefore functioned as parts of 
infrastructure for the written constitution but were not in themselves sufficient to define 
republicanism as a governing form and to formulate the United States as the kind of nation-state 
as it came to be. The written constitution assumed the pivotal challenge of contextualizing an 
ancient subjective political ideology into a governing thought—a process that also inaugurated a 
new kind of secular politics of nation-states in the world.     
 Although this chapter has established the leading role of the written constitution in 
formulating republicanism to the United States, the project would benefit further from a research 





the possibilities for the federal Constitution. That the art and genre of the written constitution 
emerged from the rich and extensive experimentation with state constitutions is well-documented 
fact in scholarship. But a nuanced research on how republicanism articulated in the Constitution 
itself was slowly fine-tuned with different state constitutions and what aspects of which 
constitutions became formative structures for the federal experimentation would add details and 






















Chapter 3: The Cherokee Constitutional Rhetoric: From Eighteenth-Century Politics of 
Identification to Twenty-first Century Vision of Transterritorial Sovereignty    
3.1 Introduction 
In 1827, the Cherokee Nation promulgated its first written constitution, creating a 
western-styled centralized government that undermined its traditional system of independent 
towns. 40 Faced with the crisis of removal from their ancestral homeland and prospect of 
annihilation, the Cherokees at that time needed a one-door political authority to negotiate with 
the United States in their attempt to save their land. Amidst their relatively dwindling fighting 
power compared to the growing U.S. military strength, their only meaningful recourse for 
protecting their land was to use the discourse that the United States could understand. In a sense, 
the Cherokees entered that phase of history when they had to fight for their survival and 
sovereignty rhetorically—persuading the United States on the value of their continued existence 
in their land instead of winning the enemy by warfare. This need and ability to respond to the 
shifting national and international context has remained a potent instrument of resistance, 
survival and sovereignty for the Cherokee Nation historically from its first adoption of the 
written constitution in 1827 to this day, making the Nation a rich field of rhetorical actions. 
 As the introductory chapter describes, the major thrust of this dissertation rests on 
understanding the genre functions of the written constitution. Keeping that interest in mind, the 
question for this chapter becomes, what function does the written constitution perform for the 
Cherokee Nation? Focusing primarily on the two phases of the Cherokee history—the first third 
of the nineteenth-century and the last quarter of the twentieth-century because of the Nation’s 
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the emergence of the Cherokee Nation. See Conley (75-80) for Cherokee matrilineal clan 
system: every Cherokee belonged to one of the seven clans, but the clans themselves did not 





intensified constitutional activities during the periods— I demonstrate that the written 
constitution as the most powerful legitimizing political genre of the secular west provided the 
Cherokee Nation with a dominant space for articulating its sovereignty. Amidst the imminent 
removal from their ancestral homeland in the early nineteenth-century, the Cherokee elites 
realized that they could make a compelling case in their favor only by identifying with the 
discourses, genre conventions and institutions of western modernity if they were to survive the 
massive imbalance of power between themselves and the United States. They launched a 
rhetorically powerful program that I—drawing on Kenneth Burke—call ‘the politics of 
identification’ for which they transformed themselves into a modern nation-state, used their 
transformation as the proof of their progress in the way demanded by the Washington 
Administration’s Indian policy, and appealed to a range of the entities of the United State from 
public sphere to the Supreme Court to recognize its sovereignty and independence. The 1827 
written constitution, where they asserted their sovereign ownership to their ancestral land as 
specified by the treaties with the United States, remained at the core of this entire process. This 
claim that the nineteenth-century Cherokee adoption of the written constitution and discourse of 
civilization was a part of politics of identification designed for national sovereignty directs the 
scholarly conversation beyond assimilationist-traditionalist paradigm.   
 While the 1976 and 1999 Cherokee Constitutions still accentuate the idea of the written 
constitution as a major legitimate space for articulating national sovereignty and its internal 
distribution, the documents also demonstrate that sovereignty is not an ahistorical phenomenon. 
Practices of sovereignty are historical formations produced with the use of genres in rhetorically 
active situations. For instance, while the 1976 Constitution does not include strong statements on 





displayed the idea of the Cherokee Nation as a distinct and separate identity. The 1976 Cherokee 
Constitution’s mandatory provision of its revision by every generation opened the space for the 
1999 Constitution that dramatically redefines the contours of a nation’s internal sovereignty: 
Faced with the limited land-base and the need to address the representation of dispersed 
population outside its territorial boundaries, the 1999 Constitution envisions what I call a 
“digitalized deterritorial sovereignty.”  In this vision, the citizens of the nation residing outside 
its formal territory can send their representatives to the National Council without having to 
register with any of its territorial districts. To use the possibility of synchronous presence 
afforded by the digital media, the constitution requires the government to maintain a continuous 
system of publication and contact with its citizens. While other old systems remain functional, 
the Nation maintains the required connection now via its official website, catapulting the vision 
of a nation beyond territoriality to the digital deeper space.  I argue that the further articulation of 
this vision can serve as an example to other nations with deep ramifications to how we think of 
the nation-state and its relationship with territory.       
 While the visions of sovereignty in the 1827, 1976 and 1999 Cherokee Constitutions may 
be different, what grants them the position of legitimacy is the function of the written 
constitution. Legitimizing function of the written constitution has become such a hegemonic 
ideology by now that stating it seems almost like a redundant, all-known, unnecessary fact. But it 
is by stating the all-known, too obvious to be told, that we come to realize the constructive—
even deterministic—ideology of a genre. The written constitution as a genre might have 
remained fundamentally similar (not identical) in its form in its existence for more-than-two-





sovereignty—but in providing a space for articulating them. The deployment of the genre in the 
Cherokee Nation’s history testifies this fact.  
What follows is divided in main two parts. In the first part that covers early nineteenth-
century context, I read the 1827 Constitution, laws, lawsuits, court verdicts, memorials, 
editorials, and other primary documents to demonstrate the logic, nature and effects of the 
Cherokee politics of identification. My aim in establishing the broader context of the politics of 
identification—instead of merely dwelling on the 1827 Constitution alone—is an attempt to 
manifest how the function of a genre such as the written constitution can be understood only by 
placing it in the entire system of activities in which it participates. Besides rhetorical genre 
theories discussed in the introductory chapter, I also use rhetorical concepts from Kenneth Burke 
and Homi K. Bhabha, cultural theories of digital technology, and various theories of sovereignty 
in course of my interpretation.  In the first part, I hope to demonstrate that the Cherokee Nation 
appropriated the discourse of modernity—the written constitution and the institutions and 
political procedures instituted by such constitution— to establish the identification effect with 
the United States, and, in the process, exposed the ambivalence of U.S. colonial discourse that 
exerts its force even today with new intensity—often in the language of formal apologies. In the 
relatively shorter second part, I focus on the 1976 and 1999 Cherokee Constitution to particularly 
highlight the innovation in the conception of sovereignty and how the written constitution has 
served as the generic locus of such innovation.   
3.2 The Rhetoric of Survival: Nineteenth-century Cherokee Adoption of Modernity, the 
Politics of Identification and the Written Constitution       
 In the early nineteenth-century, the Cherokees found themselves in such an existentially 





foreign relationship could no longer sustain them in new international political order. In the 
context of the disappearance of many other Native American tribes and the mainstream United 
States’ prognosis that the Cherokees also would follow the suit, the Cherokees needed a survival 
strategy. Since they could not fight a traditional war with neighboring states or the federal 
government, the Cherokee elites realized that they could survive only by appropriating the 
master discourse of Euro-American modernity. They transformed themselves into the image of 
the United States by constituting a centralized national government, of which the declaration of 
the 1827 written constitution that was modeled after the U.S. Constitution was a pivotal moment. 
 In a powerful rhetorical study of the 1830 Indian Removal Act and the two memorials 
submitted to the Congress by the Cherokee Nation and its citizens against the removal, Arnold 
Krupat analyzes the nature of Cherokee argument. He writes, “Cherokee removal, as emplotted 
by the Cherokees, is not the tragic story of the Whites would tell of the sad-but-just-punishment 
meted out by the God, fate, or even the progress of history” (161). It would instead be “the story 
of ironic victimization” (italic origina,161). The Cherokee emplottment “will not allow their 
dispossession to be seen, as savagist ideology would have it, as inevitable or necessary, neither 
God’s will or Nature’s law” (161). It would rather be “the result of no more than the force of 
American imperial power” (161).  In the rest of this section, I hope to demonstrate that the 
Cherokee emplottment of the story as the “ironic victimization” rested on the rhetorical strategies 
of adopting and identifying with the discourses of the west so that they could establish 
themselves as the victims within the category comprehensible and recognizable to the United 
States.             
 This rhetorical move of combating the existential crisis by adopting the master discourses 





well-known theory. Instead of opposing the basic character of the United States as the intruding 
inimical force into the Cherokee territory, the politics of identification allowed the Cherokees to 
appeal to the moral and legal foundations of the United States for their sovereignty. In adopting 
modernity, the Cherokees tried to transcend wartime strategies and confrontational politics “of 
scramble, of insult, bickering, [and] squabbling” (Burke, Rhetoric 20).41  They could instead 
“look beyond this order [that of traditional war], to the principle of identification”—a process 
through which they could forge a cooperative, communal and recognizing relationship with the 
United States by “mimicking” (in Bhabha’s sense of the term) the western discursive and 
political patterns (Burke, Rhetoric 21).42  Speaking the same language could help them to 
establish a subliminal connection with the United States, a connection that they would use to 
assert their existence as a distinct political entity—a relationship of equal fraternity and 
understanding: “you persuade a man only in so far you can talk his language, tonality, order, 
image, attitude, idea, identifying your way with his” (Burke, Rhetoric 55). By transforming 
themselves into the discursive and institutional pattern of the United States, the Cherokees tried 
to strike a communicational cord that would require the parties in the conversation to recognize 
one another’s basic existence, dignity and sovereignty.      
                                                          
41 One major tendency among Burke scholar is to rhetoricize the idea itself, particularly by 
placing it in the historical, cultural and biographical contexts of its origin. M. Elizabeth Weiser 
thinks that the idea was the theorist’s response the twentieth-Century World Wars and 
philosophical conundrums. Richard Graff and Wendy Winn think of identification as a cognate 
concept coevolved with Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s notion of communion. They think that 
the identification and communion as rhetorical concepts serve as New Rhetoric’s master terms 
with some resonance with Aristotelian enthymeme. On the other hand, John W. Kirk thinks that 
identification is not merely an extension on Aristotle’s idea of persuasion, but “an essentially a 
new term” that “can no longer be profitably grouped within classical tradition” (414).    
Jay Jordon (265-269) chronicles the evolution of Burke’s understanding of identification. 
Edward G. Berlinski argues that Burke borrowed the term from Freudian psychoanalysis and was 
a novel contribution to rhetoric because of its focus on unconscious intersubjective process of 
exchange based on the participant’s identity (30-67).  





 The attraction of this self-transformation in the image of the other for the Cherokees 
rested on the identification’s promise of consubstantiality. On consubstantiality, Burke writes, 
A is not identical with his colleague, B. But insofar as their interested are joined, 
A is identified with B. Or he may identify himself with B even when their 
interests are not joined, if he assumes that they are, or is persuaded to believe so. 
Here are ambiguities of substance. In being identified with B, A is “substantially 
one” with a person other than himself. Yet at the same time he remains unique, an 
individual locus of motives. Thus he is both joined and separate, at once a distinct 
substance and consubstantial with another.  (Rhetoric 20-21)   
In being identified as a modern nation-state with a written constitution, the Cherokees could 
claim that they were “substantially one” with the United States. However, this identification or 
unity with the western modernity was valuable for them only because the United States—the 
consubstantiated other—could recognize the Cherokees “at once a distinct substance and 
consubstantial with another.” Therefore, here was an attempt by an existentially threatened tribe 
to establish a subliminal communal connection with its counterpart through the adoption of 
foreign discourses, institutions and culture. In the process, they created what Timothy Sweet 
calls a “counternarrative,” not opposing the white discourse itself, but using it to argue how they 
had “improved” as per the attributes expected of “civilized” persons and culture from the 
standard of contemporary mainstream white discourse.43      
                                                          
43  As Sweet argues, the Cherokees formulated a counternarrative with the claim that “Indians 
themselves could participate in the movement of progress, or, in contemporary language, 
‘improvement’” (124-25). As he notes, the Cherokee counternarrative appropriated the white 
discourse of “improvement” that valued the image of “sedentary farmers,” making pro-Removal 
whites difficult to argue “that Indian ‘savages’ were not making the best use of the environment 





 Such appropriation of modernity—an attempt at identification with the warring party—
could be a rhetorically influential politics for the Cherokee Nation because of the particular 
nature of the United States’ Policy of Indian Civilization of that time. As the policy’s name 
encapsulates, when the Washington administration, particularly Secretary of War Henry Knox, 
formulated the plan in the late 1700s, the administration’s intention was Indian containment 
through the Cherokees’ Christianization, participation in trade, and conversion from hunting to 
agriculture. Putting it another way, the policy planned for the construction of an amenable and 
recognizable Indian, someone who could be controlled “disciplinarily,” if not assimilated fully.44 
However, the Cherokee elites saw an opening in the policy for their own politics; they could 
appropriate the policy thoroughly directing it beyond the project’s original purport. They could 
transform themselves in the image of “civilized Indians,” but the transformation would be used 
to forward their own cause instead of fulfilling the policy’s intended original intention. As 
Andrew Denison writes, “The creation of a new Indian government was hardly what Knox had in 
mind when he made Indian Civilization a goal of federal policy. For the Cherokees who led the 
fight against the removal, however, the tribe’s written laws and political system were among the 
highest expressions of Cherokee progress” (20). Instead of assimilating themselves to the United 
States, Cherokees turned the U. S. policy into their own project. For them, the value of the 
project rested on the fact that it could be a “persuasive discourse as a discourse of cooperation 
through identification,” where “the writer attempts to identify or define in the entire course of 
discourse…in relation to her audience” (Mao, “Persuasion” 137, 138). In this politics of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
counternarrative was not designed for assimilation; the Cherokee spokesmen “insisted on 
separate nationhood and national sovereignty” (125).  
44 In the sense of Michel Foucault uses term in Discipline and Punish: The Birth of Prison. 
Disciplining for him is transforming habits using the discourses so that people start governing 





identification, the subjects appropriated the foreigners’ project to the point of exceeding its 
original purpose. Using Homi K. Bhabha’s term, the project was a politics of “mimicry” in 
which the Cherokees camouflaged themselves in the dominant discourse while not allowing it to 
totalize them within the parameters set by the policy. Through the project, they tried, as Burke 
describes, “producing assent by such appeals to character and emotion as [to] arouse the 
audience’s confidence in the speaker and his cause” (quoted in Wible 272). In a sense, the 
Cherokees developed the United States’ civilizing interest to an ironic level by claiming that they 
have become the whites themselves in terms of civilizational value. For instance, their appeal 
submitted to the U.S. Supreme Court against the state of Georgia in 1831 claimed, “They were 
willing to submit to a comparison [in terms of the progress they had achieved] with their white 
brethren around them” (Peters 27). The value of such claim of equivalence with the whites rested 
on the assumption that it would deprive the white establishment’s justification of the Indian 
dispossession based on Native savagery. Theda Perdue writes, “The rapid acculturation of the 
southeastern Indians in the first three decades of the nineteenth century weakened old 
justifications for dispossessing ‘savages,’ so states whose chartered boundaries contained Indian 
land began to insist that tribal governments threatened their sovereignty” (Perdue 1980, xxi). 
Thus, by turning the U.S. policy of Indian Civilization into their sovereignty-protecting project, 
the Cherokees projected themselves as a “rational” nation-state instituted in the tradition of 
modernity and thus worthy of participation, dignity and rights in the international system.  
 Their politics of identification can be theorized as having three phases. In the first phase, 
they organized themselves into the Cherokee Nation in the image of the United States. In the 
second phase, they used their transformation as an evidence of their “improvement” to generate 





U.S. court system to stop the White encroachment into their land when their public campaign 
could not garner enough support in the Congress against the Indian Removal Bill. The entire 
process was the politics of identification designed not for assimilation in the way anticipated by 
the contemporary federal Indian policy but a calculated move for claiming difference and 
independence by the tribe that had exhausted other instruments of effective resistance.     
3.3 The First Phase: The Cherokee Transformation and the Politics of Identification 
The first part of the Cherokee politics of identification involved the self-transformation in 
the image of the United States. As Cherokee historian Robert J. Conley writes, the “push toward 
remaking the Cherokee Nation in the image of the United States” turned the “the period between 
1819 and 1827 [into]…the single most remarkable period in Cherokee History” (103). As he 
sums up, the major motive for this unprecedented, “concerted effort at culture change” emerged 
from “a powerful impulse to hold the line against any further incursions on the Cherokee land 
base” (103). This degree of exigency behind the transformation can be gauged by the fact that 
the Cherokees were trying to replace a civilization “that had developed over countless 
generations and was especially suited to the needs, beliefs, and circumstances of the Cherokees” 
and that had “provided a safer and more secure environment for women and children” (Conley 
103-104). But the love for the traditional way of life weighed lesser in significance compared to 
the existential crisis brought about by the prospect of removal. The Cherokees therefore devoted 
to the change so deeply that “for any group of people to consciously remake themselves, to 
reshape their social and governmental institutions according to a set of foreign beliefs and forms, 
and to do so thoroughly, so well, and so quickly is remarkable occurrence in the history of the 
world” (Conley104).           





emanate from the Cherokees’ sheer love of western civilization. The incessant ceding of the land 
with an ever-new treaty with the Euromericans had forced them to reckon on their historical 
condition and to take an appropriate action if they were to survive at all. Almost all treaties 
signed earlier with the British government and later with the United States included a clause that 
the treaty would be the last one and the remaining land “shall forever” be protected for the tribe. 
However, the perpetual pressure for a new treaty and the federal government’s 1802 promise to 
Georgia that it would help extinguish the Cherokee title to the state essentially cast the shadow of 
doom for the Cherokees. As John Ridge, an influential young Cherokee political leader wrote in 
the mid-1820s, “Their existence was in danger & the Remedy was within themselves & this 
could be affected in the amendment of their government” (37). It was not that the Cherokees did 
not have a government before, but “their chiefs were numerous and their responsibility was 
trifling. Lands then could be obtained of them at a price most convenient to the U. States” (Ridge 
37). Ultimately, “the eyes of our Nation were opened to see their [the Cherokees’] folly” (Ridge 
37). During this period, they formed a centralized government both to create an internal order as 
well as to find a single legitimate authority to negotiate treaties with the United States. They also 
introduced Euromerican constitutional and institutional apparatus designing themselves into a 
recognizable entity adapting the western legal tradition, an attempt at what Bhabha calls 
“mimicry” to ward off the danger by an existentially threatened people.     
 To understand the persuasive force in this argument for the adoption of modernity, we 
should turn to the Cherokee Nation’s internal politics, particularly to the question of how the 
reformist section ultimately won over the forces that insisted on continuing with the traditional 
life style and political organization. As it can be expected in an old culture with engrained 





political structure and mode of living within the Cherokee Nation in the early nineteenth-century. 
Acculturation in the image of white civilization and the forging of Cherokee identity based on 
this “improvement” was not a smooth, automatic sail. Historian Theda Perdue writes, “In the 
1820s a major controversy erupted between progressives, who wanted Cherokee society to 
mirror that of Anglo-Americans, and traditionalists who wanted to preserve aboriginal practices 
and beliefs” (159). The conflict become intense with “the proposal that the Cherokees write a 
republican constitution” (Perdue 159). With the promulgation of the 1827 Constitution, local 
communities would lose their traditional power as it would be delegated to elected officials and 
centralized government. As William G. McLoughlin recounts, the introduction of national laws 
and the adoption of a written constitution in the 1820s also instigated “a widespread popular 
uneasiness” particularly because of “persistent efforts by the acculturated elites to please the 
missionaries by denigrating the customs and pastimes of the majority” (366). Despite this 
opposition, the progressive wing—made up mostly of mixed blood citizens with the skills to 
navigate white cultural world relatively effectively—could garner enough support within the 
nation because it demonstrated that transforming the Cherokee identity into the image of white 
civilization was the best politics available for maintaining their existence and sovereignty during 
that historical juncture.         
 Major Ridge, one of the most influential Cherokee leaders of the time, exemplifies the 
spirit of the politics of this macro tribal transformation at the personal biographical level. He was 
fundamentally a traditionalist in his political and cultural beliefs in the first decade of the 
nineteenth-century; he fiercely opposed to any further ceding of the land, particularly as seen in 
the revolt of the young chiefs in 1808 of which he was a major voice. But his engagement in the 





the late 1810s—must have taught him that the Cherokees needed a dramatic transformation 
within themselves and their style of engagement with the whites if they were to survive the 
impending removal and the existential threats posed by it. By proposing John Ross, a young mix-
blood Cherokee in a culture that prized age and war experience in its leader, for the leadership in 
1818, Major Ridge placed someone at the helm who could not only be the face of the changed 
Cherokee Nation but also could lead the politics of identification effectively. In a sense, his shift 
represented the win for the progressive wing within the internal politics of the Cherokee Nation. 
 Certainly, the progressive wing itself was not of a single unified view regarding the place 
of the United States in the Cherokee identity. As the post-1830 events would play out, Elias 
Boudinot, the founding editor of Cherokee Phoenix, for instance was at one end of the spectrum 
regarding the Cherokee Nation’s relationship with the White world: he had “genuine admiration 
for the United States as a model or culture and government,” believed that “civilization grows 
from savagery to civility,” and disdained “any definition of Native culture that might include 
traditional practices and beliefs” (Schneider 151). While he was against the removal originally, 
he signed the Treaty of Echota that allowed the United States to claim the legality of the removal 
and the Cherokees’ willingness for the action.  Principal Chief John Ross however was against 
the treaty as he differed from Boudinot in his assessment of how far the Cherokee Nation could 
save its sovereignty against the removal policy. Despite this difference, they did not differ in 
terms of the politics of identification. The progressive camp, mostly represented by mixed race 
Cherokees, could become dominant within the Cherokee power dynamics because they could 
demonstrate the logic of the politics of identification in the acculturation process.   
 Then the question becomes, was the “civilization” not a genuine interest of the 





analyze the whole situation by using the categories agent, agency, scene, purpose and attitude as 
presented in Burke’s dramatistic pentad—particularly to remove the confusion between “agency” 
and “purpose.” Was modernity the “purpose” for which they organized their loosely associated 
independent town governments into a bureaucratic nation-state, or an “agency” through which 
they tried to preserve their sovereignty by remaining in their contemporary homeland? First, as 
the state of Georgia and the United States started to pave the way for removing them, they 
refused to be a passive “scene” or ineffective waiter of the doom that engulfed most of the other 
Native American tribes. Rather they actively tried to be the “agent” of their fate through the 
“agency” of civilization and modernity. Thus, their embracing of the instruments, discourses and 
institutions of western modernity did not entail the purpose itself; It rather was an agency—a 
tool—for a different purpose. Although many Cherokees saw value in modernity and civilization 
themselves, the major impetus (as embodied in letters, memorials and legal briefs) behind the 
whole project of identification and self-transformation was a collective strategy for preserving 
their sovereignty, particularly the land base as specified by the 1785 treaty of Hopewell.    
The 1827 Cherokee Constitution particularly presents the purpose of the adoption of 
modernity in two ways. First, as Lewis Cass observed then, the declaration of the Constitution 
itself made the statement that Cherokee embracing of the “civilization” was not designed for 
assimilation. The Cherokees wanted to be like the United States, but not a  part of the United 
States itself. An epitome from the perspective of identification project, the Constitution was 
almost the replica of the Constitution of the United States: it introduced a republican form of 
government with check-and-balances among the three branches of government, and divided the 
nation into eight territorial districts for government services and electoral representation. The 





rational government—not a global phenomenon in early nineteenth-century world.  
 Second, despite modelling the Cherokee government after the United States, the 
Cherokee Constitution departs significantly from the U.S. Constitution in one major way. Unlike 
in the U.S. Constitution, the very first article of the Cherokee Constitution makes the statement 
on the boundaries of the nation’s territory: “The Boundaries of this nation, embracing the lands 
solemnly guaranteed and reserved forever to the Cherokee Nation by the treaties concluded with 
the United States, are as follows; and shall forever hereafter remain unalterably the same to wit.” 
Technically, a statement on the boundaries of a nation in a national constitution is redundant 
because while a constitution as the main law of the land aspires to hold complete influence 
within the nation’s borders, its jurisdictional capacity does not extend over the boundaries or 
lines of the nation separating it from others. National boundaries in practice are determined by 
war or treaties or the combination of both. Nations, such as the United States, also expect to 
grow and thus tend not to limit themselves with a statement on the fixity of their territorial 
boundaries. But introducing the U.S. styled written constitution and the institutions associated 
with it was not only about adopting a certain form of governance for the Cherokee Nation; it was 
as much a calculated rhetorical move designed to resist the removal lurking over their head. As 
McLoughlin writes, “By 1827 [with the adoption of the written constitution], the Cherokees had 
learned so well the ideology of their conquerors that they were able to use it against them” 
(xviii). The territorial statement—while redundant from the scope of the constitutional genre—
embodied the purpose of the whole identification project that the Cherokee Nation was launching 
during that period. Given the history that the Cherokee Nation itself often was not recognized as 
a legitimate entity largely because agents of the United States could sign treaties with their 





to both the Cherokee citizens as well as the outside audience: now, the Nation would not shed 
any land at all, and involving in the transaction would be automatically void, given the power of 
the constitutional genre. Certainly, the Nation had introduced a law for the same effect earlier in 
1822 as well, but the inclusion of the statement in the epitomical genre of secular politic would 
bear a higher claim of legitimacy and power.       
 Scrutinizing further, the article on the territorial boundaries represents the depth of 
identification project at a new level. Instead of claiming the ownership of the land on the basis of 
the Cherokee’s primordial association, which they would do later in their appeal to the United 
States Supreme Court, the article points to “the treaties concluded with the United States,” as the 
source of their ownership. While such statement does not necessarily undermine the indigenous 
land ownership as not stating something is not equivalent to its absence,45 by using treaties—the 
privileged writings of the time— as the source of its ownership, the statement presents the 
Cherokees as a nation of writing formed in the tradition of Euromerican modernity. Besides, the 
reference to the treaties with the United States in the article also placed the moral responsibility 
of upholding the sanctity of the treaties—thus, of the territorial integrity of the Cherokee 
Nation—on the United States as well. Such politics of identification emphasized that the 
destabilization of the Cherokee land would not thus only be a disaster for the Cherokees but 
would also be a moral failure on the part of the United States as well.  
 
 
                                                          
45 The term “indigenous” holds different meanings in different historical contexts. It did not 
suggest the same kind of power in the early nineteenth century that the term embodies now, 





3.4 The Phase Two: Cherokee Public Campaign, the Claim of Improvement, and the 
Politics of Identification           
Besides transforming themselves into the image of the United States by constituting a 
nation-state and forming apropos cultural, institutional and public apparatus, the Cherokee 
Nation campaigned to influence the public opinion of the United States. As the debate on the 
Indian removal started, the Cherokees thought that persuading the public in the United States on 
the Cherokees’ right to their land would lead the Congress to pass laws favorable to them. To 
that purpose, they systematically organized the campaign that “included sending Elias Boudinot 
and John Ridge out on speaking tours of northeastern cities, publishing the Cherokee Phoenix, 
submitting memorials to Congress, and drawing on aid of missionary organizations” (Konkle 
44).46 The whole public campaign attempted to prove that the Cherokees had dramatically 
improved in civilization following the introduction of the Knox-Washington policy of Indian 
civilization and that removing them from their homeland would jeopardize the civilizing process 
itself. In the campaign, they also used their improvement as the counterclaim to the growing 
clutch of scientific racism that tried to project Native Americans as biologically unfit for the 
institutions of modernity and rational deliberations. They also appealed to American founding 
tenets such as republicanism and Christian morality, arguing how removing the Cherokees from 
their homeland would be against the moral fabric of the United States itself.    
 While the public campaign would intensify in the late 1820s with the election of 
President Andrew Jackson, the Cherokees already had the threat of removal from as early the 
                                                          
46 Boudinot and Ridge were young men well-versed in the Cherokee as well as white cultural 
norms. Both of them were educated in an English school located in Connecticut where they fell 
in love and later married with local white girls, irrupting controversy that led to the closure of the 
school itself. The education and experience made them effective “spokesmen” for the Cherokee 





1802 Georgia Compact that was becoming increasingly imminent in the 1820s. Coinciding this 
development, the Cherokees had already started using any available opportunity for convincing 
the United States how removal was a bad idea.  A case in point for instance is John Ridge’s 
February 27, 1826 letter to Albert Gallatin, who had served in the Jefferson Administration as 
the Secretary of Treasury earlier and now was collecting information on American Indian tribes 
for his 1836 book. In the letter, Ridge compares the Cherokee past and present diachronically, 
and also the Cherokee’s contemporary condition with that of neighboring whites synchronically. 
He then declares the progress that the Cherokees now “are farmers and herdsmen, which is their 
real character,” as he “take[s] pleasure to state, tho’ cautiously, that there is not to my knowledge 
a solitary Cherokee to be found that depends upon the chase for subsistence” (36). Now, as he 
insists, the Cherokee difference from his white neighbor had eroded as “their farm[s] are 
conducted in the same style with southern white farmers of equal ability in point of property” 
(41). He notes the marvelous swiftness with which the Cherokees had experienced the 
transformation: “And many a drunken, idle & good for nothing Indian has been converted from 
error & have become useful Citizens” (41). While the Cherokee syllabary was a recent invention, 
Ridge highlights how enlightenment had dawned on the Cherokees because of education: “I 
suppose that there are one third of our Citizens, that can read & write in the English Language” 
(42). And the Cherokee ladies are as comparable as any elegant white middle class women: 
“Two Cherokee female have recently completed their education…they would pass for the 
genteel & wellbred ladies in any country” (42). Most of this information, when read in the 
particular context of the correspondence between Ridge and Gallatin, is redundant for Gallatin’s 
language-dominant ethnological project. But the macro historical context where Ridge found the 





project. He used the opportunity instead to present a progress report so that he could change the 
public opinion of the United States through Gallatin’s project. The closing section of the letter 
collects all the strength of the narrator’s voice and presents the compelling reason behind the 
transformation of the letter into a progress report:  
I draw to a close. Solemn & gloomy is the thought that all the Indian nation who 
once occupied America are nearly Gone! Powerful in War and Sage in peace, the 
Chiefs now sleep with their heroic deeds silent, in the bosom of the Earth! It was 
not their destiny to become great. Their council fires could not be united into one, 
as the Seat of a great empire. It was for strangers to effect this, and necessity now 
compels the last Remnants to look for its protection. It is true we Govern 
ourselves, but yet we live in fear. We are urged by these strangers to make room 
for their settlement & go farther west. Our National existence is suspended on the 
faith &honor of the U. States, alone. Their convenience may cut this asunder, & 
with a little faint struggle we may cease to be. (44)  
Ridge’s progress report ends appealing to the good “faith and honor of the U. States.” His 
argument insists that the Cherokee had materialized themselves into the image devised by the 
Knox-Washington policy of Indian Civilization, and that now the moral responsibility of 
safeguarding the transformed Indian rested with the United States itself. Breaking the faith would 
not only undo the Cherokee civilization but would also be a failure of promise on the part of the 
United States. Protecting the Cherokee nation thus was as much in the interest of the Cherokees 
as was in the moral wellbeing of the United States itself.     
 If John Ridge’s letter was a direct progress report, Elias Boudinot’s editorials written for 





Instead of trying to prove that the Cherokees had progressed in the preceding decades, he 
assumes the progress a self-evident truth, and argues how the Cherokee attainment of civilization 
itself was the cause behind Georgia’s decision to extend its laws over the Cherokee land. In his 
June 17, 1829 editorial, he writes that the extension of such law “might have been a matter of 
charity” in the past “when we were governed by savage laws.” But the Georgian laws are 
extended now that the Cherokees “have established for ourselves a government of regular law” 
as “being fostered by the U. States, and advised by great and good men.” He accentuates how the 
Cherokees had walked exactly on the footsteps of the United States, and for which “the aid and 
protection of the General Government have been pledged to us; when we, as dutiful “children” of 
the President, have followed his instructions and advice.” Now that we “have established for 
ourselves a government of regular law; when everything looks so promising around us, that a 
storm is raised by the extension of tyrannical and unchristian laws.” Boudinot, with dismay and 
sorrow, repeats the same idea forcefully in another editorial published on November 12, 1831: 
“But alas! No sooner was it made manifest that the Cherokees were becoming strongly attached 
with their land to the ways and uses of civilized life, than was aroused the opposition of those 
from whom better things would have been expected.”  He is convinced that, “the promises of 
Washington and Jefferson have” been aborted and that, “the policy of the United States on Indian 
Affairs has taken different direction, for no other reason than that the Cherokee have so far 
become civilized as to appreciate a regular form of Government.” While the Cherokees had 
attained the state of civilization to appreciate and use their legal rights, “they are now deprived of 
rights they once enjoyed.”           
 Boudinot’s assessment of the cause of the extension of the Georgian law now, especially 





sovereignty using the most powerful western genre of legitimization, touches the inner nerves of 
the white motivation. White America envisioned the natural attrition of Native American 
sovereignty. The Knox-Washington policy of Indian civilization expected that the Native 
Americans would either assimilate completely or sell their land and vanish in the wake of many 
other tribes. But the promulgation of the 1827 Constitution and the formation of a sovereign 
government by the Cherokees posed a unique challenge—an unexpected impediment on such 
belief. This attainment of the Cherokee modernity, as Lewis Cass—who would later serve as 
Andrew Jackson’s Secretary of War—forcefully presented in his academic essays, needed an 
immediate action if the United States were to justifiably question the Cherokee sovereignty. Cass 
writes,  
It is evident, that if this pretension [the Cherokee adoption of the constitution and 
their claim of sovereignty] be not resisted now, resistance hereafter will be in 
vain.  It is of those questions, eminently practical, which a few years’ 
acquiescence would settle. What might now be the assertion of a just and proper 
jurisdiction by the civilized communities, might then be an unjust claim to be 
enforced only by war and conquest. (119)  
Cass understands the dynamics involved in the Cherokee politics of identification: The 
Cherokees were not transforming themselves into the image of the United States for their 
acquiescence, but rather were adopting the western methods of legitimization that would be 
difficult for the United States to resist after the solidification of the practices. The only way to 
prevent such option would be to delegitimize the 1827 Constitution and to remove the Cherokees 
from their land itself. Waiting longer to act would engrain the documents and practices of 





it is the similar genre conventions and practices through which the United States has instituted 
itself. Cass and Boudinot, though placed on the opposite isles of the struggle, understand the 
motivations involved in the identification project and responded accordingly.       
 From that perspective, Boudinot’s editorials—while they present the Cherokee 
improvement as a self-evident truth requiring no further claim—took a more sophisticated angle 
rather than merely repeating the Cherokee public campaign’s mainstream claim of the attainment 
of civilization. His approach is more rhetorically nuanced in the sense he calibrates his editorials 
in response to the intellectual developments in the western world, particularly on the nature of 
race and race relations. For instance, besides explaining how the Cherokee attainment of 
civilization was the cause of the Cherokees’ imminent removal, his editorials also try debunk the 
scientific racism that, as Konkle demonstrates, was increasingly taking hold in nineteenth-
century western imagination.47 When Knox-Washington formulated the Indian Civilization 
policy, it assumed that the Native American cultural inferiority was the result of particular 
historical circumstances that could be ameliorated through specific programs. “Knox and 
Washington believed that the obliviously ‘uncivilized’ characteristics of Indian life existed 
because Native people knew no better. In other words, their ‘inferiority’ was cultural, not racial. 
Indians, therefore, were fully capable of becoming ‘civilized’ and assimilating into American 
society as functioning citizens” (Perdue & Green 2005, 11).  But as the nineteenth-century 
picked up, the western intellectual milieu started to establish the doctrine of Native Americans’ 
innate racial inferiority, suggesting that Native American tribes were biologically incapable of 
civilization. Such sweeping doctrine automatically consigned all tribes into a single box, freeing 
the minds of having to dwell on the specifics of a tribe’s progress for making any position. From 
                                                          





this new perspective, judging on the Cherokee civilizational progress had become a redundant 
exercise.            
 Boudinot perceives the monumental danger of this new doctrine to the efficacy of the 
Cherokee politics of identification and thus presents counterargument asking the readers to 
observe the specifics of the situation, cautioning them not to jump to stereotypically influenced, 
lazy and hasty conclusions. In his November 12, 1831 editorial, he notes the “customary charge” 
that Indians could not be civilized: “We have on more than one occasion remarked upon the 
difficulties which lie in the way of civilizing the Indians. Those difficulties have been fully 
developed in the history of the Cherokees within the last two years [difficulties arising from the 
Georgia’s encroachment].” He claims that,  
[N]o one can now mistake the source[s] [of Native American wanting of 
Civilization] …. They are not to be found in the “nature” of the Indians, which 
man of high authority once said was as difficult as to change as the leopard his 
spots. It is not because they are, of all others, the most degraded and ignorant that 
they have been brought to enjoy the blessings of a civilized life.—But it is 
because they have to contend with obstacles as numerous as they are peculiar.   
He presents the success of the Indian Civilization program as the evidence against the doctrine of 
biological determination of racial progress.  He reports, “With the commendable zeal of the first 
Chief magistrate of the United States undertook to bring the Cherokees into pale of 
civilization…his successor followed his example…The attempts of those good men were 
attended with success.” The evidence of transformation is everywhere now: “Instead of wild and 
ferocious savages, thirsting for blood, they [the Cherokees] have become the mild ‘citizens.’” 





the fact that “we have no example upon which we can build the assertion, that it is impossible to 
civilize and Christianize the Indian.” Given how consequential the implication of the new racial 
doctrine would be to the Cherokee attempt to maintain its sovereignty, the editor relentlessly 
argues, “We have instances of nations, originally as ignorant and barbarous as the American 
natives, having risen from their degraded state to a high pitch of refinement.” As he repeats in 
another February 19, 1831 editorial, it was not the biological or natural causes that would stymie 
the Cherokee process of improvement but the extension of the Georgia’s law as “it forces from 
them the vary means of their improvement in religion and morals, and in the arts of civilized 
life.”             
 As the Committee on Indian Affairs reported the Indian Removal Bill to both houses of 
the Congress in the early 1830, the Cherokee Public campaign took a tone of urgency. Now, 
unfortunately, the Cherokees realized that the fate of their sovereignty rested on the Congress’ 
decision on the bill. To garner the support against the bill, they intensified their effort, often 
producing powerful statements through their newspaper that circulated in major American cities 
outside the Cherokee territory as well. For example, a Cherokee Phoenix article published on 
March 17, 1830, notes the bill and writes, “The question is therefore now open for discussion, 
and soon we shall hear what is to become of us.” The article continues, “Crisis is at hand. Will 
justice prevail?” This question of justice was no more an abstract deliberation of after-life 
consequences or about the determination of petty everyday conundrum. It was about the 
“momentous questions which must in vary short time receive a practical answer.” It was the 
question about justice: “If Justice prevails, the Indians will assuredly be protected. But if treaties 
are disregarded and declared of no validity, as many high in office have already done, then 





the removal, “If therefore we are to be scarified, let the bloody tragedy be accompanied here on 
own native soil around the graves of our fathers & in view of the people of these United States.” 
Then comes the powerful final challenge to the people of the United States:  
The good people of this boasting republic may stand and gaze on the oppressive 
acts of Georgia, consenting or not, as they please, to our destruction. It will not 
require their aid to destroy us—they need only stand still—Georgia can 
accomplish her design easily—But there will be reckoning hereafter.  
Written amidst the compelling time with existential threats hovering over the Cherokees, the 
carefully chosen words in the statement for the maximum rhetorical impact reminded the people 
of the United States their principle of republicanism and their antipathy with any form of 
oppression. Just boasting about their republicanism would not be sufficient after reading the 
article; the article challenged the reader to actively exercise their principle by standing with the 
Cherokees. Passivity was not an option. Only by standing against the removal bill, the “good” 
people could fight the oppression exactly in the way their earlier generation had fought against 
the British tyranny. The characters and contexts might have changed, but the principle was not 
different at all. Not participating actively against the bill represented a serious breach in the ethos 
of the United States, but it also would lead to a “reckoning hereafter.” The voice was as much of 
otherworldly Christian challenge to someone about to be derelict of a pious duty as was about the 
rupture of secular moral philosophy on which the nation was founded. The statement tried to 
touch the moral heart of the not-so-old nation, challenging it to be true to its “boasting” 
republican principles. The article further reminded the readers the hypocrisy of using one means 
instead of another to violate the Cherokee existence.  “It is said, however, that the general 





that open force will be resorted to—this would be too barefaced.” All legislative maneuvers and 
the pretension of just treaties to remove the Cherokees were merely feel-good factors for the 
removers: 
The object is our removal, and if it is ever accomplished, it must be done contrary 
to our wishes and inclinations, by means which honor and justice forever 
reprobate. It makes no difference whether we are ousted at the point of the 
bayonet, or by indirect and oppressive measures—it is the same thing with us, and 
we wish the public know it. 
 Then, after the long explanation how the Cherokees and the people of the United States could 
not morally and legally accept the removal, the article directly addressed the people of the United 
States: “People of the U.S. our appeal is to you—Will you, with relentless hand, extinguish all 
our rising expectations?”         
 Responding to the Cherokee appeal, many white Americans took the Cherokee cause for 
themselves. They devoted themselves against the Indian Removal Bill by holding meetings, 
publishing memorials and pressurizing their representatives. While they used various lines of 
argument, the most striking and common among them was the idea that the Cherokees had 
progressed in civilization and thus they deserved the protection, respect, and sovereignty. In the 
abundant number of memorials written by the white supporters across various cities from Boston 
to Baltimore, the Cherokee politics of identification had caught on the fire—catapulting the 
Cherokees-coming-to-civilization a compelling case within the public sphere of the United 
States. For example, “the Representatives of the Religious Society of Friends, in the state of New 
York, and parts adjacent” singed a memorial on January 5, 1830 to the United States Congress 





“from a dependence on the precarious subsistence which the chase affords, to habits of civilized 
life, and have made great advancement in agriculture and domestic economy.” Citing the 
Cherokee situation that the United States “threatened violation of their rights and privileges as 
distinct and separate people, recognized in numerous treaties of the government of the United 
States,” the memorialists pointed to the moral fabric of “our beloved country.” Characterizing 
the Indian removal plan as full of “injustice,” the memorialists pointed at the reprobation that the 
United States would face if it commits the proposed injustice against the Cherokees.  
We anticipate the opprobrium which will cast upon it in the eyes of the world, if it 
[the Indian Removal] should be consummated. And as national sins have, under 
the just government of a righteous Providence, drawn down national punishments, 
we tremble, lest when the Most High shall arise at the cry of the poor and 
oppressed, his arm shall take hold of vengeance. ..To avert these fatal results, and 
to prevent the total extermination of a much injured people, we…solicit the two 
houses of Congress to interpose their authority for the protection of the Cherokee 
nation in its just rights. 
While the state might have been constitutionally separate from religion, the memorialists 
coalesced the theological and rational to make the case against the removal. In this fusion of 
traditions, the white campaign for the Cherokee cause become as much about the Cherokees’ fate 
as about the soul of the United States.           
 “The citizens of Philadelphia, on behalf of the Cherokee” singed a memorial on January 
11, 1830 that literally reinforced the Cherokee politics of identification. While their memorial 
strongly opposed the removal, it did not see the Cherokees possessing their own independence in 





focus rested on the idea that the Cherokee would be assimilated if they were allowed to remain in 
their own land.  Quoting the Cherokee “address to the President of the United States dated at 
Washington 12 March 1825,” the memorial argued,  
A few years the progress of civilization, and increase of knowledge, would of 
necessity change their [the Cherokee] character, modify their laws and customs, 
and finally prepare them [further] for the amalgamation with the white population. 
They would gladly receive the rights of citizenship, the duties of which an 
improved education would teach them to appreciate and perform. That this is the 
ultimatum of the hopes and wishes of the Indians themselves. 
From this perspective, the Knox-Washington policy had remained effective; the Cherokee were 
working hard in transforming themselves to be worthy of the citizenship of the United States. For 
such grand attainment, the Cherokees were equivocal: “for the sake of civilization and the 
preservation of existence, they would willingly see the habits and customs of the aboriginal man 
extinguished.” They have come a long way from their savage and barbaric past:  
[T]he Cherokee, by the express recommendation, nay, by the aid and assistance of 
the Government of the United States itself, have, for a series of years past been 
rapidly advancing civilization—that they have relinquished the habits and pursuits 
of the savage, and have become possessed of houses and mills, flocks and herds, 
schools and printing presses. 
And thus, it was not the time for turning the wheel of progress backward. What was missing in 
this argument were the governmental institutions, including the 1827 written constitution that the 
Cherokees had adopted for claiming their independence and sovereignty.  Although this elapse 





was what the Cherokees wanted at that point.       
 In another memorial written against the Indian Removal, “the Citizens of Massachusetts, 
residing in all parts of the Common Wealth” did not see the assimilation a requirement for the 
United States to respect the Cherokees’ continued existence in their homeland. The citizens 
certainly highlighted the recent Cherokee improvement, but they primarily concentrated their 
argument on the legitimacy of the Cherokee sovereign nationhood itself: The first treaty “made 
between the United States, and the Cherokees, the latter are not only called and considered as 
being a nation; but they actually exercise every one of the powers which we had enumerated, in 
the Declaration of Independence, as the highest attributes of national sovereignty.” The way they 
framed the argument, the whole point of the Cherokee transformation into civilized lifestyle was 
to establish them as sovereigns in their own land. So, while the Cherokees had taken the United 
States’ mission into their own heart, the main agent of transforming the Cherokees from 
wandering savages to nation-holding sovereign was the United States itself.  What mattered now 
was the will of the Cherokees themselves, and on the question of the removal, “your 
Memorialists feel bound to say, that they have seen no reason, which satisfy them, that the 
removal of the Cherokee would be for their benefit.”  With the removal, “they would be thrown 
into a state of anarchy, and would lose the benefit of improvement already made by some of 
them, in practice of government.” All attributes of civilization such as “subordination and public 
spirit” would disappear, and again “improvidence, contention, idleness, intemperance, and 
general profligacy” replacing the progress made recently. “The Progress of the education also, 
we fear must be interrupted.” So, In conclusion, our “ Memorialists do humbly entreat the 
National Legislature to interpose and deliver the country from all apprehension of violated faith, 





tribes.” As the executive had failed to honor the past treaties, the Congress—the sovereign body 
of the people’s representatives that had declared the Independence from tyranny in 1776—had to 
act again according to the principle, honor and faith.     
 Perhaps the most important white campaigners against the Indian Removal from 
historical perspective were women. The cause gave white women the first major public voice in 
the history of the nation.48 Influenced primarily by William Penn essays, Catherine Beecher and 
Lydia Sigourney drafted the first petition against the removal that prompted thousands of other 
women from across the country to write memorials for the same effect. 49 These women 
campaigners, the republican mothers, who were expected to mind their domestic duties instead 
of engaging in public discourse, found the boundaries between the two spheres blurred because 
of the moral question involved with the Indian removal. Protecting the hapless tribes was the 
matter of as much domestic as public morality. But again, despite many tribes facing the 
removal, the main example for the women’s anti-removal argument became the Cherokees’ 
progress itself: the Cherokees had progressed recently and that protecting the striving tribe was 
the moral responsivity of the nation built on republican principle and Christian cultural 
foundation. For instance, in Beecher’s “Circular Addressed to Benevolent Ladies of the United 
States” reads like a progress report on the Cherokee condition—not much different from the one 
written by John Ridge a few years ago. The circular insisted that Americans had to change the 
dominant perception about the Native Americans. Citing the Cherokees, the document stated that 
they were no more “naked and wandering savages.” The differences among the Cherokees was 
not that of savage and civilized, but rather like the one among white population: “The various 
grades of intellect and refinement exist among them as among us; and those who visit their 
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chieftains, and families of the higher class, speak with wonder and admiration of their dignified 
propriety, nobleness of appearance, and refined characteristics as often exhibited in both sexes.” 
The Cherokees had also progressed in political, economic and cultural realms substantially: 
“Among them are men fitted by native talents, to shine among statesmen of any land, and who 
have received no inferior degree of cultivation. Among them also, are those who by honest 
industry, have assembled around them most of the comforts, and many elegancies of life.” So, 
while the imperative behind the women’s participation in the campaign emanated from their 
traditional gender role as the guardians of morality that they tried to extend beyond the domestic 
sphere, it was the Cherokee progress that provided the impetus for the justification of their 
action. Not supporting a striving and improving group of people from punishment would be the 
breach on the moral fabric that gave the women a higher cause even when they were deprived of 
public political participation, including suffrage. In these women’s petitions, the Cherokee 
politics of identification had come to bear a full force, gaining them the recognition of parity 
with the whites.             
 While an influential part of the Cherokee public campaign, particularly to generate the 
support from various Christian denominations, including the women petitioners organized 
around the benevolent ladies’ organization, Jeremiah Evart’s (written in the pen name William 
Penn) essays on the front appeared to be an exception. William Penn essays mostly focused on 
the Native American tribes’ inherent right to their native land and the history of legal recognition 
of those rights by the whites. In his argument, he went to the extent that though the white 
establishment had recognized the sovereignty of the Cherokee nationhood, “such admission is in 
no sense necessary to the perfect validity of the Indian title” (106). For him, violating the already 





would be “an instance of gross and cruel oppression…, and therefore entirely unjustifiable,” 
irrespective of what the Cherokees did or where they stood on the ladder of civilizational 
hierarchy (107). His appeal to the idea of oppression deeply resonated to different sections of 
society in early Nineteenth-century American cultural imagination: Puritans automatically 
associated the idea with Roman persecution of early Christians and the pain and suffering of the 
Protestants during European Reformation that catapulted their emigration to America. Within the 
public sphere dominated with the ideas of republicanism, which was not completely antithetical 
to puritan views,50 the term ‘oppression’ not only reminded Americans the Revolutionary era 
emotions against the British oppression of American colonists but also intensified the unsettled 
questions of sovereignty between the states and federal government in antebellum America. The 
rhetoric of oppression touched the inner political and cultural nerve of American public sphere. It 
is notable that increasingly a dominant national cultural character that would see its full 
articulation in the mid-century letters by the giants such as Emerson and Thoreau, was forming 
around this theme that asked the people to assert their independence and to stand to power. 
Evarts’ argument of unjustified oppression to the hapless tribe thus mobilized American public’s 
ingrained pathos, reminding it of its historical victimhood in the past from oppressive 
government, and asking it to imagine itself in the place of vulnerable American tribes ready to be 
sacrificed at the clutch of an unjust power. And, it also reminded that such unjust sacrifice was 
not without consequences for the perpetrators. Even in the most oppressed condition, American 
Christians had hoped that divine wrath would ultimately balance the natural law, establishing 
ultimate poetic justice. But Evarts’ essays suggested that now the oppressor would be the United 
States if it failed to honor the Cherokee sovereignty. Individually, only by participating in the 
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anti-removal campaign, people could atone the sin their country was about to commit.  
 But despite his attempt not to make the Cherokee improvement as a justification for the 
recognition of the Cherokee sovereignty over their land, Evarts cannot help himself:    
Again, it is supposed, that the existence of a little separate community of Indians, 
living under their laws, surrounded by communities of white, will be fraught with 
some great and undefined mischief…. when the case is accurately examined, 
however, all the fog clears away, and nothing appears in the prospect but little 
tract of country full of civilized Indians, engaged in their lawful pursuits, neither 
molesting their neighbors, nor interrupting general peace and prosperity. (109) 
 Not only does the statement suggest that the Cherokees had made the progress by responding to 
the missionary and governmental civilizational efforts, it also imagines the future of a model 
community that could serve as an example of what could result from the active benevolence of 
the good people. Evarts’ vision of just society emanated from both his Christian zeal as well as 
the sacred legal documents of the nation that he prized because of his role as a missionary and a 
lawyer.             
 Even after it was evident that the Cherokee politics of identification had failed to achieve 
its goal as the United States prepared for the removal that would lead to the Trail of Tears, many 
white northeasterners continued to publish letters asking the United States to rethink about the 
plan. Ralph Waldo Emerson for instance wrote a letter to President Martin Van Buren in 1838 
opposing the Cherokee removal. Illustrating the picture of the imminent removal and the 
suffering it would generate for the Cherokees, Emerson faulted the United States for recognizing 
the “sham treaty,” the 1835 Treaty of New Echota that accorded the façade of legality for the 





painted the U.S. stratagem as “a dereliction of all faith and virtue, such as denial of justice, and 
such deafness to screams for mercy, [that] were never heard of in times of peace” (30). 
Representing “the heart’s heart in all men” from Maine to Georgia, he wrote, “Sir, does the 
Government think that People of the United States become savage and mad? From their minds 
are sentiments of love and of a good nature wiped out?” (30). The letter reached the climax when 
Emerson characterized the U.S. government as committing a crime that had denied both the 
citizens of the United States and the Cherokee Nation of their country. In his conceptualization, a 
country was not merely a bounded territorial structure with a governing institution, but a moral 
superstructure safeguarding the spirit of the American Revolution as sanctified in the 
Declaration. In the Cherokee case, the government had failed the people: “We only state the fact, 
that a crime is projected that confounds our understandings by its magnitude—a crime that really 
deprives us as well the Cherokees a country; for how we could call the conspiracy that should 
crush these poor Indians our government?” (31). In this line of argumentation, the Indian 
Removal deprived not only the Cherokees of their sovereignty, but, even more significantly, the 
United States its republican values upon which it was founded. Now, the country had lost its own 
soul, degrading itself into a mercenary, colonial power.        
 This argument was not made outside the Cherokee public campaign, especially its 
politics of identification. In the very beginning, Emerson framed the letter discussing how the 
Cherokee had transformed themselves into a civilized community warranting his praise and an 
appropriate treatment by the United Stated for their achievement:  
Even to our distant State, some good rumor of their worth and civility has arrived. 
We have learned with joy their improvement in social arts. We have read their 





with the great body of the American People, we have witnessed with sympathy 
the painful endeavors of these red men to redeem their own race from the doom of 
eternal inferiority, and to borrow and domesticate in the tribe the inventions and 
customs of the Caucasian race. (29) 
Although it is difficult to gauge how far the Cherokees themselves thought of the civilizing 
mission as the process of “redeem[ing] their own race from the doom of eternal inferiority,” it is 
apparent that Emerson and other white Americans who opposed the removal based their 
argument primarily on the progress made by the Cherokees. The Cherokees’ system of 
government, their constitution, and their education served as the major hallmark for supporting 
the cause. As the quoted passage above suggests, the Cherokees campaigned against the removal 
using newspapers and public speeches where they claimed their improvement, turning the United 
States’ policy of Indian civilization into a politics of identification, which not only consolidated 
power within the Cherokee Nation, but also garnered support from many white Americans like 
Emerson. 
3.5 The Cherokee Politics of Identification on the Legal Front  
Once the Congress narrowly passed the Indian Removal Act that Andrew Jackson signed 
into law on May 28, 1830, the Cherokee Principal Chief John Ross submitted a lawsuit on behalf 
of the Cherokee Nation to the U.S. Supreme Court requesting the injunction against the federal 
government and the state of Georgia from executing the Indian Removal Act. The lawsuit 
claimed that the Cherokee Nation was an independent foreign country, requiring the United 
States to respect its treaty obligations and the Cherokee Nation’s sovereignty. Chief Justice John 
Marshal delivered the consequential Cherokee Nation v. the state of Georgia verdict stating that 





nation as a “domestic dependent nation.” However, in the 1832 Worchester v. Georgia case filed 
by the U.S. citizen Samuel Worcester, the Supreme Court affirmed the status of the Cherokee 
Nation as a foreign nation, with the ruling that the statues of Georgia could not be applied in the 
Cherokee territory. As it is well known, President Jackson did not respect the verdict as he did 
not change his mind of removing the Cherokees from their ancestral land even after the ruling.     
 Scholars have widely commented on the Marshall’s verdicts on Native American cases. 
However, not much have been written on the text of the lawsuits submitted by the Cherokees 
themselves. In what follows, I foreground the Cherokee side of the case and argue that both the 
Cherokee action of going to the Supreme Court and their text collectively perform the rhetoric of 
identification. With their move to the court, the Cherokees certainly further emphasized their 
attainment of civilization, but now their major line of argumentation also tried to establish 
themselves as a recognizable body within the western legal system. In the process, they 
transformed their vision of sovereignty, nationhood, and even identity.   
 From the perspective of the Cherokee politics of identification, their submission of the 
appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court itself represented a statement of where the Cherokees had 
arrived from the point of the drafting of the U.S. Constitution and the formulation of the federal 
Indian policy by the Washington administration. As Marshall’s verdict on Cherokee Nation v. 
the State of Georgia states, Native Americans were the afterthought in the mind of the drafters of 
the Constitution gathered in Philadelphia. It never occurred to the framers that Indians would 
bring their cases to the U.S. Supreme Court. The Constitution thus held a huge blank space 
regarding the place of the Native Americans in the United States polity, leaving substantial room 
for judicial interpretation in the future. Backed by the nation-building work and public campaign 





skills needed to be involved in the United States’ constitutional and political apparatus. With the 
lawsuit, the Cherokee had hired the best available lawyer and had started a constitutional war to 
justify their sovereignty in a new political order, using the discourse of modernity. What they 
wrote in the lawsuit was certainly important, but the act of going to the court and using the 
privileged genre convention, processes and concepts represented a new zenith in the politics of 
identification. They could lose the case, but the action of inserting themselves within the western 
legal system claimed them as a party worthy of judicial protection.  While the public campaign 
tested how far U.S. public could withstand its moral ground, the legal battle tested the strength of 
the country’s founding principles such the separation of power, guarantee of a disinterested 
hearing at a court, and redressing of the harm caused by the power.     
 The submission of the petition marked the dramatic transformation in the way Cherokees 
conducted their international relations. Traditionally, the Cherokees did not solve the 
international or intertribal conflicts using Euro-American style of legal process; by submitting 
the lawsuit, the Cherokees embraced a new kind of international politics based on western 
constitutional and legal discourse. With the new move, the Cherokees spoke in the specialized 
language that the United States could understand and required to respond. Using our 
contemporary language, with the lawsuit and the whole politics of identification, the Cherokee 
Nation insisted on its participation to the same discourse community that white America 
belonged to. But the objective was not their submission to the master discourse in totality as the 
federal Indian policy anticipated. The assumption of the white discourse hinged on an 
understanding that “one is [and, could be] always simultaneously a part of several discourses, 
several communities, [and] is already always committed to a number of conflicting beliefs and 





deploying the discourse that was not originally theirs. They demonstrated the confidence they 
could master of the discourse of western modernity for the politics of identification. As Bakhtin 
argues, discourses do not belong to anybody automatically; they are acquired with hard efforts.51 
Although the use of the discourse did not “guarantee that our utterances will be interpreted 
adequately or that we will interpret adequately the utterances of others,” the Cherokee use of the 
western legal discourse insisted on the proper hearing (Kent 442). Participating in the discourse 
community of the United States by using the discourse of modernity for the Cherokees meant 
that while their national identity may be different, the underlining values that they practiced were 
similar with the United States. Therefore, while the lawsuit might bear the claim for an 
alternative sovereignty or non-allegiance to the United States, the underlying logic of the 
identification required the U.S. to recognize the voice of the Cherokees. Not recognizing the 
Cherokee voice in this context would be self-shattering—a kind of homicide, killing of one’s 
own kind—on the part of the United States.       
 The politics of identification cast the Cherokees in Euro-American terms. For instance, 
they present themselves as the first discoverer of the land at one point in the lawsuit. They 
deploy western legal, cultural and economic concepts and structure of argumentation 
systematically first to delegitimize the white claim to the Native American land, and then to 
establish their ownership. For instance, the lawsuit engages with the history and process of 
granting land titles in colonial and national periods. Since European settlers’ claim to the Indian 
land originated from the title they received from their king, the Cherokee argument resorts back 
to the origin itself first by directly rejecting King George II’s legal authority to grant the title of 
the land that did not belong to the crown. 
                                                          





That, in the year of the Christian era one thousand seven hundred and thirty-two, 
the monarch of several islands on the eastern coast of the Atlantic ocean, under 
the name and style of George II. King of Great Britain, by a charter to the 
company of his own subjects there residing, affected to grant them all the country 
on this continent lying between the Savannah and Alatamaha rivers. That this 
country was, at that time, occupied and owned by several distinct sovereign and 
independent nations of Indians, and among others, by the Cherokee Nation; and 
that the monarch who affected to grant it had no title to it whatever. (qtd. in Peters 
26)  
Structured in the binary between “distinct sovereign and independent [Native American] 
nations” and the European king “who affected to grant” the title without his proper authority, the 
lawsuit questions the source of white claim to the Indian land. The petition further indulges in 
the context of European encounter with Native Americans and uses the context to highlight how 
it did not warrant the king an authority to grant the title and how the people receiving the title did 
not fulfill the conditions required of a discoverer. 
These complainants are informed, and believe, that the only title to which he 
pretended was derived from circumstances, that a ship manned by his subjects 
had, about two centuries and half before, sailed along the coast of the western 
hemisphere, from the fifty-sixth to the thirty-eighth degree of north latitude, and 
looked upon the face of that coast without even landing upon any part of it. (qtd. 
in Peters 26) 
This compact sentence makes a number of statements simultaneously: first, it presents the 





nineteenth-century context of the hierarchy of civilizations, such claim mattered, especially in 
the context where colonized people were denied their full rational, human agency. The 
cognizance in par with the European man or a claim to it established rational human self. 
Second, the sentence reinforces its earlier statement regarding the king’s lack of authority to 
grant title for Native American land. From the petitioners’ perspective, it was just a “pretension,” 
not a real ordinance worthy of a sovereign’s prestige—thus unrecognizable by any rational court. 
Third, even if the king had the power to grant the title to the first discoverer, his subjects did not 
discover the Cherokee land in the proper sense of the term as they did not land upon any part of 
it. Not only does the lawsuit here present facts, but also questions the definition of discovery 
itself. The fact that the explorer did not land upon the land would resonate with the nineteenth-
century audience, particularly in the contemporary context infused with the discourse of 
improvement. The ideology of improvement emphasized that only those who improved—
cultivated—the land had the moral and legal authority to own it.52 So, the discovery, from the 
perspective of this lawsuit would not mean merely obtaining a title from the monarch but 
inhabiting the land as well.           
 With this background, the suit deploys the doctrine of discovery for its own purpose.53 
“This, we are informed and believe, has been called a title by first discovery; which is not true, 
even in point of fact, as against the Cherokee nation and other Indian nations: for they had 
discovered and occupied it long before the European ship had ventured to cross the Atlantic 
ocean” (italic original, qtd. in Peters 26). Given the indigeneity of the Cherokees, “discoverers” 
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would not be a proper designation for this Native American tribe. But they assume the mantle of 
discoverer in their attempt to establish themselves as proper subjects identifiable by Euro-
American legal culture, particularly to claim the ownership of the land. The assumption of this 
designation is symptomatic of the Cherokees’ larger politics of identification at deeper 
conceptual level.          
 Besides adopting the doctrine of first discovery, the lawsuit also foregrounds the 
instances from Euro-American legal and legislative history that respected the Indian sovereignty 
to expand on their argument. It, for instance, highlights how the Charter of George the Second 
never claimed “that the grantees had the right to disturb the self-government of the Indians who 
were in possession of the country” (qtd. in Peters 26). The petition further reiterates the recent 
developments, particularly the treaties between the United States and the Cherokee Nation, 
including the one signed in 1816, that the United States Congress “duly ratified and confirmed 
…, and became thenceforth, and still are, a part of the supreme law of the land” (Peters 26). The 
lawsuit also narrates the long history of treaties in which the United States promised “the 
Cherokee to a greater degree of civilization” (Peters 26-27). Then the suit recounts how the 
Cherokees have established a republican form of government for which they borrowed the main 
characteristics from the Constitution of the United States.  As a contemporary Supreme Court 
reporter describes,  
They have formed a code of laws, civil and criminal, adapted to their situation…. 
they have established schools for the education of their children, and churches in 
which the Christian religion is taught; they have abandoned the hunter state and 





continued and hard to borne, they have observed with fidelity, all their 
engagements by treaty with the United States. (Peters 27)  
The lawsuit reaches the pivotal moment when the plaintiffs claim that they have reached—or 
surpassed—the project of civilization designed for them. They had progressed to the point that 
they could assert “they are willing to submit to a comparison with their white brethren around 
them” (Peters 27). Now, with this scaffolding of evidence and arguments, they request the court 
for the injunction against the executive branch of the United States and the State of Georgia from 
enforcing the Indian Removal Act.          
 While the Cherokee public campaign failed to garner enough support in the Congress, 
they won the legal battle. In the 1832 Worcester vs. Georgia verdict, the Supreme Court affirmed 
the Cherokee sovereignty. Jackson administration had to compel the Cherokee Nation for 
another treaty if it were to maintain the façade of legality for the removal. Thus, there was the 
1835 Treaty of New Echota. After the 1835 treaty was approved by the senate with one vote and 
the United States and the state of Georgia started the removal process forcibly,  a large section of 
the public interpreted the treaty as fraud ( Fleischmann 35-45), including the foreign press 
ridiculing the United States “cynically about ‘a government founded upon such lofty principles’ 
having its ‘deviations exposed to public scrutiny’” (Fleischmann 47),  prompting representative 
Horace Everett of Vermont to propose the amendment on the senate’s treaty resolution. 
3.6 Cass-Jackson Rejection of the Cherokee Consubstantiality 
Even those who did not want to acknowledge the Cherokee politics of identification had 
to respond to it, largely because of the storm with which it swarmed the public sphere of the 
United States during the Andrew Jackson Administration. The politics of identification was so 





justify the removal. Stepping to this exigency, two of the most prominent contemporary 
politicians Andrew Jackson and Lewis Cass offered powerful rebuttals to the Cherokee claim of 
civilizational attainment. Lewis Cass, who would be Jackson’s Secretary of War in 1831, wrote 
an “extended reviews of books and articles” (Perdue and Green 115) in the January 1830 
subscription of the North American Review. Designed to debunk the “exaggerated 
representation” that “the constitution of the Cherokee, their press, newspaper, and alphabet, their 
school and police, have sent through all our boarders the glad tidings, that the long night of 
aboriginal ignorance was ended, and that the day of knowledge had dawned,” the essay sets to 
keep “the truth” straight (117). The truth is that the “wish [of Indian civilization] is vain” (116). 
Cass praises the efforts of white “zealous and pious men” to the cause of Indian civilization, and 
their “generous ardor to the task of instruction, as well as in agriculture and mechanic arts, as in 
principles of morality and religion” (116). But he declares, “Unfortunately, they are monuments 
also of unsuccessful and unproductive efforts” (116). The failure does not originate from “the 
nature of experiment” or “the character, qualifications, or conduct, of those who have directed it” 
but “some insurmountable obstacle in the habits or temperament of the Indians, which has 
therefore prevented, and yet prevents, the success of these labors” (116). The truth is that 
“existing for two centuries in contact with a civilized people, they have resisted, and successfully 
too, every effort to meliorate their situation” to the point that “their moral and intellectual 
condition have been equally stationary” (118). Thus, the recent Cherokee assertions of the 
attainment of civilization—particularly the nation’s declaration of constitution “claiming 
legislative, executive, and judiciary powers, and all essential attributes of sovereignty”—are 
merely “pretensions” (119) or a “scheme” (121) or “a false conception of their own interest” 





submersion into the body politic of the United States, Cass challenges the Cherokees to submit to 
the laws of the state of Georgia if they were truly civilized: “If he has advanced in knowledge 
and improvement, as many sanguine persons believe and represent, he will find these laws more 
just, better administered, and far more equal in operation, than the regulation which the chiefs 
have established and are enforcing” (120). The failure to submit thus is tantamount to the 
absence of civilization and claim of sovereignty: “If these Indians are too ignorant and barbarous 
to submit to the state laws, or duly estimate their value, they are too ignorant and barbarous to 
establish and maintain a government which shall protect its own citizens, and preserve the 
necessary relations and intercourse with its neighbors” (120).      
 Unlike the Cass essay aimed at white academic readers, President Andrew Jackson’s 
letter signed on March 16, 1835 directly addresses “the Cherokee Tribe of Indians East of 
Mississippi,” urging them to remove from their ancestral homeland with the disapprobation that 
the Cherokees had failed to civilize themselves. Not germane to the occasion of the letter itself, 
yet demanded by the broader context, the letter stacks evidence to counteract the Cherokee claim 
of civilization and equality.  
Most of your people are uneducated, and are liable to be brought into collision at 
all times with their white neighbors. Your young men are acquiring habits of 
intoxication. With strong passions, and without those habits of restraint, which 
our laws inculcate and render necessary, they are frequently driven to excesses 
which must eventually terminate in their ruin. 
 Besides this absence of education, restraint, proper impulses and appropriate neighborly 
manners, the letter also points to the factionalism within the Cherokee Nation: “a divided people 





Cherokee is the cornerstone of civilization—the property: “a large portion of your people have 
acquired little or no property in the soil itself, or any article of personal property which can be 
useful to them.” Then finally, comes the moral indictment: The Cherokees had exceeded the “the 
reach of moral evils which are hastening your destruction.” Jackson continues, had you removed 
earlier following the “wisdom of this [my] council” you “would have been governed by your 
customs and laws, and removed from the effects of a white population.” But since the Cherokees 
did not heed to the council, “Where you now are, you are encompassed by evils, moral and 
physical, & these fearfully increasing.” Your condition has worsened, “and you will ultimately 
disappear, as so many tribes have done before you.” So, the only option for the addressees again 
is to “listen to me” because “I tell you that you cannot remain where you are now. Circumstances 
that cannot be controlled, and which are beyond the reach of human laws, render it impossible 
that you can flourish in the midst of a civilized community.” Summarizing the whole argument, 
Jackson, the ultimate political clout to recognize literally the Cherokee attempt at identification 
with western modernity, refuges the recognition phrasing the Cherokee’s transformed way of life 
“your peculiar customs” instead of appreciating their mimicry of  U.S. inspired republican form 
of government: “Your peculiar customs…have been abrogated by the great political community 
among which you live; and you are now the subject of the same laws which govern the other 
citizens of Georgia and Alabama.”  Subtly playing within the logic of hierarchy of civilizations 
and denying the Cherokee argument of improvement and request of recognition from the United 
States on the basis of that improvement, Jackson’s letter refuses to acknowledge the Cherokee 






3.7 Late Twentieth-century Cherokee Constitutional Rhetoric: From Subjection to 
Sovereignty            
 For the Cherokee Nation, being responsive to shifting reality and transforming its politics 
to match the historical need for its survival, sovereignty, and self-determination was not merely 
the nineteenth-century phenomenon. As the drafters of the 1976 Constitution envisioned, 
particularly by introducing the provision of mandatory constitutional amendment by each 
generation, the Cherokees articulated themselves as a nation of growth—not something frozen in 
the past or totally shaped by the dictates of the ancestors, but as a living and self-perpetuating 
people. Indeed, at the core of this spirit lies the instinct for self-translation, the ability to 
contextualize its cultural values and history for new situations. Rennard Strickland captures this 
essence succinctly: “Each generation has created and re-created the Cherokee in the image of 
that age…. Ironically, this mythical Cherokee looms so large today that the real one is in danger 
of being forgotten by many Indians and by much of white society that has come to believe many 
of these often-contradictory myths” (qtd. in Justice 1). As Strickland points, the mainstream 
dominant narrative often portrays the Native American cultures in mythical terms without 
recognizing their historicity—and the human agency involved in that historicity. But, as Leslie 
Marmon Silko writes of Native Americans, if they were to survive, their ceremonies should grow 
(105).  “The genius of Native American culture was its ability to persist shifting regimes and the 
conditions imposed by colonialism” (Hoxie 138). Although the theory of linear progressive 
history from ignorance to enlightenment as enshrined at the core of modernity, and the 
evolutionary narratives that this vision encourages, may not characterize this transformation, the 
Cherokee constitutional history—particularly the experiments of the last quarter of the twentieth 





or identity is marked by the awareness of historical context and the will and practice of 
transforming themselves to make the best as afforded by the context.54     
 True to the spirit of the name of the Nation’s first official newspaper Cherokee Phoenix, 
the Cherokee Nation’s  constitutional accomplishments of the last quarter of the twentieth-
century that culminated in the introduction of the 1976 Constitution and its amendment in 1999 
reemerged from the ashes: the Indian General Allotment Act of 1887 that distributed the 
Cherokee Communal land in Oklahoma for their private ownership virtually destroyed  the 
Cherokee Nation already devastated by the U.S. Civil War. After the United States started 
handpicking the Cherokees’ Principal Chief in 1907, any semblance of the Nation’s sovereignty 
perished. The mid-twentieth century Indian termination policy attempted to relinquish Native 
tribes’ special recognition as they were tried to be brought under the complete jurisdiction of the 
states. But the 1960s—with its own multiculturalist spirit—also witnessed the movement for the 
Native American self-determination, embodied mostly by AIM (American Indian Movement) 
and other Native activist organizations. As a result, Congress passed many legislations, including 
the 1975 Indian Self-determination and Education Assistance Act, to terminate the mid-century 
policy of Native American assimilation. It is in this historical background, the Cherokee Nation 
introduced a new written Constitution in 1976 that was amended in 1999.   
 In this section, I read the 1976 and 1999 Cherokee Constitutions by placing them in their 
historical contexts. As stated in the introductory chapter, while a genre exerts some of its traits in 
almost all situations, context shapes the genre functions, making them rhetorically nuanced 
performances. Adopted under the aegis of the Bureau of Indian Administration, the 1976 
Constitution embraced the prototypical constitutional form recommended to the Indian tribes by 
                                                          





the U.S. Promulgated without a constitutional convention, the 1776 Constitution was self-
limiting, particularly in its provision of the approval from the president of the United States for 
its amendment.55 Despite this subjection to the United States and the Nation’s history of 
powerlessness, the Constitution itself however was an expression of the Cherokee sovereignty: it 
did not only remind us that the Cherokees are a distinct people with own history, but also served 
as a harbinger of the new time; having the written constitution symbolically manifested a distinct 
Cherokee identity. Besides this function, the 1976 Constitution also included the Article IV, 
Section 9 with the provision that the question of the constitutional amendment “shall be 
submitted to the members of the Cherokee Nation at least once in every twenty (20) years.”  The 
provision opened a space for the Constitution to transcend its own limitation; the 1999 
Constitutional Convention, for instance, annulled the provision of the United States’ approval 
requirement for its amendments, added a new statement of sovereignty, and envisioned a new 
form of nationhood that would enhance the opportunities of representation for its citizens. 
Because of these changes, the 1999 Constitution embodies the power of revision, a shift from the 
state of subjugation to a declaration of sovereignty. The 1999 Constitution goes even further: 
Using the affordances offered by new communications media, the Constitution envisions a 
deterritorialized nationhood in which non-residential Cherokees can also participate in the 
Cherokee Nation’s government without having to give up their engagements in their locations. 
While the vision is still embryonic, the 1999 amendments sufficiently gesture toward new form 
of digitalized deterritorialized sovereignty and nationhood that can be an inspiration for many 
other nations mulling over the porous boundaries brought about by the forces of globalization.  
                                                          
55 See Lemond (313-14) for Ross Swimmer’s reflection on the context of the 1976 Constitution. 
Swimmer, Principal Chief in that period, highlights Cherokees’ own understanding of the tribe’s 





Before elaborating on digitalized deterritorialized sovereignty conceived in the 1999 
Constitution, a close examination of the difference between the two Constitutions regarding their 
statements on sovereignty is in order.  No provision in the Constitutions speaks better than their 
preambles on the state of the Nation’s sovereignty. When sent for the ratification, the Nation 
provided the citizens with both the 1976 and 1999 Constitutions along with the summative 
information on the amendment. Commenting on the revision in the preamble, the document 
notes, “No substantive changes, just stylistic changes.” Here is the preamble from 1976 
Constitution: 
We, the People of Cherokee Nation, in order to preserve and enrich our tribal 
culture, achieve and maintain a desirable measure of prosperity the blessing of 
freedom, acknowledging, with humility and gratitude, the goodness of the 
Sovereign Ruler of the Universe in permitting us so to do, and imploring his aid 
and guidance in its accomplishment do ordain and establish this Constitution for 
the government of Cherokee Nation. The term “Nation” as used in this 
Constitution is the same as “Tribe.”  
The 1999 Constitution revises it in the following words: 
We, the people of the Cherokee Nation, in order to preserve our sovereignty, 
enrich our culture, achieve and maintain a desirable measure prosperity and the 
blessing of freedom, acknowledging with humility and gratitude the goodness, aid 
and guidance of the Sovereign Ruler of the Universe in permitting us to do so, do 
ordain and establish this Constitution for government of the Cherokee Nation.      
While claimed as merely a stylistic change, the amended preamble not only includes a powerful 





broader identity of nationhood. When viewed in the legal context, the accentuation of tribal 
identity in 1976 Constitution reinforced the regulatory parameters established by the United 
States. By preferring nation to tribe, the 1999 Constitution sets the tone differently for the 
Nation’s sense of itself and its relationship with the United States of America. When theorizing 
the sovereignty statement of a “domestic dependent nation,” we should not merely consider the 
actual material condition prevailing at the time or the declarative statements for their denotative 
meanings alone, but also the connotations suggested between the lines. Only by being attuned to 
those suggestions, we can understand the notion of sovereignty as a dynamic, protean 
phenomenon as much practiced at present as is wished differently for the future. By striking 
down “tribe” for “nation” and by including a powerful statement on sovereignty, the amended 
preamble encapsulates not only the Nation’s sense of its past and present, but also its dream for 
the future. Reading in this manner, it can be said that the Cherokee vision of sovereignty is an 
unfinished business, a work-in-progress. In a sense, the amended preamble reminds us of the 
Cherokee Nation’s 1831 Supreme Court petition to be recognized as a foreign nation. While the 
“constraints” in their rhetorical situation—being within the boarder of the United States and the 
historical fact of their subjugation and occupation—does not allow them in 1999 to declare the 
kind of sovereignty that the1831 Supreme Court petition demanded, the amended preamble 
gestures toward that desire.56           
 More instructive on the new Constitution’s spirit of sovereignty is the Article no.1 (one), 
immediately following the preamble. The article in the 1976 entitled “Federal Regulation” reads, 
“The Cherokee Nation is an inseparable part of the Federal Union. The Constitution of the 
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article “The Rhetorical Situation,” in which he characterizes exigency, audience, and constraints 





United States is the Supreme Law of the land; and therefore, the Cherokee Nation shall never 
enact any law which is in conflict with any federal law.” The revised article in the 1999 
Constitution shifts the title from “Federal regulation” to “Federal relationship,” and redefines the 
nature of relationship from that of the regulator and regulated to the one between two equal 
partners: “The Cherokee Nation reaffirms its sovereignty and mutually beneficial relationship 
with the United States of America.” Cumulatively, the amended preamble and the Article 1 (one) 
make a powerful statement on the state of Cherokee sovereignty as something that is not 
subservient to the sovereignty of the United States.     
 Scholars have emphasized that Native American sovereignty should be analyzed in terms 
of white colonialism, Native resistance, and tribal peoples’ effort for their self-determination.57 It 
is thus understood to be relational with the United States. Because of this reason, as Scott 
Richard Lyon has demonstrated, Native American sovereignty is rhetorical in nature, and only 
by having “rhetorical sovereignty” with “a people’s control of meaning” that can be “found in 
sites legal, aesthetic, and pedagogical” (447) that Native American tribes can ensure their self-
determination. As Alyosha Goldstein states, tribal sovereignty “is not a question of having or not 
having some transhistorical or universal thing,” but “a necessarily relational and interdependent 
                                                          
57 For Fredrick E. Hoxie, “the term [sovereignty] is perhaps best understood not as a fixed legal 
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autonomy that might apply to any area of life” rather than “simply … condition of political life” 
(140). In the same vein, Jodi Byrd thinks of sovereignty as “the force and rule of law whether it 
is bound to spiritual deity, an individual, and entire population, or a piece of land” (131). For her 
Indigenous sovereignty is “the power and capacity to dictate selfhood in the face of settler 
colonialism and across four centuries of liberal enlightenment” (131). Joseph William Singer 
thinks that the map of the United States has erased the Native sovereignty as it does not reflect 
the 566 federally recognized tribes (1-18). Manu Vimalassery argues that tribal sovereignty is 
something primal that existed from pre-contact era against which United States makes it 
sovereignty claims, which he terms as “counter-sovereignty” (142).  Sovereignty is also about “a 
political entities externally recognized right to exercise final authority over its affairs” 





set of claims and strategies that are made and mobilized in specific times and circumstances with 
regard to particular antagonism” (148). In the tradition of Euro-American modernity, the 
sovereignty of a nation is expressed by the sanctity of its territorial boundaries. Its direct 
implication can be seen in the international borders—particularly, unresolved fault lines—that 
nations police for stopping any infiltration. Even when an infiltration does not create any 
pragmatic difficulty, such encroachment generates high nationalist furor as it is interpreted as a 
direct assault on the nation’s sovereignty. Ideologically, an individual ownership of property and 
the national claim of territory have similar roots in modernity. Given the rationality involved in 
the conception of modern nation-state that required it to stand above ethnic and linguistic bases, 
the territoriality served as the determining factor for the nation-states. As stated above, Native 
Americans did not practice property ownership in the way European modernity—as in John 
Locke’s treatise— conceptualized it. Native Americans have had a spiritual and indigenous 
relationship with the land, a connection that should have been translated into European 
conception of sovereignty comfortably, especially from the European perspective. But Native 
Americans did not have the identical conception of territorial sovereignty, a reason that many 
Native American tribes shared their land with early colonial settlers. But as they lost their land 
substantially and the fear of losing all land emerged, some of the tribes saw the value in 
constituting them as territory-based nations. As a part of their politics of identification, the 1827 
and 1839 Cherokee Constitutions, for instance, stated the territorial sovereignty as their major 
characteristic, although the Constitutions did not embrace the full spirit of a territorial nation-
state as only the people with the Cherokee ancestry could be its citizens. While self-
determination is still at the core of the Cherokee struggle in the early twenty-first century, the 





digital technology have instigated the need for new vision of nationhood and sovereignty, 
leading the Cherokee Nation to be rhetorically creative in its articulation of its sovereignty. 
 Thus, because of having to redefine its sovereignty according to the broader historical 
context and the rhetorical exigency and kairotic opening available in that context, Cherokee 
Nation in the 1999 Constitution not only presents strong statements on sovereignty, but also 
expands it to a more nuanced form, one marked with the spirit of deterritorialization and 
digitization. The Article VI, Section 3 allocates two seats at the National legislature, National 
Council, to be elected “by those registered voters residing outside the boundaries of the 
Cherokee Nation voting at-large in according with this section.”  Before the 1999 amendment, 
the Cherokee Nation’s nonresidential citizens could vote for the National Council only being 
registered in a territorial district. Lifting of that requirement freed the citizens from having to be 
artificially registered to a territorial district. As it can be expected, this development did not 
come in vacuum; it suggested the availability of communicational and connective infrastructure 
among the people and the Cherokee government. The Article VI, section 10 states, “The Council 
shall establish a continuous system of permanent publication of all laws of the Cherokee Nation 
and judicial opinions of highest court. The system shall provide for regular updating, indexing 
and digesting and shall be of public record of all times.”  In the historical context where the 
constitution was amended, the significance of this article transcends the traditional “right to 
information” kind of interpretation. Understood in the context of the existence of an active 
official website of the Cherokee Nation and its ability to bring its citizens, irrespective of their 
residential condition, on a single space, this article represents the shifting conception of 
nationhood—a deterritorialized, virtual nationhood. While attributing the quality of 





the land may induce an automatic opposition, my theorization rests on the digitizing trends in the 
Cherokee Nation’s practices and the provision of non-resident citizens’ representation to the 
Nation’s legislature in the 1999 Constitution. In a sense, the virtual platform that the Cherokee 
Nation is using supplements the territorial limitation imposed on the nation. Through the 
platform, the Cherokee citizens—irrespective of their geographical location—can participate 
with the activities of the nation, an imagined community collectively formed by the shared 
history, language and culture. While the Cherokee Nation may not have articulated this new 
conception of nationhood in clear words and the Constitution itself may not have fully exhausted 
the possibilities inherent in such conception, the provision of non-residential representation in 
the National Council and the use of virtual platform to bring the Nation’s citizens in a single 
space point to that direction—something other nations could follow, particularly in a globalized 
world with flowing population.          
  Two contextual aspects inspired the digitalized deterritorialized sovereignty in the 1999 
Constitution: dispersed population and digital affordances. From the time of the promulgation of 
the 1976 Constitution, the Cherokee Nation had faced a puzzle of how to ensure the 
representation of non-residential citizens to the Nation’s structure. Triggered by the Dawes Act 
of 1887, which allotted the Cherokee Nation’s communally held land for individual ownership, 
the Cherokee population has dispersed widely from one coast to the other, often making small 
satellite communities. Had the Cherokee Nation been a completely a standard territorial nation-
state, the dispersal would have ruined the possibility of its reemergence as a Nation. Ancestral 
relationship, interpreted in terms of blood quantum, has been the basis of the Cherokee 
Citizenship.58 Even amidst the wide dispersal, the people-nation nature of the nation always kept 
                                                          





the nationhood for the Cherokees even in the most powerless condition. A note of explanation is 
order here: the notion of a blood-based nation and the practice of blood quantum in identifying 
people may evoke an essentialist, non-rhetorical image, often pointing to a purist, atavistic tribal 
desire. But, as the 1999 Constitutional Convention—in course of discussing the blood quantum 
qualification for the candidate of Principal Chief that finally decided against any specific 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
interracial marriages. As Sturm’s ethnographical study suggests, the blood-based nationhood 
rests on certain historically constructed conception of ancestry. Blood, when used as a source of 
citizenship, becomes rhetorical in nature as an applicant to citizenship has to persuade the 
authority for one’s eligibility using the existing blood-based criteria. The Resolution issued by 
the Joint Council of the Cherokee Nation and the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians on April 9, 
2008 is particularly relevant here: while it acknowledges that hundreds of groups claim 
themselves as Cherokees and does not dispute many of their  Cherokee ancestry, the resolution 
states, “ any individual who is not a member of federally recognized Cherokee tribe, in academia 
or otherwise, is hereby discouraged from claiming as a Cherokee, or on behalf of Cherokee 
citizens, or using claims of Cherokee heritage to advance his or her career or credentials.”  As 
Todd Crow reports in Cherokee Phoenix on February 2, 2012, “According to a Jan. 25 U.S. 
census release, people claiming Cherokee linage on their census forms increased by more than 
89,000 to 819,105 since the 2000 U.S. census.” So, the blood for the citizenship is not so much 
about the ancestral Cherokee blood as is about the particular Cherokee blood discursively 
produced by the federal recognition and reinforced by the ‘privileged’ Cherokees themselves. 
The blood line with the access to the Cherokee citizenship thus rests on the writing established in 
legal, economic and cultural discourse, polishing the boundaries of the Cherokee identity.  
As Robert Wald Sussman argues, racial and ethnic identity does not withstand the rigor of 
scientific analysis. From one perspective, such kind of claim may empower the races and ethnic 
communities deemed to be intellectually inferior by the nineteenth-century pseudoscience of 
racial biology that was used to justify colonization and subjugation. Race, as Stuart Hall argues, 
is a “floating signifier” discursively produced by language, power, and history, with different 
inflections in its meaning and impact in different socio-economic and historical contexts. Even 
the liberal discourse of meritocratic individualism may find the collective racial identity 
antithetical to its non-discriminatory philosophy, often interrogating affirmative provisions. But, 
as Cornet West boldly entitles his book, “race matters,” particularly for those underprivileged 
whose identity needs to be redefined for their liberation and self-determination.  As the Rachel 
Dolezal—who allegedly claimed African-American identity despite both of her parents’ 
European ancestry—case demonstrated, the constructed nature of race or ethnicity does not mean 
that it is open for assumption to anybody (Victor, Daniel. “Spokane N.A.A.C.P Leader Posing as 
Black, Parents Say” New York Times, June 12, 2015.). Indirectly commenting on the case, 
President Obama, in his Amazing Grace Eulogy delivered on June 17, 2015, connoted that 
“grace,” which many heard as “race” of African Americans is given, not earned 






quantum requirement—displayed, the purity and degree of blood itself is the matter of 
convention. While a few delegates repeatedly evoked a particular image of Cherokee appearance 
saying that they don’t want somebody not-looking-like-a-Cherokee to be their Principal Chief, 
the Convention deliberated on the future of any ancestry-based blood formula and highlighted 
the possibility of ever-reducing blood quantum of its citizens because of the increasing 
interracial births. Given the dispersal and the contact with the people from other ethnic and racial 
backgrounds that the dispersal brings, specifying the blood degree would be exclusionary as 
well.             
 By introducing the provision of representation to the National Council from the citizens 
residing outside the Nation’s boundaries, the 1999 Constitution instituted a new form of 
sovereignty that would participate in the virtualization introduced by digital technology. The 
Cherokee blood may be in itself a rhetorically produced historical formation, it is the basis of the 
Cherokee citizenship. As the Cherokee Nation’s website states, for the current form of the 
Cherokee citizenship “it requires that the applicant to the citizenship has at least one direct 
Cherokee ancestor listed on the Dawes Final Rolls, a federal census of those living in the 
Cherokee Nation that was used to allot Cherokee land to individual citizens in preparation for 
Oklahoma Statehood.” But this condition also poses a challenge for the Nation as it has to 
incorporate all interested Cherokee citizens in its nation-building process. While philosophically 
a people-nation, the Cherokee Nation also operates like a territorial state in its governmental 
structure and services; its limited land-base and the scattered population outside the base does 
not allow it to bring all citizens within a single territorial boundary. The advent of digital 
technology provided a new structure through which people could engage with an organization or 





people nature of the Cherokee Nation and its scattered population, the new digital virtual 
platform with its ability for “time-space compression” provides the Nation with a functional 
imagined community of collective identity and politics, by complementing to the Nation’s 
limited land-base.59           
 Virtual supplementation is something fundamental to human existence. As Jacques Lacan 
theorized, human difference from the rest of the primates depends on human capacity to 
associate itself with the symbolic other.60 Or, drawing on rhetorician Kenneth Burke, human 
beings are primarily “symbol-using animals.” Writings, arts, and other human endeavors do not 
merely represent the world, but also create their own reality. Twenty-first-century digital 
platform accentuates the human capacity for virtualization to a new level, disrupting old concepts 
such as territorial-sovereignty, while inaugurating new forms. Theorizing virtualization, Pierre 
Levy writes, “the virtualization can be defined as the movement of actualization in reverse. It 
consists in the transition from actual to the virtual, an exponentiation of the entity under 
consideration. Virtualization is…a change of identity, a displacement of the center of ontological 
gravity of the object considered” (26). He further writes, “virtualization fluidities existing 
distinctions, augments the degrees of freedom involved, and hollows out compelling vacuum” 
(27). Commenting on the impact of information technology, he writes, “taking a profoundly 
actual constraint (time and space) and making it a contingent variable clearly involves the 
creation of an effective solution to a problematic and thus of virtualization” (30). 
Deterritorialization is the natural impact of virtualization: “It was therefore to be expected that 
deterritorialization, the escape from ‘here’ and ‘now’ and ‘that,’ would be encountered as one of 
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the roads of virtualization” (Levy 30).  Expanding on Marshall McLuhan’s thesis that technology 
shapes human cognition, John Tinnell writes, “mobile world browsers make possible a way of 
seeing that we might call Internet vision—seeing the world through the lens of an immense range 
of Web Writing/media that has geotagged to the places we inhabit.”  Pointing how “the Age of 
Print is passing,” and how the process of virtualization started with the technology of telegraph 
has intensified with the advent of the Internet, Katherine N. Hayles writes, “the interactions are 
dynamic and continuous, with feedback and feedforward loops connecting different levels with 
each other and cross-connecting machines processes with human responses” (2, 13). This new 
way of seeing, intensified virtualization, and deterritorialization have collectively ushered in the 
possibility of deterritorialized sovereignty in which people could effectively associate themselves 
with an organization, community and nation-state without necessarily being geographically in 
the place where the entity of association physically exists. The virtualization of nation opens 
itself to the people located beyond its territorial boundaries, facilitating the participation of 
people to the virtualized deep space. From the perspective of sovereignty, the classical version of 
which indicates human ability to participate in public organizations beyond their own personal 
affair, the virtualization enhances the possibilities of new connection and participation, 
especially of those located far-flung from the land-base of the nation.    
 The ubiquity of virtual presence of organizations and businesses now may blind us in 
noticing this grand transformation, the new kind of national imagination based on new forms of 
communications technology. As Benedict Anderson argues the modern nation-states are 
imagined communities with their roots in the print culture; people sharing the language could 
imagine themselves as the members of new community even without having to engage in a face-





of writing, printing and reading in vernacular languages. Putting it differently, nation-states, their 
sovereignty, and the vision of citizenship have been the forms of human imagination contingent 
upon particular historical formation. Arjun Appaduari contends that electronic capitalism 
revolutionizes the possibilities involved in what Anderson called “print capitalism.” Not only it 
accelerates the flows of all kinds—from finances to ideas to people themselves—from one place 
to the other, electronic capitalism also provides the platform for synchronous presence and 
connection for territorially far-flung populace in its virtual realm. (For instance, my family 
scattered across continents is localized in a Viber page where all members communicate and 
share photos, videos, and messages. Despite the temporal and spatial differences among us, the 
instantaneous communication and sharing gives us a sense of familial togetherness and 
immediate connection.) It ushers in the new forms of imagination that do not have to comply 
with the boundaries of geography and time. As an illustration, Appaduari points at the new forms 
of diasporic experiences in which new immigrants—unlike the immigrants from pre-
electronically mediated communication era—keep their contact with their native communities 
intact, bypassing the old temporal and spatial distances.      
 But this development does not erase the importance of territoriality. Surfing the Cherokee 
Nation’s website and participating in the national discourse using the virtual platform may 
provide users a sense of deterritorialization. But the virtualization of the nation—the use of 
interactive communications platform and the participation opportunities that it offers—does not 
erase or replace the nation’s geographical territory; it only adds on a new dimension of activities 
or a field of actions. In a sense, the added virtual dimension is a deep space, grounded on real 
time-and-space. As scholars have noted, the online virtual platform—despite its deterritorialized 





that control and develop the platform.61 The digitization of nations has opened new avenues and 
new forms of challenges—like the ones posed by cyberattacks— in preserving the security of 
their information, but it hasn’t reduced the significance of territorial control. In line with this 
understanding, the drafters of the 1999 Cherokee Constitution added a new article—article no. II 
(two)—with a statement on “territorial jurisdiction,” a provision prominently present in the 1827 
and 1839 Constitutions but missing in the 1976 Constitution.  This reiteration of territorial 
sovereignty reinforces the idea how Nation’s trans-territorial possibilities depend on national 
territory, analogous to the relationship between the metropolitan nodal points and the global 
digital platforms they operate. 
3.8 Conclusion   
 Reading the Cherokee Constitutions in the boarder Cherokee constitutional history from 
rhetorical and genre perspective provides us with at least two insights. First, it makes evident that 
the written constitution remains the dominant legitimate space for the Cherokee Nation in its 
articulation of the vision of nationhood and sovereignty differently according to their kairotic 
horizons. Second, this difference establishes sovereignty as naturally rhetorical in nature that the 
forces of history and writing conventions bring into being. The constitutional genre’s embedded 
capacity to form a nation offered the Cherokee Nation an opening to adopt the politics of 
identification in the 1820s. Bereft of military power, they could use the written constitution and 
other genres, discourses and institutions of modernity as rhetorical instruments in their struggle 
for survival and sovereignty.  At the turn of the millennium, the Cherokee Nation uses the 
written constitution not only to redefine its relationship with the United States but also to 
reorganize its internal vision and distribution of the sovereignty that is attuned to the spirit of 
                                                          





deterritorialization and digitization. What this deployment of the genre suggests is that the 
written constitution as a genre has served as a sovereignty generating agency—replacing the pre-
modern divine authority, conceived differently in diverse cultures, on whose name sovereignty 
was predicated previously. This emergence manifests that any practice and conceptualization of 
sovereignty is rhetorical in nature, including those claims of non-rhetoricality attached with 
divinely ordained sovereignties.62 Therefore, while the function of the written constitution is 
contextually driven and thus is particularly inflected in a specific historical juncture, its ability to 
legitimize nations, to provide the space for the articulation of sovereignty, and to act in concert 
with  other genres and field of activities are something fundamental.  
 
 







                                                          
62 I’m using Jacques Derrida’s insight here. Of Grammatology demonstrates how even the claims 
of non-textuality has textual nature; oral exchanges are written structures. The deconstruction of 
oral-written binary is of significance for my project because rhetorical sovereignty, as Richard 
Scotts theorizes, emphasizes on the sovereignty as conceived in the writings of and about the 
Native Americans in the post-contact period. Not only has rhetoric its roots in oral culture, the 
strength of the term lies in its ability to transcend oral-written binary. Sovereignty thus has 
always been rhetorical both in pre-contact America as well as in the traditions where sovereignty 





 Chapter 4: Nepali Constitutional Rhetoric: Genre, Authorship, and Sovereignty  
4.1 Introduction           
 Padma Shumsher Rana announced the first written constitution of Nepal in 1948—180 
years after King Prithvi Narayan Shan conquered Kathmandu Valley in 1748--setting the stage 
for modern Nepal. The year 1948 also marked a century since Padma Shumser's predecessor 
Jung Bahadur Rana took control of the state from the king and started the era of autocratic Rana 
family regime.  Because of opposition within the ruling Rana family, however, the 1948 
Constitution never came into effect.  Instead, King Tribhuvan ordained a new constitution in 
1951 in response to the popular uprising against Rana oligarchy, abrogating not only Padma 
Shumsher’s constitution but also the Rana regime itself.  Four more constitutions followed in 
1959, 1962, 1990, and 2007, each accompanied by decades of political revolutions, movements, 
and armed revolts.  In September of 2015, the Constituent assembly—the elected body of 
people’s representatives—approved the present constitution.  While a tradition for the 
legitimization and functioning of the government existed in Nepal prior to any written 
constitution, the adoption of the constitutional genre and its associations with western modernity 
has had deep transformative implications for the country, starting from the mid-twentieth 
century.    
 The constitutional history of Nepal generates interesting questions: What did Padma 
Shumsher expect the genre of a written constitution to perform for him and the country? Why did 
Nepal first adopt the genre in 1948—132 years after the 1816 treaty of Sugauli largely stabilized 
the present territory? Why did the 1948 constitution fail, necessitating Nepal to rewrite its 





of a constituent assembly a major demand?  Why did the King, who had originally favored such 
an assembly in 1951, eventually rescind it?     
 With few exceptions, writers who discuss Nepali constitutions fall into three categories: 
native Nepali informants writing in English to interested western readers; western writers who 
present themselves as Nepal experts or consultants on the subject; and activist academics or 
researchers who analyze the situation and documents with the aim of changing the context itself, 
largely for further “democratization” of the country.  While there is no possibility of any neutral 
and objective position because of my own inescapable acculturation, this article is an attempt to 
analyze, conceptualize, and explain the constitutional rhetoric of Nepal without falling into one 
of these categories by default.        
 While constitutional forms, historical events, and political concepts serve as the building 
blocks of this chapter, I approach the constitutional history of Nepal from the perspective of 
Rhetorical Genre Studies (RGS) as developed in the works of Carolyn Miller, Amy Devitt, 
David Russel, Charles Bazerman, and Anis Bawarshi, among others. Carolyn Miller’s 1984 
seminal essay oriented the study of genres away from typified features or forms and toward 
social and performative functions of a genre. As Devitt summarizes, rhetorical genre studies 
equips us to see that “genres are created, dynamic, ideological constructs” (348) that perform 
context-specific functions while remaining partially true to their ideological dispositions 
generated through earlier practices. Approaching constitutions from the perspective of rhetorical 
genre studies thus provides us with metaconstitutional insights--the understanding of what and 
how the adoption of the written constitution transformed the context, the participants and even 
the genre itself in the process. Metaconstitutional insights are the functions of the written 





by the process of using the genre. It is about the genre's performance in history, thus requiring an 
analysis of the interplay among the genre, context and participants.     
 A rhetorical genre studies perspective provides us with the insights that not only enrich 
but also significantly redefine some of the established views of Nepal’s constitutional history and 
national historiography. For instance, one persistent reigning view has been that Nepal’s current 
state of sovereignty is at a historically low point. A rhetorical genre approach to constitutions 
allows us to revisit the idea of sovereignty itself as a historically produced discursive formation. 
Monarchy in Nepal was constitutionalized as soon as the king's power was named in a binding 
document.  That is, the constitution brought the king within the boundaries of formal definitions, 
allowing the participants to think of alternative possibilities of power, including the abolition of 
the monarchy. As a result, the question of who gets to write the constitution has shaped the 
country’s protracted, decades-long conflict between traditional and modern forces.63  
 The traditional force—first represented by Ranas in the1948 and then by the king since 
1951—fervently tried to hold onto constitutional authorship because it provided the king a 
validation of his sovereignty: Declaring constitutions would reinforce the king’s traditional status 
as the law-giver. Modern forces—first represented by the revolutionaries in the 1950s—
internalized an idealized constitutional genre convention from western modernity and demanded 
the election of constituent assembly to draft a democratic constitution. Cognizant of the 
constitutional genre and the legitimizing function embedded in it, they insisted on gearing the 
constitution in their favor—sometimes with the purist desire of following the procedure of 
                                                          
63 See Chauhan for the early characterization of Nepali political actors as modern and traditional. 
Pashupati Shumshere J. B. Rana complicates Chauhan’s characterization as an unrealistic 
categorization of “the complex politics of an emergent nation” in “the format of a medieval 
morality plays” (300). Contrary to Chauhan’s thesis, Joshi and Rose present king Mahendra’s 





constitutional authorship from the genre convention as practiced in its ideal setting, while other 
times avoiding such procedures significantly.  For instance, the framers of the 1951 
Constitution—given their popular support— could have announced a full-fledged democratic 
constitution that would have set the history of the country on a dramatically different route. 
Instead, the alliance of the king and parties chose to declare “The Interim Government Act of 
Nepal, 1951” because the idealized genre convention that they had internalized required them to 
elect a constituent assembly to craft a “we the people” kind of popular constitution. The king, 
who had momentarily committed to the idea of a people-written constitution in 1951, ultimately 
withdrew the promise, unilaterally announcing new constitutions on his own in 1959 and 1962 
with the insistence that constitutional authorship was his prerogative as the sovereign.  
 The 1990 constitution, drafted after a successful movement to restore multiparty 
democracy by ending the King’s autocratic rule, continued to struggle with questions of 
constitutional authorship. While the king never publicized his precise views against the popular 
constitutional authorship (which would have been against the spirit of royal declarations that the 
Shah dynasty respected the popular will), he fought hard to maintain his own authority within the 
preamble even when he conceded many of his other powers. His insistence over the content of 
the preamble suggested that a constitution from the constituent assembly would go against the 
very spirit of kingship—besides the loss of power pragmatically for him.  
 The constitutional history of Nepal is, however, ironic. When the modern forces 
ultimately found the way to draft their constitution through the Constituent Assembly in 2015, 
the opposition to the newly promulgated Constitution suggested that the collective authorship 
crafted through an electoral procedure had become insufficient to fulfill the promise of 





that the hegemonic procedural aspect engrained in constitutional authorship needed rethinking in 
the context of postmodern promises of radical democracy.  
 To understand what and how the adoption of each of Nepal's written constitutions 
transformed the context, the participants and even the genre itself, the remainder of this chapter 
will focus on reading each of the preambles. While authorship and sovereignty are at the core of 
the discussion, they become explicit only in relationship to the contexts of their unfolding. The 
first section analyzes the context of the 1948 constitution’s emergence and Padma Shumsher’s 
use of constitutional genre to legitimize his regime by claiming constitutional authorship. Using 
critical genre perspective, the section shows how the adoption of the written constitution at that 
historical juncture was more about the use of the genre’s nation-recognizing and regime-
legitimizing functions rather than about the rulers’ intention to bring about any real political 
transformation. The second section discusses the 1951 constitution and demonstrates how and 
why popular constitutional authorship was inserted in Nepali political discourse during the 
period and how this insertion would drive the rest of the country’s history. The third section 
concentrates on the 1959 and 1962 constitutions, demonstrating how the king bent the genre, 
especially by claiming that constitutional authorship was his cultural prerogative—a move that 
used an otherwise anti-hereditary, modern genre for reinscribing traditional practice of 
sovereignty. The third section discusses the 1990 constitution, claiming how its compromised 
constitutional authorship derailed the document itself despite many of its promising democratic 
possibilities. The concluding section sheds some light on the 2015 Constitution, arguing that the 






4.2 The 1948 Nepali Constitution and the Genre’s Nation-recognizing and Regime-
legitimizing Functions          
 Drawing on Anne Freadman’s concept of uptake, Anis Bawarshi has argued that a genre 
performance accentuates, undermines, and sometimes adds on certain aspects from the standard 
genre convention. A particular instantiation of genre does not take up all the aspects of a genre in 
its entirety. Indeed, while the participants using the genre may have an idea of the genre as a 
stable, fixed form, the genre itself is realized through its performances. The performances can be 
divergent, although not to the point of being unrecognizable as a part of a species. Written 
constitution as a genre has certain compelling ideological elements (such as “the consent of the 
governed”) and functional elements (such as the regulation of the government) that originated 
with the genre’s first experimentation in eighteenth-century America. But the way this genre has 
been taken up globally in the last two centuries, written constitution also has developed new 
performances that were not the part of, or were only tangentially related to, the American 
exercise.           
 As the case of Nepal’s 1948 constitution demonstrates, constitution as a genre has 
generated nation-recognizing and regime-legitimizing functions in its pervasive globalized form 
by the mid-twentieth century. While never formally colonized, Nepal was caught by the global 
furor of the mid-twentieth century, when more than 85 % of the world was colonized by the 
European powers was either already or in the process of being independent. As postcolonial 
theorists have noted, the independence in that context largely meant becoming a nation-state, an 
ideological disposition borrowed from modern European tradition, instead of resuscitating 
precolonial local political structures. While Nepal had enjoyed independence when most of 





historical exigency for the country. Just having a traditional national structure with a few treaties 
would not suffice the national existence in the new context. Nepal needed to redefine its image if 
it were to survive the swiftly shifting maps in the region. As the Nepali ruling elites realized by 
the mid-twentieth century, that would mean adopting the genre of written constitution because 
the genre was increasingly a defining parameter of a nation-state in a new post-war international 
order. Not having a constitution could jeopardize international recognition, including the 
membership in the United Nations.         
 The historical exigency for the deployment of the written constitution emerged 
particularly because of Nepal’s tenuous national sovereignty, especially in the changing South 
Asian context. When Padma Shumsher Rana announced the first written constitution in 1948 
entitled “The Nepal Government Act,” South Asia was going through tremendous political 
transformation because of the decolonization process. Precolonial boundaries had become 
dysfunctional, and the independence from British Empire required the region to forge new 
political maps.           
 Because of its continued independence, Nepal had well-defined territorial boundaries and 
a state structure--conditions that spared it the suffering, violence and forced mass-migration that 
caught most of its southern neighbors in an unprecedented way. But the wave of transformation 
influenced Nepal in its own way. With the departure of British rulers—Rana regime’s strongest 
foreign ally—from India, Nepal had lost an anchor in the regional and international order. As 
many historians have noted, while Nepal’s sovereignty was originally won by valor and bravery 
on the battlefield, Rana regime maintained the official independence in the latter period mostly 
by supporting the wishes of British Raj— to the extent that Rana Prime Minister had sent his 





 The provisions of the 1816 Sugauli Treaty between Nepal and the East India Company 
are testament to Nepal’s compromised sovereignty during the period: For instance, the sixth, 
seventh and eighth points of the treaty brought Nepal under the security umbrella of the Britain 
Empire. The sixth point of treaty states, “If any difference shall arise between Nepal and Sikkim, 
it shall be referred to the arbitration of the East India Company.” The seventh point states, “The 
King of Nepal hereby engages never to take or retain in his service any British subject, nor the 
subject of any European or American State, without the consent of the British Government.” 
Although the treaty was a major milestone that stopped the East India Company from trying to 
colonize the territories of Nepal to British Empire, the treaty compromised the sovereignty of 
Nepal until the new treaty was signed between the two countries in 1923. As the new treaty 
states, it “essentially cancelled, except so far as they may be altered by the present Treaty” the 
provisions of Sugauli Treaty.  With the following words, the new treaty affirmed Nepal’s 
independence: “Nepal and Britain will forever maintain peace and mutual friendship and respect 
each other’s internal and external independence.”  Given the national glory gained by 
maintaining political independence when most of the world was colonized, Nepal’s current 
nationalist historiography does not present these treaties in right perspective, often signaling that 
Nepal’s continued political sovereignty fully rested on the country’s bravery and power. But the 
treaties played vital space both in compromising as well as maintaining the country’s 
independence.          
 Because the country’s sovereignty was tenuous during the south Asian decolonization 
process, Nepal needed a new structure if it were to maintain independence after the departure of 
the British Raj from India. The chaotic (thus formative) conditions in the region had undermined 





ignore the territorial independence of Nepal. Given Nepal's limited military and economic power 
in regard to the subcontinent’s overwhelming population and land comprised by present-day 
India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, Nepal faced an existential threat as a nation-state, at least 
psychologically. This threat exerts its power even today.      
 Beyond the regional power dynamics, the international context also shaped Nepali 
motivation in adopting the country’s first written constitution in 1948. After World War II, the 
whole global context was changing. The newly independent territories in the so-called third 
world were coming into being as nation-states. With the crumbling of the British Empire, the 
locus of global power was shifting from Europe to North America. Emerging was the new 
international order, and institutions of nation-state placed the written constitution at its zenith.64 
Gone were the days of valor. Technological breakthroughs in the instruments of warfare such as 
the invention of nuclear bomb meant a massive imbalance among countries’ power. Nepal, who 
could dare to fight the British Empire in 1816, did not have resources for such daring in the new 
context. For most countries such as Nepal, international recognition (rather than military power) 
defined their existence as a nation-state.        
 This regional and global context, coupled with the country’s tenuous sovereignty, forced 
Nepal to revamp its image if it were to preserve its national independence and sovereignty. 
                                                          
64 Critics theorize the post-World War II era of universalized nation-states differently. The 
revolutionary-nationalist historiography interprets the era as the glorious time of independence 
and sovereignty. Promoted officially by the states and perpetuated through school curricula, the 
nationalist historiography presents struggle for independence as a pious and glorious sacrifice 
made by the leaders and the independence as nation’s coming into being, although nativist pre-
colonial “golden age” (mostly imagined and mythical in nature) is often evoked in legitimizing 
the new nation. This version demonstrates the structural affinity between modern nation-states 
and the discipline of history as co-enabling and co-informing entities (See Hobsbawm). Some 
postcolonial critics argue that the colonized locations’ birth into nation-states is not so much 
about newly gained sovereignty as much as it is about the effect of paradigm shift in the structure 
of western domination from territorial empire to a system of globalization controlled by 





Sensing the transformed conditions of nationhood, Nepal, for instance, established diplomatic 
relationships with the United States and France, and used the relationship as an evidence for 
securing the membership in the United Nations (Whelpton 69).65 Having such recognition at an 
international forum would make Nepal stronger in the region. As Bazerman has noted, genres 
work in a system by reinforcing each other’s functions. In this context, when Nepal was 
searching for and deploying the nation-recognizing genres approved by the international 
community, a written constitution automatically served the need along with other genres such as 
treaties that established diplomatic relationship between countries. It is important to note that in 
this context it did not matter much at the international level whether a constitution was proposed, 
drafted, and ratified by an appropriate body; that a country had a written constitution was the 
evidence of nationhood in the new dominant global political cultural imagination.   
 Besides this nation-recognizing function, Padma Shumsher also sensed a regime 
legitimizing function in the constitutional genre. Not only did the British departure from the 
subcontinent require the realignment of international politics for Nepal, the struggle for and 
winning of independence in India in the 1940s had its own political reverberation: Gandhi’s 
catch phrase “self-rule”—used to mobilize a large swath of people in a diverse linguistic and 
cultural setting—held deep democratic, economic and even spiritual meanings.  "Self-rule" 
coalesced a complex set of ideas from diverse sources such as traditional religious beliefs, 
British legal theories, and Thoreau’s and Tolstoy’s economic-spiritual view. The ideas of 
democracy and self-rule resonated deeply with Nepali revolutionaries. By establishing political 
parties and waging revolution for democracy, they wanted to use the transformed international 
context in their favor. For them, the Rana regime had become a vestige of the past, unsuitable to 
                                                          





meet the democratic aspirations of the nation. The protest across the country created an exigency 
for the ruling Ranas themselves. Their traditional style of politics had started to become 
infective; they needed to fight back by using the same ideological weapons of modernity. If the 
people wanted a legitimate political system appropriate for the new age, the Ranas had to prove 
that they themselves were that system. A written constitution, along with other reform programs, 
helped legitimize their regime.        
 Textually, this sensitivity to self-legitimization is particularly evident in the preamble of 
the 1948 constitution. It reads, 
Whereas, by virtue of the Supreme Power vested through the instruments of their 
sacred Panja-patras by Shree Panch Maharajadhiraja of Nepal, dating from the 
year of 1903 BS onward, delegating all powers of the State upon the 
contemporaneous Shree 3 Maharajas, whereas it is our fevent desire, through all 
social, economic and political developments to bring Nepal, this sacred country of 
Lord Pashupatinath, in line with the advanced nation of the world and grant our 
beloved motherland her rightful place in the comity of nations. (From the 
Preamble, “Government of Nepal Act, 2004 [BS]”).  
The preamble casts the Rana regime and the new constitution in legalistic fashion.  By quoting, 
the “scared Panja-patras” (royal seal; literally, the papers stamped with the king’s hands) as the 
source of his power twice in the preamble, Padma Shamsher accentuates the idea that the country 
had the legal apparatus even before the drafting of the first written constitution. While the nation 
might not have had a written constitution in the past, it did have traditions that were as 
significant and binding as the constitutional provisions; thus, the royal seal still mattered and was 





thus was to interrogate the foundational state structure of the nation itself.  Protecting Nepali 
identity required respecting the state and its legal traditions.   
 But what this claim of Nepali identity missed is that revolutionaries had internalized the 
function of a written constitution differently. Influenced by western and Indian experimentations, 
their foremost focus was on popular authorship. Many of the revolutionary leaders had seen the 
elections for a Constituent Assembly in India in 1946 and the subsequent drafting and 
promulgation of the Indian Constitution.66  From their perspective, Padma Shumsher or even the 
king could not be the legitimate author of the constitution. Padma Shamsher, who is often cast as 
a reformist in Nepali history, had anticipated this opposition, and the constitution therefore 
included many reforming programs, including the provision for fundamental human rights, and a 
form of elected legislature.  The revolutionaries nonetheless rejected the constitution on 
ideological grounds: they were fighting for democracy, which would be realized only upon the 
promulgation of a people-written constitution. For them, abolishing the Rana regime and forming 
a civilian government were merely the necessary conditions for democracy. The sufficient 
condition—which was inspired by the idealistic democratic practices in western countries—
entailed a people-written constitution with fundamental rights and democratic principles.  
 This contestation regarding the procedure, place, and function of the 1948 Nepali written 
constitution provides us with new insights about both genres in general and the constitution as a 
genre. When we think about genres, we expect them to perform relatively uniformly at least in 
the same context because genres in the practical world are normally settled phenomena without 
inviting substantial discussion on their very nature. For instance, people may discuss the content 
of a letter but rarely the nature of the letter as a genre itself. That happens largely because the 
                                                          





letter in that context is a settled entity, without requiring further qualification. Mostly, it is only 
in academic settings that established genres such as letter and reports are unfurled for analysis as 
teaching and research tools. The debates surrounding the 1948 Nepali constitution suggest that 
even in the practical world, genres themselves can generate discussions if they are not well-
established among the participants. Certainly, Nepal appropriated the genre of written 
constitution for its nation-recognizing and regime-legitimizing functions. Yet, since the 
participants in the context of 1948 Nepal did not have a tacitly agreed understanding of a 
constitution, they discussed the genre of the constitution itself by referring to various foreign 
experimentations. As Devitt emphasizes, “genres do not exist independent of people, though the 
generic actions of some people influence the actions of other people. To say that genre is a social 
action is to say that people take action through their conceptions of genres” (50). If a genre is a 
foreign entity trying to settle in a new situation, appropriating parties try to familiarize it before 
letting it settle in their terms. The Nepali experience with the 1948 constitution was an attempt to 
familiarize itself with the new genre—knowing what it was and appropriating it for the cause of 
sovereignty.   
4.3 The 1951 Constitution and the Question of the Genre’s Collective Authorship 
The 1948 Constitution also prompted discussion of sovereignty with different views to 
constitutional authorship. Ranas insisted on the doctrine of a monarch’s divine sovereignty, 
claiming that the sovereignty rested in the king. The claim allowed Padma Shamsher to author 
the national constitution on the proposition that the king had delegated his sovereignty to the 
Rana prime minister’s predecessor. But revolutionaries rejected this idea because they had 
imbibed the new notion of sovereignty with the stipulation that the people were the rightful 





this conflict, the 1948 constitution could not come into effect at all. Eventually, the 
revolutionaries and king Tribhuwan forged a coalition against the Rana regime, successfully 
ending Rana rule. The nation had entered into a new phase: Now not only the country needed a 
written constitution,67 it required to observe popular sovereignty in the constitutional authorship 
if it were to be a democratic modern nation.         
 This was a unique historical moment capturing the country’s transformation from 
traditional to modern statehood. Nepal might have emerged organically earlier claiming an 
irresistible unique identity in the region, but now it had to imitate the image of the modern 
nation-state in order to be relevant in the new situation. The imitation promised not only external 
recognition for the country, but also the internal devolution of power from the handful of 
families to the great mass of people. As the preamble of the 1948 constitution accentuated, the 
imitation would mean bridging the old nation with the new democratic polity. Indeed, this 
imitation was directly about the people’s democratic rights and responsibilities, but even more 
important was the promise of general peace, prosperity and happiness embodied in those ideals. 
 Undoubtedly, the 1950s did not see a complete break in the psychosocial disposition of 
an individual person from the past, and certainly variables of one’s existence such as class, 
education, gender, geographical location, caste, and ethnicity structured each person differently, 
but the macro-modification in the image of nationhood accompanied a new conception of 
personhood as well. The transformation involved a new conception of individual, including what 
one should expect from life, what it means to live a successful and happy life, and how the state 
can be helpful in realizing individual aspirations. Until this moment, the state from the people’s 
perspective was largely a regulating body, punishing transgressions and ensuring basic security; 
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it was basically a law and order project. After all, the Civil Code was the governing document of 
the time. The state in pre-constitutional time in Nepal was not conceived as a grand project 
designed for the wellbeing of its people. The discourse of development, democracy and success 
as envisioned in secular modernity and accompanying capitalism had not yet become a major 
part of Nepali consciousness. Thus, the adoption of the constitution was a part of a massive 
psycho-social modification in the conceptions of an individual, state, and life.     
   Although the written constitution was the most critical genre bridging this 
transformation, Nepal’s adoption of the genre did not come smoothly. In the absence of the 
country’s long history with the genre, again the mode was mimetic; the country looked to its 
surrounding for cues and expert advice for drafting its new constitution. Genre theorists such as 
Devitt and Bazerman have emphasized the role of context and learning in the way participants 
use a genre. Nepali users of the genre observed the region, thought about their own national 
history, and tried to find the best course available for them. The king and the revolutionaries 
were in a position to announce a full-fledged democratic constitution in the name of the people. 
Instead, they announced, “the Interim Government of Nepal Act, 1951” qualifying it as an 
interim act, and postponing the installation of a full-fledged constitution until the formation of a 
constituent assembly, although the act did not include a specific date for the elections of such 
body. Influenced by Indian and American constitutional practices, they thought that proper 
popular authorship rested at the core of the written constitution genre. 
From a genre perspective, however, the 1951 Nepali constitution was a compromised 
public action: It promised a people-written constitution yet did not even offer a full constitution 
for the moment. The compromise largely was the function of the conflict between the dominant 





Marxist perspective, the material base, particularly the feudal socio-economic condition led by 
the king and Ranas, did not support an immediate election of a constituent assembly. But the 
idealistic political aspirations that resulted from the revolution would not settle for anything less 
than a people-written constitution. With the success of the revolution, the king, who had been 
relegated to a titular head bereft of any executive power for more than a century, regained his 
centrality in the nation’s polity. For political parties, the doors of opportunity had opened 
suddenly. Emotionally, the moment was optimistic.  Even the king had internalized an idealistic 
vision of constitutional authorship at the moment (something that he would disavow later). While 
the socioeconomic base was stopping the decision for a constituent assembly, the widely shared 
mood was prompting them to look for something to transcend the constraints.     
 What this conflicting 1951 Nepali context suggests is that particular uptake of a genre is 
not always determined by one factor. Context is complex and often full of contradictory 
impulses. The uptake of a genre such as a national constitution, which demands the public 
performance of a large body of forces, tries to pull genre in different directions. Given that 
Nepal’s constitutional history at this point was almost non-existent, the king and the 
revolutionaries did not have a native tradition to follow or a hardened belief about a 
constitution.68 Charles Bazerman writes, “We learn about what to expect from genre through 
public and personal histories of experience with them (Bazerman, Rhetoric 30). The Nepali 
actors in 1951 were guided mainly by an abstract idealistic foreign tradition that resonated with 
the upbeat pathos following the success of the revolution. Thus, instead of pragmatically 
securing the political achievements of the time in a constitution by establishing a functioning 
democracy, they looked for the procedural purity of constitutional authorship. What they forgot 
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in the process was that the content of the constitution written by a constituent assembly does not 
necessarily have to be more democratic than that of a constitution drafted by other processes. For 
the young revolutionaries69 who had unseated the autocratic family regime that had reigned for 
more than a century, the significance of a proper constitutional authorship for a democratic polity 
was a non-sacrificial substance at that point.70     
 Unfortunately, by opting for a momentary compromise, the Nepali leaders of 1951 
created a philosophically incoherent constitution. Textually speaking, the result was the gap 
between the spirit of the preamble and the absolute power ascribed to the king in the constitution. 
The 1951 preamble embodied the democratic principles in simple language.71  King Tribhuwan 
“ordained and promulgated …the Interim Government of Nepal Act, 1951” on “the advice of the 
Council of Ministers” because “it is necessary till such time, as the Constitution is not framed 
and promulgated, the administration of the country should function according to a Constitution 
and certain rules and principles” (from the preamble of the 1951 Constitution). Hard laws had 
ruled general populace for a long time, but now with this preamble, the government also came 
within the province of law—a big leap. But the provisions within the constitution did not reflect 
the preamble’s democratic spirit.  Certainly, the constitution included a long list of rights, 
something that had come from the Anglo-American bill of rights tradition that the departing 
British rulers in the region were insisting to adopt for the newly independent countries largely to 
safeguard minorities from majoritarian government.72 Practically, the constitution reinstated the 
absolute monarchy, ascribing total state power to the king, giving him freehand in appointing 
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complicated when the ideas expressed are contentious, needing strong justification that tends to 
make the argument convoluted.   





minsters, judges and officials in other branches of the government.     
 How did this discrepancy become acceptable for the political parties that had waged the 
revolution to establish a constitutional democracy? Again, we need to think of the context to 
understand the participants’ motivation.  Two factors generated this inconsistency. First, even 
with the imperfect constitution, the revolutionaries believed that the country had entered into a 
constitutional phase. The statement in the preamble that “the administration of the country 
should function according to a Constitution and certain rules and principles” bore transformative 
political possibilities. From political parties’ perspective, gone were the days of a ruler’s 
whimsical arbitrary dictates; written laws would determine even the king’s power. Even when 
the new constitution privileged the will of the king momentarily as the rule of law, having that 
point written down in the constitution meant that the nature of politics had dramatically shifted. 
Second, the revolutionaries trusted the king’s ethos (naïve from the present perspective) because 
he had sided with them in the revolution. Despite the intricate blood relationship with the Ranas 
because of interfamilial marriages, the king had abdicated the throne in protest, dramatically 
enhancing the credibility of the revolution. The conspiracies and whims that plagued the royal 
palace ultimately giving way to the rise of Rana regime was merely a lore of the past, not even a 
distant memory for this generation fighting for democracy.  And, indeed, the fact that the king’s 
ancestor had led the country’s unification bestowed on the nation a distinct identity that 
automatically added value in the way the revolutionaries perceived the king’s ethos. The crown 
was the sign of the country’s continued independence, a condition that freed the country from 
having to establish a legitimate constitutional authority immediately, unlike the post-
independence contexts of the United States of America or India.  They could just use his 





for a constituent assembly were established. Given that the Ranas were still powerful (the first 
prime minister under the 1951 Constitution was Mohan Shumsher Jung Bahadur Rana), 
entrusting the king with state power through a constitution for the interim period until the 
election of the constituent assembly made a pragmatically expedient decision as well.  
 In the way subsequent history unfolded—particularly the fact that the king withdrew the 
1951 Constitution’s promise of a constitution written by an elected body by repeatedly 
announcing new constitutions himself—it can be said that the revolutionaries’ desire to follow 
the electoral procedure to craft popular authorship turned out to be ironic; their desire for an ideal 
constitution made them lose what they could have achieved without following the route of a 
constituent assembly.  Had they pushed for drafting a democratic constitution without according 
the king the absolute power or making the 1951 constitution a constitution-in-progress, the 
nation would certainly have taken a different course. This assessment may sound completely 
speculative, but it is important because it tells about the fault lines of observing the idealistic 
genre convention of the constitution without fully observing the context for that approach. 
Something thought to be idealistic could turn into a self-limiting prospect.     
 Eventually, the king crushed the revolutionaries’ naïve idealism and trust as expressed in 
the preamble. Increasingly, the provisions of the constitution that accorded the absolute power to 
the king started assuming full force. As the events between 1951 and 1959 demonstrated, the 
king stalled the election of the constituent assembly indefinitely. In the absence of a definite 
deadline for the formation of the constituent assembly, the revolutionaries' only hope rested on 
the king’s conscience. Had there been a provision of judiciary interpretation of the constitution 
or a tradition of independent judiciary to that effect, the spirit of the preamble might have exerted 





the preamble remained ineffective. In the culture where the king held deep-rooted authority and 
society was habituated to an autocratic rule, the king’s absolute power, rather than the 
preamble’s promise of democracy, came naturally. To sum up, the power granted by the genre of 
the constitution and the power descended from the tradition mutually strengthened each other to 
create an absolute monarch in practice, crushing the democratic will deposited in the preamble.
 With the introduction of the written constitution, Nepal witnessed the emergence of a 
liminal space in the practices of sovereignty. On the one hand, the introduction started new 
tradition of sovereignty, the practice of the rule of law as written down in the constitution, 
statutes and civil codes. The introduction promised the notion that national politics and power 
would be mobilized in accordance to the words in the constitution. But, on the other hand, the 
king’s assumption of the constitutional authorship along with his absolute power reinforced his 
traditional sovereignty. So, while the country was trying to learn to operate according to the 
words of the constitution, a collective national feeling persisted that traditional king could jump 
into scenario any moment stopping the march of modernity. Unlike in the Unites States, where 
all political crises have to be solved using the words of the constitution and related statues, the 
presence of the king undermined the constitution-based practices of sovereignty in the early 
constitutional period of Nepal. This lead to a hybrid form of sovereignty in which the written 
words of modernity as well as the unwritten forces of tradition mixed together forming different 
matrixes between them—sometimes colliding intensely while cooperating smoothly in other 
times.  
4.4 The 1959 Constitution and the King’s Claim of Constitutional Authorship   
 In 1959 King Mahendra announced a new constitution that formally rescinded the 





king proclaimed “an efficient monarchial form of government responsive to the wishes of the 
people” (Preamble, 1959 Nepal Constitution).73 Even though the1951 constitution provided for 
an absolute monarchy, its spirit was not monarchist: the king had ordained and enforced it, but he 
did not hold the sole authorship as the 1951 constitution was an agreed-upon-document among 
the major contemporary stakeholders. The 1951 document was, however, merely an act, 
designed for an interim period. By 1959, the king needed a more stable and prestigious 
constitution to cement his recently revived and solidified power. He could do so only by 
claiming the total authority over the constitutional authorship: thus although he conceded some 
of his power with the provision of popularly elected government in the 1959 constitution, he 
claimed full authorship of the new constitution, something that was not there in the 1948 and 
1951 constitutions.             
But the king’s claim to constitutional authorship was not a smooth sail. During the last 
two decades preceding the announcement of the new constitution, two views on constitutional 
authorship were gaining prominence in the Nepali public sphere. On the one hand, political 
parties had further augmented the idea of a constitution authored by the people. On the other 
hand, the king was reviving the traditional cultural epistemologies that accorded the power of 
authoring law to the monarch. From the political parties’ perspective, constitution as a genre was 
a vehicle of modernity. A national constitution needed to follow an internationally-established, 
deliberate, rational procedure for it to be a legitimate governing document. But monarchists, who 
had recently consolidated state power, tried to present the written constitution merely as a new 
tool within the traditional cultural framework. While not so clearly articulated, these two visions 
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of constitution circulated in the public sphere, resisting the king’s effort to own the constitutional 
authorship fully without opposition. The country already had a written constitution from 1951 
that theorized constitutional authorship against the monarchist interpretation. That fact created an 
extra burden on the king, making his assumption of constitutional authorship a reactionary 
move.74             
 In a sense, the king’s assumption of the authorship in the context of 1959 Nepal bended 
the spirit of the constitutional genre. As stated earlier, the 1951 constitutional Act had already 
defined the parameters of constitutional authorship. The king successfully made a powerful 
rhetorical move to claim that constitutional authorship was his prerogative. Among many 
strategies, one of his prominent moves was to insert the mythologized cultural view of monarchy 
in the new constitution. Here is the first clause of the preamble, although the English translation 
does not fully capture the spirit of the Nepali text:  
Whereas His late majesty King Tribhuvan Bir Bikram Shah Dev, Father of the 
Nation and revered descent of the illustrious King Prithvi Narayan Shah, adherent 
of Aryan Culture and Hindu religion, having led a Great revolution for the rights 
and welfare of His subject, earned immortal fame in the history of the world and 
was firmly resolved to establish real democracy in Nepal by giving fundamental 
rights to the people.     
It is important to note that in the original Nepali text where the constitution was promulgated, 
this clause is preceded by another paragraph. The excluded paragraph, which is difficult to 
translate into English because of the absence of similar concepts in the target language, may not 
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have significant information but plays a powerful cultural role in establishing the tone for the 
cultural supremacy of the king, even suggesting the king’s entitlement in authoring a 
constitutional document. The untranslated paragraph is a customary paean that celebrates the 
glory of the king, includes his titles, and wishes for his perpetual victory. The excluded text came 
from a long tradition of chanting a formulaic paean celebrating the greatness and glory of the 
king at the beginning of the royal ceremonies. Ingrained in the practice, the chanting associated 
the king with a non-earthly power, by placing him in a divine realm.     
 The non-translated paragraph, along with the clause cited above, is the first of its kind in 
the constitutional history of Nepal that would set the tone of politics at least for the next half 
century. The text did not only elevate the Shah dynasty but also defined the culture of the nation. 
In the process, it executed many goals simultaneously: Foremost, it constitutionally catapulted 
the Shah king to the center of national identity and discourse. Undoubtedly, the Shah king had 
been at the center of the Nepali state from the beginning of the unification process. And, indeed, 
the 1948 constitution also reinforced that centrality even when the king did not hold the 
executive power; and, as explained earlier, the 1951 constitution accorded the absolute power to 
the king. But this preamble was unique in the sense that the king’s cultural sovereignty was 
brought into the constitutional realm, a transference that helped the king strengthen his power as 
the constitutional author. Undoubtedly, Nepali cultural landscape before this period. The 
centrality of the monarch in the cultural life of the nation came from the mythical and religious 
stories such as Mahabharata and Ramayana. Thus, while the Nepali kingdom was established 
with hard fought real-world efforts in which many chieftains and kings from small mediaeval 
principalities perished and the Shah dynasty prevailed, the best resources for understanding the 





that did not allow Ranas to abolish monarchy, despite their absolute power during the Rana 
period. The cultural imagination required a legitimate king; no matter how powerful the Rana 
ruler was, the king’s cultural capital overwhelmed the Rana’s worldly power. During the period, 
while a not-so-subtle imitation of British royalty in language and practices would also begin, the 
kings tried to cast themselves in the image of the mythical monarchs.   
 While further historical research can narrate the full process and history of the 
mythologization of the Shah Dynasty in detail, merely the analysis of the names of the 
successive kings from Prithvi Narayan Shah to Mahendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev illustrates the 
shift of the Shah Dynasty from a small feudal chieftain to the kingship aimed at religio-mythical 
level with divine authority. The name Prithvi Narayan Shah (January 11, 1723—January 11, 
1775) does not claim any higher mythical or religious place; it can be any commoner’s name.  
Nor do the names of his early successors—Pratap Singh Shah (16 April 1751—17 November 
1777), Rana Bahadur Shah (May 25, 1775-April 25, 1806), and Girvan Yuddha Bikram Shah 
(October 19, 1797—November 20, 1816) suggest any association with divinity. These names 
rather valued the valor and bravery—important attributes in the context of the ongoing 
“unification” process started by Prithvi Narayan Shah that was not complete until the 1816 
Sugauli Treaty with British government. Since the power of the king during this period came 
more from his ability to organize wars and execute them successfully, the mythologization of 
any sort that we encounter in the later period did not make much sense. The mythologization of 
the names of the kings began after the stabilization of territorial boundaries and the ascendency 
of Rana Regime. As court intrigues and a consolidation of power became the dominant mode of 
politics, the mythologization of monarchy served the cause. Instead of valuing the king for his 





cultural superiority—a divinity without any direct consequence—and helped legitimize the Rana 
Regime that technically executed power as the delegate of the King. As a result of multi-
generation mythologization, the humble Prithvi Narayan Shah metamorphosed into Mahendra 
Bir Bikram Shah Dev: the number of words in the name increased, and the new words such as 
Mahendra (Maha+ Indra: Indra in Hindu mythology is the god of heaven and Maha translates to 
“great”) and Deva (God—common name) added an aura of divinity to the traditional character of 
bravery and valor represented by words such as Bir and Bikram.     
 This whole discussion of the mythologization is warranted here because the preamble, 
particularly the excluded text from the English translation, was the summative point of the 
process. By including the mythologized version of the monarchy in the constitutional text, the 
king suggested that the adoption of a new genre of legitimization was not the beginning of a new 
kind of politics, but a continuation of the same old order in a slightly different form. The 
mythologized version of the monarchy preamble was used to establish the ethos of the king, an 
attribute not grounded on the direct achievement of the person holding the throne but emanated 
from the dynasty’s illustrious past and its association with divinity. Such glorification of 
monarchy answered the critical question of authorship that had a pressing presence in the 
constitutional rhetoric of Nepal from the time of the promulgation of the first constitution. Since 
the 1951 constitution expected the elected representatives of the people to write the new 
constitution, the king needed to justify his new iteration in 1959. The glorified mythologization 
of the Shah dynasty in the preamble established the king’s rationale for the claim of authorship 
of the new constitution. From this logic, the king was the glorious sovereign born to give laws. 
 By the 1950s, however, this mythic-religious worldview was losing its power as the 





intensified interaction with the outside world. A large section of the Nepali population had 
returned from their service in World War II hardened for political fights and exposed to ideas of 
modernity such as democracy, communism, and capitalism and their counterparts such as 
fascism, autocracy, and feudalism. The recent political experimentation of India, led by British 
educated lawyers such as Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru (in which many first 
generation modern Nepali leaders had participated), created an active political class in Nepal that 
interpreted political economy using the vocabulary of contemporary western political and legal 
discourse.  Within the country, the vibrant discourse of political philosophies during the decade-
long transition from 1951 to 1959 gave emergence to many political parties expanding their 
reach beyond India-educated or influenced individuals. These factors challenged the traditional 
cultural view of politics, particularly the centrality of monarchy in politics.  
 Now, if monarchy were to be legitimately sustained, it needed supplementary 
justification in modern discourse.75 The king perceived that the genre of the constitution was the 
surest means of such justification in the modern time. He did this first by further accentuating the 
mythic-religious cultural imagination by casting the king as an “adherent of Aryan Culture and 
Hindu Religion.” Subtly inserted into this casting was the mythologization of his father King 
Tribhuvan and his ancestor Prithvi Narayan Shah: by characterizing Prithvi Narayan Shah as 
“illustrious” founder and King Tribhuvan as “revered” and “Father of the Nation,” who 
“establish[ed] real democracy in Nepal by giving fundamental rights to the people,” the preamble  
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not only used familial images to establish the place of the monarchy in the new cultural 
imagination but also hinted at the mythical kings such as Ram, Krishna, and Janak who fight for 
the shake of Dharma (righteousness), Naeya (justice), and Kalaena( well-being) of his people. 
For Nepali readers who had grown up with the Shah-Dynasty-centered Nationalist 
historiography and narratives, these appellations may sound a natural, appropriate interpretation 
of history. Given the centrality of the kings in the national history, including in the formation of 
the nation itself, the historiography made sense. This “natural” appearing historiography began 
as a discursive formation with the 1959 Constitution and intensified during the Panchayat period 
following the enactment of the 1962 Constitution. The 1959 and 1962 Constitutions reinvented, 
re-conceptualized, and repurposed the institution of monarchy by strategically deploying the 
constitutions themselves and related genres. The reconceptualization of the monarchy used 
mythical monarchical patterns, British tradition and other regional and global paraphernalia of 
modern nation-state. For instance, think of how King Tribhuwan was cast as “father of the 
nation” in the fashion Gandhi was called so in India. Such reinvention in the post-1948 period 
helped the monarchy gain political currency in the new cultural politics formed around ideas 
such as constitutions, democracy and development.  In a sense, the preamble was an ironic 
climax of the mythologization of Nepali monarchy that used an otherwise ideologically anti-
hereditary and anti-feudal modern genre of political legitimation to establish a monarchical form 
of government.            
 While it was a powerful move that epideictically exploited the country’s dominant belief 
system, the production of the king’s ethos in mythologized terms alone was not sufficient to bend 





thus felt the need to further emphasize his authority to author a constitution. Here is the clause in 
the preamble for that effect:   
I, King Mahendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev in the exercise of the sovereign powers 
of the kingdom of Nepal and the prerogatives vesting in US in accordance with 
the traditions and customs of our country and which devolved on us from Our 
August and Respected forefathers, do hereby enact and promulgate this 
fundamental law entitled “The Constitution of Nepal.” 
Expecting opposition, the statement presents a forceful justification to the king’s claim to 
legitimate constitutional authorship. This sentence is not a normal, routine statement as expected 
by the public from the traditional monarchial perspective. A sovereign ordains a law without 
justifying his or her power to proclaim it. Such authority is assumed to be given, without 
requiring explanation. The perceived need on the part of the drafters to include the justificatory 
statement suggested that the king had lost the self-sufficiency and sovereignty expected in a 
traditional monarch—forcing him to legitimize his authority by referencing custom and process. 
Thus, while King Mahendra had custom, tradition and power on his side, the extended 
justification suggests contextual tensions, particularly the prevalence of voices against the king’s 
claim to constitutional authorship.         
 If observed closely, something fundamental had changed in Nepal regarding the nature of 
power through this preamble. Traditionally, the state power was conceived as something 
possessed by the king. But the preamble unwittingly established the idea of the transferability of 
power from one body to another—an important epistemological transformation in Nepali 
political-cultural landscape of the time. For instance, as explained above, the whole 





Everybody knew about the tradition of primogeniture royal succession; while the public needed 
to be informed about the transfer of power, the palace itself traditionally hinted that what 
happened within the royal family was not of much public concern. Engaging the public about the 
line of succession, how the current king’s power had devolved from his ancestors, the preamble 
brought the source of the king’s power into direct public discourse. The approach is contrary to 
the subtle mythologization strategy applied in the first part of the preamble. With the discussion 
of the king’s succession history, the constitution made an epistemological modification in the 
way kingship was conceptualized in Nepal: Instead of understanding the power of the king as 
something embodied in his personhood that made him the self-sufficient sovereign during that 
moment, the statement interpreted the king’s sovereignty as something that had devolved from 
one person to the other. Indeed, in the context of the Constitution, the power delegated from his 
ancestors to king Mahendra, but it also established the notion of the transference of power, an 
idea that power can move from one body to the other.      
 Two factors contributed to such transformation. First, it was the function of the genre of 
the constitution itself. Ideologically, a written constitution as a genre demanded a clear 
description and demarcation of power. Born with the republican aspiration to make power 
accountable in eighteenth-century America, a written constitution logically expected the 
elucidation of the source and description of power, including the king’s authority to author the 
constitution. From that perspective, it was not only the king who was performing social actions 
using the genre, but the genre itself was performing certain actions, structuring participants’ 
expectations and ideas about power in a certain way. This leads us to the second factor: the 
context-driven functions of genre.         





experimented in the American context and internalized in Nepal, only people could be the 
legitimate author for the constitution; the whole idea of constitutionalism, democracy and 
modern statehood revolved around the popular constitutional authorship. Second, the 1951 
promise had its own moral pressure. And, third, political parties themselves were challenging the 
king’s rule and authority to write a constitution. This context warranted a place in the preamble 
for the king’s justification of his constitutional authorship. But ironically, a justificatory 
statement in the constitution also automatically opened the space for counter-arguments by 
political parties, again intensifying the idea that the king had misused the genre without 
respecting its core values.           
 If the 1959 constitution was a regressive move as it stalled the promise of a people-
written constitution enshrined in the 1951 constitution, then the question becomes, how did the 
political parties agree on the constitution?  First, as the history suggests, political parties had lost 
much of their influence during the preceding decade because of the king’s use of absolute power, 
particularly by playing within political parties with his strategic appointments. The frequent 
changes in the government led the country through a treacherous transition and instability that 
demoralized political parties. The Nepali Congress was looking for an opening as their demand 
for a constituent assembly was almost dashed. In this politico-psychological context, the king 
commissioned British constitutionalist Sir Ivor Jennings to draft the 1959 constitution, and 
Jennings used the Westminster system, although heavily departing from the model by providing 
unlimited power to the king, including his ability to suspend the constitution.76  But because the 
constitution arranged for a provision of a popularly elected government, it opened an opportunity 
for democratic participation by political parties despite their crushed dream of a people-written 
                                                          





constitution. Using this arrangement, the first ever general elections were held in 1960, which 
resulted in the Nepali Congress’s first popularly-elected two-thirds majority government led by 
charismatic B. P. Koirala.          
 While the 1959 constitution upheld democratic Westminster form, an analysis from the 
perspective of authorship shows that the constitution functionally established the king’s 
sovereignty, not only by stating it literally and by making him announce the constitution but also 
by placing him above the daily governmental administration. The constitution envisioned the 
king’s place in a kind of godly way as somebody who was above the fray of daily, immanent 
activities and with the ultimate power to suspend his own laws.  This arrangement could not last 
long. As with the case of the 1951 constitution, the discrepancy between the spirit of the 
preamble and the articles started to exert its force—pitting the king against the popularly elected 
government.77           
 The constitution had vested unlimited power to the king, but it also had the provision of 
an elected government to run daily administration. Following the 1960 elections, B.P. Koirala 
formed his cabinet and started to introduce reform programs, assuming he had secured the 
mandate for such actions. Simultaneously, the country’s political culture also was changing in 
practice. Because of the 1959 constitution, politicians did not have to fawn upon the king to win 
political appointments. A party could form on the basis of its electoral success. As the 
constitution came into operation displaying this transformed political landscape, the king found 
that the sovereignty vested to him was merely abstract and ineffective. Indeed, he could visualize 
the danger of losing even that abstract power if the democratic process continued.  The king used 
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the emergency provisions in the 1959 constitution to sack the government and place the prime 
minister and his supporters behind the bars. In the process of resuming the state power, he 
abrogated 1959 constitution and authored a new constitution in 1962, introducing an autocratic, 
party-less, monarchial system that would last for the next thirty years.  
4.5 The 1962 Constitution and the King as Constitutional Law    
 In the period between dissolving the Koirala government and the promulgation of 1962 
Constitution, the king had certainly consolidated the power and established an absolute 
monarchial system, but again he felt the need to justify not only his actions but also his claim to 
authorship of the constitution. He wanted to make sure that his sovereignty and the provisions in 
the new 1962 constitution did not bifurcate in spirit and practice. The preamble of the 1962 
constitution again served as the site of such justification. In the preamble, the king felt the need 
to highlight “the constitutional law” as one of the sources of his power to promulgate the new 
Constitution: 
Now, Therefore, I, King Mahendra Bir Bikram Shah Deva, in exercise of the 
sovereign powers and prerogatives inherent in us according to the constitutional 
law, custom, and usage of our country as handed down to us by our august and 
revered forefathers, do hereby enact and promulgate this Constitution.  (Preamble, 
1962 Nepal Constitution) 
While this preamble may resemble the spirit of the preamble of the 1959 Constitution in terms of 
the king’s advocacy of his distinctive hereditary and customary prerogatives, it is comparable to 
Padma Shamsher’s 1948 Constitution in terms of the announcer’s source of legitimacy to the 
constitutional authorship. Padma Shamsher referred to the Royal seal (Panja-Pantras) as the 





“the constitutional law” for claiming his authority to enact the new constitution, thus conceding 
that “custom, and the usage of our country as handed down to us” of the 1959 constitution had 
become insufficient for the king’s assumption of constitutional authorship in 1962. The words 
“the constitutional law” in the 1962 preamble—no matter how abstract and vague—served the 
purpose in that context: Referring to the master tropes of modernity and legitimizing genre 
convention of standard nation-states, the king made the act of enforcing new constitution a 
legalistically valid exercise that could be justified in light of the spirit of the previous 
constitutions. Certainly, by not referencing the action to any particular article with the sweeping 
claim, the king also made it difficult for the dissenters to oppose his move with a concrete 
constitutional reference. In a sense, he himself had become the amorphous, abstract 
“constitutional law” in the process.           
 The justification for the move of both sacking the popularly elected government and 
declaring a new constitution went even beyond the preamble’s abstract reference to the 
“constitutional law.” Article 2 of the 1962 constitution, after defining the nation as an entity 
“having common aspirations and united by the common bond of allegiance to the Crown” 
(Article 2:1), states, “It is indefeasible and Inalienable right of the Nation to develop its political, 
economic and cultural life and to determine its relations with other nations, in accordance to its 
own genius and traditions” (Article 2.1, the Constitution of Nepal, 1962). If we think of a 
nation’s constitution as the supreme law of the land, this statement is irrelevant because it speaks 
more to the audience outside the nation (now, defined in terms of “united by the common bond 
of allegiance to the Crown”) to whom the constitution is nonbinding. If read closely, the 
statement’s intertextual connection with the 1776 American Declaration of Independence is 





Nepal was not declaring an independence from any country at that point: Why did the drafters 
include this statement?  
 As the next thirty years’ experimentation with the king’s direct rule would show, the 
statement represented a declaration of independence from the democratic process that had begun 
with the 1951 constitution. The new constitution derailed the democratic process completely and 
started a nativist political system called Panchayat. The king’s strategists used the adjectives 
such as ‘native’ and ‘soil-suitable’ to brand the new system and marketed it effectively by 
comfortably contrasting it from the ‘foreign’ and ‘non-national’ systems that their opponents 
supported. The system itself was borrowed from autocratic constitutional model dubbed as 
guided democracy and practiced in countries such as Pakistan and Egypt during that time. In the 
process, the parliamentary democratic system was interpreted as a foreign imposition unsuitable 
to Nepali soil. From this point of view, supporting parliamentary or any western system would 
be an anti-patriotic, treasonous act. What is interesting in this whole context is that the king used 
the privileged genre convention and vocabulary from western modernity to assert his and thus 
the country’s (because the country, from this new understating, served as his extension) 
“indefensible and inalienable rights” to “develop its political, economic and cultural life . . . in 
accordance to its own genius and traditions right.” He used the power built in the genre to 
introduce a nativist political system and to claim his right to do so according to his own “genius 
and tradition,” while simultaneously rejecting the core ideological parts of the genre as foreign 
elements.           
 For the revolutionaries who had fought in the 1950s for democracy, the introduction of 
the 1962 constitution represented an anti-climactic moment. Their idealistic understanding of the 





was turned upside down. “The common bond of allegiance to the Crown” in the new constitution 
had replaced their need to craft a collective “we, the people” constitution through a legitimate 
electoral process. The king had used the genre to claim monarchical constitutional authorship as 
indigenous political right, displaying how genre conventions themselves get appropriated and 
repurposed by powerful players for achieving their goals.      
 Recapitulating the discussion of this section, we need to ask two questions regarding the 
generic performances of the 1959 and 1962 constitutions: how the genre structured the actors’ 
choice, and what the actors used the genre for. The genre provided the king a modern legal, 
discursive space where he could transform his traditional cultural and political power in a new 
form, squashing the opposing undercurrents against his rule.  With the adoption of the genre, the 
country might have chosen to be a modern nation-state, but the king claimed its unique identity 
by asserting a nativist political aspiration through the constitutions. In such aspiration, the king 
bended the genre itself, claiming his prerogative to constitutional authorship.  
 While the historical context was very different, the struggle over constitutional authorship 
in Nepal during this period resonates with the debate on sovereignty in seventeenth-century 
England. As Joyce Lee Malcolm has chronicled, the political tracts of the time forwarded 
multiple places for the location of sovereignty—“ for the sovereignty of the king alone, for the 
king in parliament, for the two houses of Parliament and the House of Commons alone, for the 
sovereignty of the law and that of people” (XXI). Although the doctrine of individuals’ natural 
rights would evolve around the same period, the tracts from the period recorded in Malcolm’s 
book suggest that the location of sovereignty was more about a historically-formed discursive 
idea rather than a natural factor itself. While it was difficult for the king in Nepal in the 





globalization of modern constitutional thought and its adoption by Nepali revolutionaries early 
on in the 1950s, he managed to keep the sovereignty with him until the promulgation of the 1990 
constitution. The King’s divine right to ordain laws and the doctrine that the king can do no 
wrong were widely circulated during this period. Despite the preponderance of these claims, the 
king knew that he could exercise his authority only by holding onto the constitutional authorship.   
 Again, context shapes genre. The 1962 constitution was not declared in a peaceful world. 
Within the country, the ousted Nepali Congress Party had declared an armed struggle against the 
king. The parties were breaking as the king offered appointments. The king needed to justify 
imposing his own rule because of the short constitutional history within the country, and also 
because growing internationalism demanded that countries fulfill certain discursive patterns such 
as maintaining a constitution.  Crises outside of Nepal, however, meant that foreign powers did 
not have time to react seriously to Nepal’s political development. The Cold War and Cuba crisis 
had enthralled the superpowers of the world. Nepal's two giant neighbors—India and China—
were at war. To the degree that foreign powers were noticing Nepal's development, the king and 
his regime had forwarded enough rhetorical moves to justify the new constitution in 1962.  
 The 1962 Constitution served Nepal for the next 30 years. Although the king 
consolidated power during this period, Nepali society continued to undergo transformation 
because of the impact of accelerated globalization and modernity. Within Nepal, banned political 
parties such as Nepali Congress and a number of Communist parties created a large structure of 
cadres, many of them serving in jail for their involvement in outlawed political parties. Drawing 
their inspiration from Nepal’s own short lived democratic past as well foreign sources, this group 
of politically active cadres dreamed of an idealistic political system ranging from western style 





mantras while feudal entitlements smoked stale, oppressive structural residues from the past. 
These cadres, many of them educated with western political books, formed a new political 
conscience of the nation as they used newly established colleges, expanding urban centers and 
remote rural hinterlands for mass mobilization and public sphere debates, mounting opposition to 
the king's autocratic rule.         
 Based on this analysis of the 1959 and 1962 Nepali constitutions, we can say that 
international public genres such as the written constitution do not always perform in a 
straightforward monolithic way. The form and its ideological disposition may shift when the 
genre moves from one time, location, and culture to another.  As genre theorist Vijay Bhatia has 
stated, genres go "through rhetorical processes of recontextualization, reformulation, reframing, 
and resemiotization" in such context (25). In Nepal, the recontextualization of the written 
constitution genre involved the negotiation between the country's desire to open itself to the 
ideals of modernity and the pull of the tradition centered on the institutions such as monarchy 
and its supporting socio-economic base. That the constitution had to be written in Nepali and that 
it had to accommodate the linguistic traditions of glorifying monarchy meant that the re-
contextualization of the genre also went through language and cultural translation.  
 The transactions within translations were multiple: Nepali drafters learned the genre in 
English language as they employed English-speaking experts in the drafting process. But since 
the constitutions themselves were introduced in Nepali officially, the English translations of the 
constitutions written in Nepali tried to capture the meaning from the Nepali text while attempting 
to follow the genre's language convention in English. In this process of translation and 
transplantation, the constitution as a genre certainly influenced the context from its earlier 





of the constitution, the idea that would have deeper ramifications in the vision and practices of 
state power in the subsequent national history. But the genre also was repurposed and 
resemiotized fundamentally:  For instance, the king used the constitutional space to perform his 
mythologization, to claim the country's indigenous right to write its constitution, and to claim his 
constitutional authorship. In his efforts with the 1959 and 1962 Nepali constitutions, the genre 
had come to reaffirm some of the core traditional cultural and political values associated to 
hereditary power, privilege and entitlement, the same values against which the genre was 
invented in eighteenth-century America. Despite the king's deliberate bending of the genre in his 
favor, the fact that the country adopted the written constitution had its own metaconstitutional 
impacts that asked, among others, the king to define his source of power of authoring 
constitutions.  
4.6 The 1990 Constitution and the Compromised Collective Constitutional Authorship  
Before directly jumping into the 1990 constitution, a brief historical context is in order. In 
1990, the rival Nepali Congress and communist parties formed a coalition and launched a 
political movement for the restoration of democracy. The context was ripe for change: it had 
already been a decade since the 1980 national referendum that gave a narrow victory to the 
king’s reformed (party-less) Panchayat over a multiparty parliamentary system. During the same 
period, the relationship between the king and India deteriorated, leading India to revoke the 
transit agreement between the two countries, eventually blocking the transportation of goods to 
landlocked Nepal from Indian borders. The country faced a dire shortage of fuel and other 
merchandises, exposing how the government had failed in its basic responsibility to its people. 
Opposition to the king accelerated as India openly supported the opposition and as the growing 





CNN was, for instance, automatically included in cable subscription and viewers could see the 
end of the Cold War and the democratization of Eastern Europe and other parts of the world in 
their own living room. The king was wise enough to notice the signals sent by the geopolitical 
context: had he crushed the movement further, the moderates within the opposition would have 
lost their control and the monarchy would itself have been their target. Responding to the 
movement, the king lifted the ban on political parties, opening up the process for writing a new 
democratic constitution in 1990. In the constitutional history of Nepal, the 1990 constitution 
presents an important turning point not only because the king accepted his position as a 
constitutional monarch for the first time but also because multiparty democracy was restored 
after 30 years. The 1990 preamble addresses issues of authorship, sovereignty and 
constitutionalism up-front by highlighting how these issues shaped the constitutional debates for 
the half century preceding this document.       
 Indeed, the preamble of the new constitution became the site of intense struggle between 
political parties and the king. The king wanted to preserve his sovereignty in the new constitution 
as well, but political parties refused to honor his interest. Ultimately, they forged a compromise 
in which the king announced the constitution while investing sovereignty in the people for the 
first time in the history of the country. Here is the preamble:  
WHEREAS, We are convinced that the source of sovereign authority of the 
independent and sovereign Nepal is inherent in the people, and, therefore, We 
have, from time to time, made known our desire to conduct the government of the 
country in consonance with the popular will;  
AND WHEREAS, in keeping with the desire of the Nepalese people expressed 





arc further inspired by the objective of securing to the Nepalese people social, 
political and economic justice long into the future:  
AND WHEREAS, it is expedient to promulgate and enforce this Constitution, 
made with the widest possible participation of the Nepalese people, to guarantee 
basic human rights to every citizen of Nepal; and also to consolidate Adult 
Franchise, the Parliamentary System of Government, Constitutional Monarchy 
and the System of Multi-Party Democracy by promoting amongst the people of 
Nepal the spirit of fraternity and the bond of unity on the basis of liberty and 
equality; and also to establish an independent and competent system of justice 
with a view of transforming the concept of the Rule of Law into a living reality:  
NOW, THEREFORE, keeping in view the desire of the people that the State 
authority and sovereign powers shall, after the commencement of this 
Constitution, be exercised in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution, I 
KING BIRENDRA AIR AIKRAM SHAH DEVA, by virtue of the State authority 
as exercised by Us, do hereby promulgate and enforce this CONSTITUTION OF 
THE KINGDOM OF NEPAL on the recommendation and advice and with the 
consent of the Council of Ministers. (Preamble, 1990 Nepal Constitution)  
Every word in this preamble was chosen with careful scrutiny because of the mistrust among the 
major stakeholders. Although the king was going to announce the 1990 constitution, the political 
parties that had launched 1990 movement for the restoration of democracy wanted the 
constitution to be read like the product of the movement rather than a gift generously granted by 
a democracy-loving king. The palace on the other hand was fighting hard not to submit to any 





records, the writing was not going smoothly—even after the king had lifted the ban on parties 
and invited them to form the government.78 For instance, the palace leaked its own (ultimately 
aborted) draft removing many clauses of the preamble from the version submitted by the 
Constitution Recommendation Commission.79 With the clauses in the preamble of the proposed 
constitution such as “in accordance with the desire expressed by the people of Nepal through the 
historic people’s movement for Constitutional change” and “framed through the broad 
participation of the Nepali people in accordance with their desires,” the framers tried to connect 
the constitution with the recently successful democratic movement (Hutt 1990, 1033). But the 
palace wanted to present the constitution as its gift to the people—not something undertaken on 
the pressure of the opposition. For that effect, the palace draft replaced the clauses quoted above 
with the expressions such as “whereas the happiness and prosperity of Nepal and the Nepali 
people have always been our [the king’s] sole objective, and we [the king] are determined to 
achieve that objective, and whereas it is desirable to frame and promulgate a Constitution” (Hutt 
1990, 1033). The palace-leaked draft also replaced the clause “on the advice and with the 
approval of [the] Council of Ministers” with “in accordance with the Constitutional laws, 
customs, and usages and traditions of Nepal” (Hutt 1990, 1033). One could easily see the 
reincarnation of the 1962 constitution in the leaked draft.     
 Promulgated amidst this bickering, the 1990 constitution was a document of compromise 
between the king and the dominant opposition parties from the perspective of constitutional 
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authorship.80 It was a compromise forged by moderates within both camps. The compromise 
rested on the fact that while the king promulgated the constitution using his sovereign power, he 
used it to transfer his sovereignty to the people. The compromise gave both stakeholders, the 
king and the major political parties, an opportunity to interpret the constitution as their victory. 
For instance, although the 1990 constitution substantially reduced the king’s power in 
comparison to the 1962 constitution, he could still feel symbolically significant because he 
performed (and thus maintained) his authority of constitutional authorship. While the 
constitution promised the rule of law, which in the context of the Nepal’s constitutional history 
suggested an end to the king’s power to play outside the constitution and thus the fear of liminal 
space as theorized above, the fact that he issued it preserved his central place as the source of the 
constitution.     
 Indeed, this sovereign act of transferring sovereignty to the people remained 
interpretatively ambivalent. The dominant political parties such as Nepali Congress and CPM 
(UML) that had become the ruling coalition during the constitution drafting process interpreted 
the action as the transfer of sovereignty from the king to the people. They emphasized the non-
retractability of such transference—a rhetorically savvy hermeneutic move that presented the 
constitution as the climatic outcome of the people's movement for the restoration of democracy. 
From this position, once the words of the constitution start enforcing themselves by becoming 
the parts of a living and sovereign document, they automatically surpass the moment of their 
birth or the technicality of their parentage.  Furthermore, the political parties interpreted the 
king’s role in announcing the constitution merely as the commencement of a Westminster 
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system.  The constitution was, they argued, prepared by the Constitution Recommendation 
Commission, which the king had formed according to the recommendation of the government 
that the parties now controlled.  The preamble also included a statement that the constitution was 
promulgated “on the recommendation and advice, and with the consent of the Council of 
Ministers.” Interpreted from this angle, the king was merely acting as a ceremonial head rather 
than claiming the absolute constitutional authorship.      
 Royalists and ultra-leftist parties undermined this interpretation by emphasizing the 
retractability of the king’s so-called transferred sovereignty, although they had their own peculiar 
interests in the claim. For them, allowing the king to announce the constitution suggested the 
incompleteness of the movement. Royalists highlighted the constitution as the product of the 
king's good will rather than the logical outcome of the movement, a position that not only 
suggested the provisional quality of the document but also the centrality of the king's 
fundamental righteousness. From this perspective, sovereignty was embodied in the king, the 
ultimate non-transferable source from where everything issued forth and to which everything 
returned. The ultra-leftist parties also rejected the dominant parties’ logic, first arguing that the 
king’s constitutional authorship automatically made him the sovereign even when he declared 
himself a constitutional monarch in the constitution, and second emphasizing that such 
acceptance always kept the liminal space of pre-1990 constitution technically alive. For instance, 
the Nepal Communist Party (Masal) stated, “We do not believe that the King will give up power 
and hand over sovereignty to the people. After all, even the new Constitution will be a gift from 
the King. How can a mango tree bear oranges?” (Quoted in Hutt, 1028).     
 These debates originated from the procedural purity engrained in the genre convention of 





views, the fundamental warrant of their arguments suggested the importance of the provenance 
of a constitution. No matter what was written in the document, what mattered most was who 
issued the constitution. The chairperson of the Constitution Recommendation Commission 
Justice Bishwanath Upadhyaya captured this legal conundrum succinctly: “The individual or 
institution that gives a constitution is sovereign. The people will be sovereign if there is a 
Constituent Assembly, but we have not followed that path. If the Constitution is granted by the 
King, under what power should he do so?” (Nepal Press Digest 34:29, July 16, 1990; Hutt 1990-
1029).  What is important to note is that in the context of Nepal, the king held the constitutional 
power to announce a new constitution. Both the 1962 constitution, the country’s constitutional 
tradition, and cultural framework provided the king the authority to issue a constitution. 
Upadhyaya’s comments however emanated not so much from Nepal’s particular constitutional 
context; the comments came in reference to the genre convention. As a transnational genre, a 
written constitution had to follow some form of electoral procedure to establish a popular 
collective national authorship. In the absence of such procedure, a constitution would not be 
legitimate and binding because the governed had not expressed their consent to the main law 
through which they wanted to be governed. The 1990 constitution certainly hinted at this generic 
requirement in the preamble; it claimed that the constitution was "made with the widest possible 
participation of the Nepalese people." Mere participation by sending suggestions to the drafters 
or making comments on the draft before the pronouncement did not, however, meet the 
necessary condition for the popular mandate within the genre convention. Upadhyaya knew that 
a handful of people like him, often with a predominant role of single individuals (think of James 
Madison as the father of the U.S. Constitution or Ambedkar as the major drafter of the Indian 





the country, the genre convention required it to be announced with collective national authorship. 
 Undoubtedly, the absence of such collective authorship left an opening for challenging 
the constitution even after it came into operation. But even more critical for the demise of the 
constitution became the words in the constitution itself, particularly its unalterable provisions. 
Clause (1) of article 116 states: “A bill to amend or repeal any Article of this Constitution, 
without prejudicing the spirit of the Preamble of the Constitution, may be introduced in either 
House of Parliament: Provided that this Article shall not be subject to amendment.” The ten-
word-rider inserted within the clause qualified the amendment, stating that constitutional 
monarchy and parliamentary democracy hallowed in the preamble were permanent, non-
amendable features. Certainly, this qualification assured both the king and major political parties 
their future security at the moment when distrust was the prevailing emotion between them: The 
parties wanted to block the king to from repeating any action such as dissolving an elected 
government or announcing a new constitution in the fashion he did in the1960s.  The king 
wanted to use the constitution to strengthen the longevity of his increasingly anachronistic 
institution. But this desire for permanence weakened the collective constitutional authorship as it 
imposed a decree from that generation to the next—not allowing the future to choose their own 
political system. Speaking from the perspective of genre convention, this assertion to 
permanence failed to observe the core ideological promise in the genre of the written 
constitution.            
 The core of a constitution in its idealistic genre form is its promise of unlimited 
amendment. While forged by one generation of the people, the legitimacy of the collective 
constitutional authorship such as “we the people” of the U.S. Constitution depends on the 





the promise of unconditional constitutional amendment, “We the people” of the constitution 
starts to represent even those people without any role in writing or amending it. With the 
promise, the collective authorship exerts its representative power to anybody with national 
citizenship. It is for this effect that Thomas Jefferson argued for every generation to write their 
own constitution. As the experience of the United States suggests, while constitutional 
amendment should not be an easy process as it would destabilize the political system, the 
unqualified amendment provision allows the possibility of the constitution’s continuous 
rewriting to include the will of the future generations. In a sense, the core or permanent element 
of a democratic constitution rests on the inalterability of its open amendment provision with a 
particular procedure. Any limitation imposed upon such provision thus would automatically 
violate the spirit embodied in the collective national authorship.     
 Besides the unamendable provisions, the 1990 Constitution also generated other 
substantial questions regarding the authorship and sovereignty. While the 1990 constitution had 
established the sovereignty of the people in principle, who were defined as "the people"?81 Do all 
citizens have the equal access to their sovereignty? Scholars have extensively pointed to the 
exclusionary nature of the 1990 constitution.82 David N. Gellner incisively illustrates the 
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challenge posed by “the rise of this new kind of rights discourse, with its emphasis on the rights 
of minority cultures” to “the liberal political and judicial theory” with its “more traditional ways 
of conceiving rights” based on individual rights than on community-based collective rights 
(177). As he argues, in the context of the rise of the discourse of minority rights as a global 
phenomenon, Nepal changed its conception of nationhood from the “old definition of Nepal as 
‘an independent, indivisible and sovereign monarchical Hindu Kingdom’” as conceived in the 
1962 constitution, to the 1990 constitution’s “multi-ethnic, multilingual, democratic, 
independent, indivisible, sovereign, Hindu and Constitutional Monarchical Kingdom” (185).  
 Such recognition alone was insufficient “to combat Brahman domination of the political, 
legal and administrative machinery” (187) and to bring about “different yet equal model” of 
multiculturalism (193). Mahendra Lawoti for instance presents four major provisions in the 
Constitution such as “banning ethnic parties,” “the lack of equal recognition of differences 
among cultural groups and adoption of dominant values and norms,” the absence of “substantive 
minority rights” and “majoritarian state-structure” as responsible for constitutionally engineering  
the exclusion of traditionally marginalized groups such as the indigenous nationalities, Dalits 
(traditional untouchables), Madhesis (plain people) (50) . This exclusion caused the “disjunction 
between state and society” undermining the participation of “more than two-thirds of the 
population, including the indigenous nationalities (Adibasi Janajati), Dalits (traditional 
‘untouchables’), and Madhesis (plains people) in the mainstream governance (Lawoti 23). In her 
excellent analysis, Mara Malagodi posits the origin of 1990 Constitution’s exclusionary nature in 
the dominant ethno-cultural national identity that emerged with Prithivi Narayan Shah’s 
conquest in the 1800s and was strengthened further by legal and political processes such as 





liberal, democratic constitution, they did not fundamentally transform “a monolithic and 
exclusionary constitutional definition of nation” (Malagodi 3).  She points out that despite stating 
the principle of equality, the 1990 Constitution ended up perpetuating the hilly high-caste Bahun 
and Chetris dominant ethno-cultural national identity by adopting Hindu religion, Nepali 
language, and monarchy that constitutionalized the exclusion of large sections of society.  
 The shifting political landscape has deep implications for the genre of constitution. 
Merely stating the fundamental rights of the individuals was not sufficient to address the 
question of democratic equality and access. The bill of rights kinds of provisions were 
understood more as the negative, restrictive statement designed to stem a majoritarian 
government from encroaching on the life of private citizens rather than as the statement to 
activate their positive sovereignty and citizenship.83 While impartial and applicable to all 
technically, the doctrine of individual rights facilitated sovereignty only for those who could use 
it because of their already privileged position. For the state to ensure the inclusion and 
representation of the marginalized, the constitution needed new procedures and practices to 
address engrained structural inequalities. For establishing the context of positive participation, 
the constitution also needed to acknowledge certain ethnicities and castes not only as distinct 
identities but as marginalized (thus unequal) categories and make them the part of representation. 
Such kind of caste or ethnicity-based representation undermined the positivist, modern doctrine 
of individual equality. But postmodern identity politics and the ideas of inclusive democracy 
demanded the inclusion of those identities as marginalized one, proving reservations. This 
contraction exposed the fissures within the equality discourse of modernity. 
 Because of the compromise in the authorship, the 1990 Constitution came under attack 
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within a decade of its promulgation. The Nepal Communist Party (Maoist) started an armed 
revolt to establish a communist system, making the elections of the constituent assembly its 
bottom-line to give up its arms and to immerse in the mainstream politics later. The 1990 
Constitution could not fulfill this demand because of its qualified provision for amendment. 
Maoists also used a growing ethnic discontent to advance their cause by supporting ethnic 
nationalism. In 2005, the new king broke the 1990 compromise by dissolving the existing 
government and parliament as he started direct rule through a handpicked government. Protests 
mounted against the king’s rule, bringing armed Maoists and the parliamentary political parties 
such as Nepali Congress and CPN (UML) together with a seven-point agreement signed between 
them. The coalition launched the movement for the restoration of the dissolved parliament and 
the election of the constitution assembly. Ultimately [the opposition prevailed; the king restored 
the parliament, returning power to the political parties. The restored parliament abrogated the 
1990 Constitution, suspended the monarchy, and promulgated an Interim Constitution in 2007 to 
hold elections for the Constituent Assembly.        
 In this swift, dramatic history, at least two aspects are remarkable from the perspective of 
constitutional history, authorship, and sovereignty. First, a disagreement occurred within the 
coalition regarding the path ahead. While the coalition partners agreed on the new people-written 
constitution, they wanted to achieve the goal differently. Maoists wanted complete disruption of 
the past constitutional process so that they could go directly to the elections of the Constituent 
Assembly. The Nepali Congress, particularly its leader Girija Prasad Koirala, focused on 
following the process within the existing constitution. Certainly, it was not possible to hold the 
elections of the Constituent Assembly or to suspend the monarchy with a literal reading of the 





constitutional process. As Krishana Prasad Situala, who played an important role in the process 
and would later serve as chairperson of the drafting committee for the 2015 Constitution, recalls, 
the restored parliament did not follow the existing law or the constitution in the way originally 
intended by the framers of the 1990 Constitution (http://setopati.com/raajneeti/47367/). As he 
emphasizes, the point was to move ahead while causing the least possible damage to the 
constitutional procedure.          
 One major reason for following the constitutional path was that the parties themselves 
were fierce rivals and held different political philosophies. Although they had agreed on the 
election of the constituent assembly, the kind of constitution they wanted from the Constituent 
Assembly was as different as a Maoist communist state to parliamentary democracy. They could 
manage the conflict among themselves in the future only by respecting the constitutional 
procedure. It was an agreement to play within the rules so that results after the tournament would 
be binding to all players. In a sense, with this decision, the parties decided to respect and thus 
continue the constitutional process started by Padma Shumsher in 1948 rather than having a 
disruptive new beginning in the fashion Mao did in China.     
 Secondly, once the parliament was restored, it assumed complete sovereignty arguing 
that it had achieved the people’s mandate through both electoral and revolutionary processes. 
Instead of respecting every word in the 1990 constitution, the parliament made the clause 
“sovereignty is vested in the people” prominent, undermining other provisions. Assuming full 
sovereignty without any restrictive qualifications, the restored parliament interpreted the1990 
Constitution from the point of view of people’s sovereignty (not the “rule of law”) perspective. 
This interpretation that the parliament was fully sovereign led to many powerful political 





members to represent CPN (Maoist); it took over the role of an active constitutional authorship 
by declaring the 2007 Interim Constitution that suspended the monarchy; made the prime 
minister the head of the state; and declared the election of the Constituent Assembly for a 
permanent constitution.           
 This development is similar to Kenneth Burke’s characterization of the American 
constitution. The Constitution, he argues, is not a coherent, single motivational document. He 
contends that the Constitution is a document with contradictory wishes, where which wish gets 
to be rewarded depends on the power dynamics of the context. For instance, the restored 
parliament foregrounded certain aspects of the 1990 constitution, especially the idea that 
sovereignty rested on the people and that the parliament had the people’s mandate to use the 
sovereignty. Interestingly, the king had interpreted the same constitution differently, indicating 
that his emergency intervening power was supreme among the provisions. But as soon as the 
parliament got hold on the power, the sovereignty statement in the constitution received 
unprecedented prominence. This anecdote, along with Burke’s characterization of the 
Constitution, gives us important insights into the function of the constitution as a genre. As the 
two different uses of the 1990 Nepali constitution suggested, the inherent epistemological 
incoherence of a document leads to divergent interpretations producing unexpected generic 
performances.            
4.7 The 2015 Nepal Constitution and the Genre's Ideological Fissure    
 The ideological battle about the legitimate constitutional authorship that engulfed Nepal 
for more than half a century came to end in 2015 when the Constituent Assembly promulgated 
the new republican Constitution. The debate about the location of sovereignty was finally 





new Constitution scrapped the monarchy and tried to be the vehicle of an inclusive democracy 
by devolving power from Kathmandu to local levels and by promoting the representation of 
marginalized groups. From the perspective of constitutional history, the long conflict of 
constitutional authorship had ended, inaugurating a post-liminal phase. There would be no king 
to suspend the written constitution and the sovereignty described in it. No external authority 
outside the Constitution could claim to be the sovereign self.  The force of writing had totalized 
the world—anything done in the name of the state had to be backed up with the words in the 
hallowed text. While it has its own unique inflections, the 2015 Nepali experimentation restored 
the main ideological underpinning of the genre of the written constitution in the way it 
established the dominant international tradition—both by authoring the Constitution by the body 
of elected representatives and by eradicating the space for the politicians to play outside 
constitutional domain.              
 From the perspective of Nepal’s constitutional history, this moment should have been a 
point of celebration. But the reaction to the new Constitution was not as positive as anticipated. 
The political parties that claimed to represent the voices of a large section of people in the 
southern parts of the country opposed the Constitution. They claimed that the Constitution has 
not addressed the historical gap of power between hilly elites and the indigenous southern 
inhabitants. Unhappy that the Constituent Assembly had not heeded suggestions sent via direct 
and indirect diplomatic channels, India unofficially blocked the transit routes, not only creating a 
massive shortage of essential supplies in Nepal but also inducing intense anti-Indian sentiments, 
such as the one expressed on Twitter with # backoffIndia 
https://twitter.com/hashtag/backoffindia?lang=en). The promulgation of the Constitution had 





 The question becomes, why could the new Constitution not be welcome news for all? 
What does the rhetorical genre perspective offer us that standard political science or legal studies 
does not in this regard? As explained in the introductory chapter, the written constitution as a 
genre is a historical construct of modernity that depends on the participants’ belief in its 
procedural rationality for its own legitimization. Ideas such as self-governance, constitutional 
authorship of the people, and equality of representation in government are at the ideological core 
of the genre and are pragmatically materialized through an electoral process. In the dominant 
genre convention that emanated from western modernity, a mathematical model tries to assign 
equal numerical values to the electors; the mathematical process rationally produces the 
constitutional authorship, governing mandate, and the will of the people. Written constitution in 
its dominant genre convention legitimizes itself by promising fairness and equality.  Using a 
metaphor from the world of sports, written constitution as a genre provides a set of rules for a 
national political game. It claims the superiority of its set of rules by evoking the master terms of 
modernity such as equality, self-governance, and objectivity. But its reliance on mathematical 
models for translating these ideals into practice automatically produces winners and losers. 
Games perfectly work until winners and losers do not question the fundamental rules of the 
games. But once the rules themselves are questioned, games stop operating because players do 
not agree on the basic fairness or premises of the rules, of what should be awarded or punished in 
the games.        
 In the case of Nepal in 2015, the procedural rationality at the core of the constitutional 
genre itself had become insufficient. As Kenneth Burke has argued, constitutions work mostly 
because they can embody many contradictory claims to satisfy large sections of society. A 





pragmatic impasse within the procedural rationality at the core of constitutional genre coupled 
with the postmodernist questioning of the master terms of modernity, generated radical 
democratic wishes, to the point that fulfilling some extreme demands required the deconstruction 
of the state itself practically. A national constitution as a genre may try to bind the state to certain 
laws, but it does not hold the capacity to deconstruct the state itself. Many parties in Nepal—
particularly those ethnic and regional marginalized communities that wanted to use the 
Constitution to establish their autonomy—found the basic procedural phenomenon in the 
constitutional genre not fair enough for their condition. As a result, even when the Constitution 
garnered an overwhelming majority, those who objected to it found it exclusionary, questioning 
the constitutional system itself. Instead of agreeing to the results coming from the used model, 
they looked for tangible results in the world. Constitution for them could be acceptable only 
when it fulfilled the tangible wishes pressing the moment.     
 Thus, while Nepal promulgated new Constitution in 2015, and the state has been 
operating using this Constitution, the context in which it was drafted created a special challenge 
for the genre to actualize a performance. Almost all the political philosophies from classical 
republicanism to ultraleftist Maoism, from liberal democracies to traditional monarchism, had 
representation in the Constituent Assembly. Besides, marginalized castes, ethnicities, localities, 
and gender also wanted the Constitution to fulfill their aspirations. In a sense, the debate on 
writing the new constitution opened various wishes suppressed under authoritarian governments 
in the past. Encompassing all these wishes into a workable system tested the elasticity of the 






Chapter 5. The Genre of Written Constitution: Where Does It Stand Now?   
 This leads us to the ideology of the genre of the written constitution. Genre theorists cited 
in the introductory chapter have argued that a genre holds an ideology—a certain disposition, a 
way of thinking and doing things. Then question becomes this: based on all these transnational 
and transcultural performances, what can be said of the major ideological trends of the written 
constitution? Where does the republican aspiration that gave birth to the genre stand now? And 
what does the answer help rhetorical genre scholarship to understand genre further?  
 An overarching theme throughout the preceding chapters has been how the genre of the 
written constitution emerged in the United States in the late eighteenth-century and how thinking 
about a nation-state in the subsequent global history required the use of the genre. The chapters 
emphasized on the indispensability of the written constitution for the construction and 
imagination of a nation-state; without a written constitution, modern nation-states cannot think of 
garnering the recognition of statehood from the global community. Nor a ruler—no matter how 
antithetical his actions to the core ideology of constitutionalism—within a country can legitimize 
his regime without the use of the written constitution. Thus, while constitutionalism is the 
idealistic core of the written constitution, the practices suggest that its ability for legitimization 
has been the main attraction and function of the genre. In its long history, the genre has come to 
be an iconic form of a secular nation-state that articulates and governs various visions and 
practices of sovereignties and submissions. From this perspective, the main function of the 
written constitution has been to provide a stable governing formula and method of legitimization 
for a secular world.84 The dominant global political culture of the modernity and postmodernity 
                                                          
84 Undoubtedly, the written constitution has been used to establish theocracies. As discussed in 
the introductory and subsequent chapters, the written constitution has a secular republican 





cannot be described without the function carried out by the written constitution.   
 By now, this dissertation has established a few conclusions about some of the 
transnational and transcultural performances of the written constitution. Indeed, the written 
constitution embodies and exerts certain ideological conditions irrespective of the exact location 
of its use. However, the exploration of the motives, historical contexts, and textual 
experimentations in the three contexts suggested that users also use the genre creatively to fulfill 
their specific contextual needs.  For instance, the main genre function of the written for the 
framers of the U.S. Constitution was the externalization of republicanism: the genre served them 
as a conduit to move from what I termed ‘subjective republicanism’ to a version of codified and 
written republicanism that can be objectified, discussed, and even amended. The main function 
of the Cherokee adoption of the 1827 written constitution was its ability to be a part of the larger 
politics of identification that the nation was launching during that time. From the perspective of 
the contemporary Cherokee elites, their adoption of the constitution would demonstrate the 
unfurling of the Cherokee progress as anticipated in the federal program of Indian Civilization. 
They thought that the mimicry would gain them an existential independence and sovereignty, a 
respect deemed for a foreign nation as promised in the U.S. Constitution. The chapter on Nepal’s 
constitutional history demonstrated how conflicting and uncompromising visions of 
constitutional authorship pushed the country through a difficult transition period of seven 
decades. The chapter highlighted how the notion of constitutional authorship—something 
historically produced and procedurally crafted by using relevant genre conventions—could be 
contentious producing different narratives to justify different political interests.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
govern its destiny. Thus, the genre’s core ideology is anti-theocratic in spirit. But the fact that the 
modern global community expects a nation-state to have a written constitution forces even 





 This analysis of the constitutions of the United States, Cherokee Nation and Nepal leads 
us to the challenge at the crux of the written constitution as a genre faced by both the framers in 
eighteenth-century America and twenty-first-century appropriators in Nepal: the impossibility of 
creating a perfect governing system while simultaneously materializing all citizens’ positive 
sovereignty. The challenge emanates from the twin aspirations of the constitutional genre: On the 
one hand the written constitution has evolved into an idealistic space to state lofty principles of 
equality, freedom and dignity of all people. As the main political genre of modernity, it promises 
to be a major vehicle of fulfilling the Enlightenment ideals. On the other hand, a written 
constitution as a governing document needs to craft a procedure to create a mandate for a handful 
of people to govern a country. In a sense, it must be both an idealistic aesthetic promise as well a 
technical governing tool—a poem as well as a users’ manual. This gap may not be apparent to 
the people living in a country with a long-held constitution such as the United States. In such 
context, the rule of the political game has largely been already set, and thus players think more of 
gaining the maximum leverage within the established rules rather than thinking of the rules 
themselves. But the rift comes thunderously alive in the context where participants of the genre 
are trying to mold it for their own situation.  For instance, participating in the debate regarding 
the content of the preamble of the 2015 Nepali Constitution, some operation-minded politicians 
such as Ram Saran Mahat argued that constitution or its preamble should not include political 
history or even principles of governance. From an operationalist perspective, a constitution 
should be a bare governing document like a set of rules for a game. But many others thought of 
the purpose differently. They contended that the 2015 constitution itself was a historical 
achievement, a glory to be celebrated. Thus, they argued, it should document the glorious history 





had fought hard. As the 2015 preamble stands now, it refuses to be a mere governing document 
as it includes the national history from the winners/drafters at that moment as well as the ideals 
of the new republic.           
 While the conflicting forces of idealism and practicality engrained in the genre of 
constitution are not necessarily antithetical attributes in themselves, the gap between them not 
only disfigures the principles on which a constitution is built but also often makes the document 
defunct. The 1990 Nepali constitution is its perfect example. Widely claimed to be the model 
constitution of balance and democracy, the 1990 constitution presented equality, democratic 
participation and the rule of the people as its major principles. These principles opened space for 
free discussion of ideas, including the voices of many marginalized communities and the need to 
fulfill the constitutional promise of equal participation in practice. But the rigid amendment 
provision as discussed earlier made it impossible for the document to transform its principles into 
a governing mechanism—ultimately making itself obsolete in the new context.   
 As the 1781 Articles of Confederation demonstrated in the U.S., letting the local 
governments remain sovereign was an idealistic expression of republicanism in principle, but the 
Articles failed as a governing document because they did not possess the procedure to create a 
governing mandate for the national government. Aware and worried that republican form of 
government could turn into a majoritarian tyranny because of the principles’ translation into 
governing procedure, American framers instituted the bills of rights to ensure the protection of 
minority. Certainly, the bill of rights squelched some opposition to the Constitution in the early 
national period, but as the rest of history shows, the practice carried out in the name of the 
Constitution has remained far from perfect from the perspective of republicanism itself. “For a 





Constitution—have come to represent this perpetual imperfection and the hope.    
 Despite the imperfections, the success of democratic processes of the United States and 
other western countries, particularly their ability to hand over power periodically from one 
government to the next peacefully and to expand democratic rights to marginalized groups 
through constitutional reinterpretation or amendment, has established a level of normalcy for 
majoritarian democratic process in the world.85 The majoritarian rule through periodic election, a 
system of check and balances among the branches of government, and the fundamental rights 
against the government’s encroachment into individual private life have established a functional 
system that somehow balances the idealistic goals associated to individual sovereignty and the 
pragmatic need of having to craft a governing mandate.     
 When Nepali revolutionaries fought for a people-written constitution for at least seven 
decades, they were guided by the idealistic aspirations embodied in the written constitution. But 
the 1990 Constitution and the early opposition to the 2015 Constitution revealed that normalcy 
created around the genre of constitution by modernity—particularly by the practices of the 
United States and many other western democracies—had become insufficient to postmodern 
aspirations. As explained earlier, the 1990 constitution failed despite being described as a model 
democratic constitution because of its compromised constitutional authorship and the limited 
sovereignty of the people because of conditional amendment provisions. Even the promulgation 
of the 2015 Constitution—supported by an overwhelming two thirds majority of the Constituent 
Assembly (507 of 598 members)—did not garner the kind of celebration deserved by the 
historical struggle for this moment: the definition of sovereignty, authorship, and democracy had 
                                                          
85 Certainly, periodic election does not always generate democratically inclusive results. The rise 
of Hitler for instance is an example of how majoritarian rule can turn into an ugly campaign of 
minority genocide. The event confirmed Madison’s fear expressed during the Constitutional 





lost its legitimacy in the postmodern political landscape. The abstract “we the people” crafted 
through majoritarian electoral process for creating a functional document has itself become 
inadequate. In such inadequacy, the ancient republican spirit of liberty has revived, where every 
individual would exercise his or her free-will instead of agreeing to a procedure that 
automatically assumes the subsuming of his or her self in the abstract “we the people” without 


















Chapter 6: Epilogue: A Short Meditation on the Pedagogical Implications of this Study  
 While I narrated some of the context-specific functions of the written constitution from 
earlier chapters, the rest of the epilogue is a meditation on the pedagogical implication of my 
study reported in this dissertation. My overarching question for this purpose is this: What does 
the Written Constitution as a Genre Teach Us about the Teaching of Writing? Genre theorists 
such as Bazerman, Miller, Swale, Devitt, and Bawarshi have widely commented and established 
the significance of rhetorical genre studies to the teaching of writing. Indeed, the whole 
discussion of the genre studies in this dissertation has some relevance to the teaching of writing.  
The discussions on how genre functions differ from one context to the next ask writing teachers 
to be sensitive to the structure, ideology, and purpose of the genre. One interesting insight from 
this study suggests that people can use a genre for the unexpected purpose: who would have 
thought at the Philadelphia Convention that the Cherokees Nation would draft the American-
styled constitution to claim its independence within the next few decades? Or, who would have 
anticipated that a republican-inspired genre was going to be used to justify monarchy in Nepal? 
What this suggests is that while a genre-focused assignment in a writing class may have specific 
learning outcomes designed by the instructor, students may use the genre for other purposes 
besides meeting the objectives set for the assignment. What they gain from the genre depends on 
students’ disciplinary background, future aspirations, and other hosts of reasons. Knowing that 
aspect of teaching writing which an instructor cannot fully control sheds new lights on the 
impact of teaching.           
 While much can be discussed about the implication of genre studies, for delimitation, I 
use the idea of the threshold concept, pondering what the process of the writing of the 





teaching of writing. Rhetoric and composition scholar Kathleen Blake Yancey argues that the 
threshold concepts of composition studies serve as the “articulation of shared beliefs providing 
multiple ways of helping us name what we know and how we can use what we know in the 
service of writing” (xix). As Yancey and the contributors in Linda Adler-Kassner and Elizabeth 
Wardle’s edited collection, Naming What We Know: Threshold Concepts of Writing Studies, 
state threshold concepts are more about the articulations of ideas that we already know than 
about proposing anything completely new. So, what I’m going to write about is not something 
new, but an articulation explained using the cases discussed in this dissertation.   
 Following their lead, here is a new threshold concept of writing as manifested by the 
three major cases of transnational, transcultural contexts of constitution writing: a high-stake 
collaborative writing is complex and contested in nature—not always a friendly and smooth 
process as the adjective “collaborative” in the expression may connote. By “high stake 
collaborative writing,” I am refereeing to those public, professional and personal kinds of writing 
projects that are transformative of people’s lives in effect. Some examples of high stake writings 
are constitutions, laws, and policy papers; these kinds of writing are highly performative in the 
sense that their enforcement holds the possibility to bring out dramatic changes in the socio-
political conditions and power distributions in their historical contexts. In a high-stakes writing, 
collaborators bring in conflicting ideologies, identities and interests in the writing process, and 
they also perceive that the outcome of the writing project would significantly impact them, 
forcing them to maneuver the writing toward their interest and ideology, a condition that may 
compromise the logical progression of the writing process in the absence of a pre-writing 
agreement regarding how they would follow the process for the project’s completion.   





writing that I examined in this dissertation, conflict surrounded the writing process. For instance, 
in the United States in the 1780s, it was hard enough for the participants of the Philadelphia 
Constitutional Convention to come up with an agreed upon document, and the ratification 
process that followed the drafting of the Constitution was not less contentious. While the general 
Enlightenment philosophical platform provided the participants a system for exchanging ideas 
meaningfully in the convention, both the ideological and pragmatic differences among them 
made the Constitution writing process a heated business in the summer of 1787. Adopting a 
western-styled written constitution was not an effortless process for the Cherokee Nation in 1827 
as well. The introduction of the written constitution would transform the Cherokee culture 
dramatically. With the constitution, the power would be centralized, and many local chiefs would 
lose their traditional clout. Now, the power would be delegated to an abstract procedure-based 
abstract system. As the historians—discussed in the chapter three—have highlighted, the 
adoption was a painful realization for many of the framers themselves, and the reformist elites 
needed much rhetorical maneuvering to convince the traditionalists that the espousal of the 
foreign genre was worth the trying in their existentially challenging context. The internecine 
bloodshed that followed in the next decade cannot be dissociated from the 1827 constitution. The 
bloodshed suggests the intensity of the conflict and the cost of the compromise generated 
through the collaborative writing.         
 Indeed, the need of having to come up with a common governing document in the cases 
of constitution writing projects like the ones explored in this study also suggests an almost 
unavoidability of some degree of symbolic violence. In these contexts, participants have deep 
ideological differences, and they put substantial effort to make their position a winner in the final 





requires all participants to comply with the outcome even when they disagree with the spirit of 
the document. Whether someone cast his vote in favor of the ratification of the Constitution in 
1789 or not, he is bound under the jurisdiction of the Constitution. Indeed, the framers tried to be 
inclusive—requiring a two-thirds supermajority of states for the ratification.86 The provision of 
two-third majority itself, however, was proposed knowing that total consensus among all the 
states was an impossible proposition. And, as discussed in the second chapter, the Constitution 
certainly included rights for the minority to ensure that opponents’ honorable existence. But, 
despite these efforts to address the discontent, symbolic violence ensues from the structural need 
for a country to have a common document for the governance. Indeed, in some way, this 
structural need compromises with the sanctity of individual sovereignty valued deeply by a 
strand of classical republicanism—something that resonates with a version of contemporary 
libertarianism.             
 The discussion of symbolic violence here is not aimed at questioning the procedural 
nature of crafting governing mandate—either to pass a law or elect a public office holder—in the 
genre convention of the written constitution. Numbers, majority, and votes matter in modern 
politics. In the absence of better alternative, thinking of shared governance requires the quest of a 
common law, and the devising of the common law itself requires some sacrifice of differences. 
Reaching a common ground demands a pruning of some divergences. While the events of the 
post-1990s questioned his claim, this structural need for the governance makes Francis 
Fukuyama’s the end of history thesis attractive. He argued that that liberal western democracy—
as articulated in the U.S. Constitution—has won the ideological battle with communism and that 
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no further development in the idea of governing system can be expected in the future.87 The 
history of political ideas has come to an end.88 My aim to highlight this aspect was to foreground 
the complexity involved in high-stake collaborative writing.     
 This threshold concept that collaborative writing is a complex and contested process rests 
on other threshold concepts of writing studies. Victor Villanueva writes, “writing provides a 
representation of ideologies and identities” (57).  Articulating another threshold concept of 
composition studies, Andrea A. Lunsford writes, “writing is informed by prior experiences” (54).  
Heidi Estrem states, “disciplinary and professional identities are constructed through writing” 
(55). Charles Bazerman and Howard Tinberg go even further and argue that, “writing is an 
expression of embodied cognition” (74). Placing these concepts together in the context of 
collaborative writing, it can be said that writers bring in different embodied cognitions, 
ideologies and identities. While the need of coexistence may have forced them to collaborate, 
often the collaboration of people with different interests and ideologies is charged with conflict. 
Such collaboration demands us to critically examine how the process of collaboration goes, who 
get to assert their agency in the process, how they negotiate what they are going to write, and 
how they manage their differences. Thinking collaboration by considering these factors has the 
                                                          
87 My answer to Fukuyama: given what genres we have now for political operations, your 
hypothesis is correct. But it makes me hopeful that we have realized that the problem—
particularly of symbolic violence—exists, and that new genre can be developed, or that the 
Constitution itself is open for a new form of governance acceptable to a larger majority. Studying 
genres, their histories, and the possibilities of genre uptake indicates that the existence of huge 
structural impasse should not lead us to declare the end of the history itself. Indeed, the history 
does not have to be linear, monodirectional or progressive. While we can be celebrating it in 
many ways, the last century was also a testament of the human capacity for ruin, destruction, and 
violence. But that testament or the structural impasse seen against the odds for the further 
‘republican’ progress in the western liberal democracy, for now, itself does not question the 
possibility of the genesis of a new genre. Which directions the history goes cannot be 
prognosticated, but not the end of the history of ideas itself.   





capacity to transform the way we approach collaborative writing.     
 One way to understand the complexity of collaborative writing is to distinguish between 
labor-intensive and ideological collaborations. In labor-intensive collaboration, writers work 
together to get a thing done. Not much philosophical differences exist among them. The 
collaboration takes place either because of the size of the task or the need of the different 
expertise from the collaborators. The collaborators in this context try to solve a technical 
problem: they may disagree on how to complete a task or solve a technical problem, but the 
disagreement does not involve much philosophical substance. In ideological collaboration, a 
problem certainly exists, but it’s more of legislative, social or of political kind. This kind of 
collaboration may not have a big bulk of writing task itself, but a difficult exchange of public 
rhetoric. Collaborators bring in their deeply held beliefs, arguments to support the beliefs, and 
interests behind those beliefs. Often, collaborators must be sensitive to the constituent that they 
represent. So, ideological collaboration is an exercise in public rhetoric, and thus charged with 
complexity and conflict. While the two categories are not completely separable in practice, 
having the categories and knowing differences between them positions teachers to approach 
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